Statement by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to the IAEA Board of Governors (Excerpts)

March 6, 2006

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

The items on our meeting agenda relate to nuclear technology, safety and verification - all three of the Agency's areas of activity. I will discuss a few issues related to each area.

. . .

Nuclear Verification

Status of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

Nuclear non-proliferation continues to face a number of challenges. In this regard, I should mention the continuing failure of some countries to fulfil their legal obligations to conclude and bring into force safeguards agreements. I should note also the slow progress on the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols. I am, however, pleased to report, since the last regular meeting of the Board, the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements with Turkmenistan and Uganda, and additional protocols with Estonia, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Uganda and Ukraine. The Board also has before it a comprehensive safeguards agreement, with a modified Small Quantities Protocol, and an additional protocol for the Central African Republic.

Despite these welcome developments, there remain 34 States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that have not yet fulfilled their Article III obligation to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, and 118 States that do not have additional protocols in force.

I would point out that, since the last regular Board meeting, the Agency has written to all States with Small Quantities Protocols (SQP), proposing to amend those protocols as directed by the Board at its September 2005 session.

. . .

Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran is before you. As you are aware, the Agency over the last three years has been conducting intensive investigations of Iran´s nuclear programme with a view to providing assurances about the peaceful nature of that programme.

During these investigations, the Agency has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Regrettably, however, after three years of intensive verification, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature of Iran´s nuclear programme. As I mentioned in my report, this is a matter of concern that continues to give rise to questions about the past and current direction of Iran´s nuclear programme.

For confidence to be built in the peaceful nature of Iran´s programme, Iran should do its utmost to provide maximum transparency and build confidence. Only through clarification of all questions relevant to Iran´s past programme and through confidence building measures can confidence about Iran´s current nuclear activities be restored. This is clearly in the interest both of Iran and of the international community.

. . .