Mentioned Suspect Entities & Suppliers:
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Tehran Research Reactor
I wish to bring the Board up to date on the current situation concerning Iran's request to the Agency to facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.
The Board will recall that my predecessor, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, proposed a draft agreement last October under which Iranian low enriched uranium would be shipped for further enrichment in Russia and processing into fuel in France. The proposed agreement was accepted at that time by the United States, Russia and France.
I received a letter from Iran dated 24 May, in which Iran officially declared its agreement with the Joint Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Iran, Brazil and Turkey which was signed on 17 May in Tehran. At Iran's request, the Agency immediately conveyed IranÂ´s letter to the Governments of France, the Russian Federation and the United States, and asked for their views. I am now awaiting their responses, and will continue to consult with all concerned parties on this matter.
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Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran
You have before you my report on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
The necessary cooperation includes, among other things, implementation of relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, implementation of the Additional Protocol and of modified Code 3.1, as well as clarification of issues related to possible military dimensions to IranÂ´s nuclear programme.
Key developments since the March Board include Iran's continued enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and Iran's announcement of its intention to install a second cascade for this purpose and connect it to the first one. This necessitated a new safeguards approach, which is now being implemented with IranÂ´s cooperation.
As the Report makes clear, Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. I also need to mention that Iran is a special case because, among other things, of the existence of issues related to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. I request Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including its Additional Protocol.
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