SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.com/)

DATE:

03/01/04

TEXT:

(Note: The following was translated from Hebrew)

AMOS GILAD:

Good afternoon,

I had the honor of standing at the head of the intelligence evaluation in '96, and looking back a bit this is an opportunity because this platform has served on several occasions to convey things in a public forum.

Ever since '96 there arose a debate with regard to what is the major threat against Israel. I was of the opinion then and think now as well, that there are two central focal points that constitute threats - the first is the Palestinian challenge about which there is no longer a debate and I shall not speak of this today, and the second is the Iranian threat. A dispute emerged, the prevailing opinion held by many significant parties and which was deeply entrenched and extensively held, in the opinion that Iran would either not yet be able to develop a strategic threat against Israel or that internal changes would apply which, by 2005 in contrast to the evaluation of alternatives [--inaudible--]

--people would dance in the streets of Tehran on the ruins of the collapsed regime of the Mullahs. The day of remembrance for this theory will be, I think, this week when the current elections will consolidate the regime. Today as well, I am of the opinion that the current Iranian regime poses one of the central threats against Israel. The recommendation at the time was to focus on removing this threat. Why? Because it involves a combination that is very grave from the Israeli standpoint, of an extremist regime, which has posed for itself the aim, and actually means to accomplish the removal of Israel from the map. They mean to do this in a twofold manner. In fact there is hardly any other such regime in existence, besides the Hezbollah offshoot, which belongs to the same alignment. They say this and they mean it. For this aim they are developing two strategies. An immediate capacity is terrorism.

To make this clearer, the terror campaign waged by the Iranians, whether through the Hezbollah or by supporting the Hamas or the Islamic Jihad or indirect support of Palestinian terror organizations or groups that promote terrorism, which, in total, constitute a strategic threat. By strategic threat I mean that if they succeed in realizing the entire range of terrorism, the infrastructure they had planned to erect here would have made it very difficult to live here - the fact that it is still possible to live here comfortably is exclusively the result today of our successes in the operational and intelligence spheres. The challenge is to understand the real capacities and the cumulative operational intentions of the Iranian regime. This was the focus of a debate that has exhausted us for a long time.

In retrospect, the current picture is as follows: this regime is dangerous for Israel, besides terrorism it is developing nuclear arms, first and foremost in order to break the equation which is very problematic for forces that are hostile towards Israel, according to which Israel is perceived, either correctly or not, as the only country in the region that has a nuclear capacity. The image, according to which Israel is perceived as having nuclear arms, is one of the most stabilizing factors for Israel's status. In jest, I would say that the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the other images with regard to our immense powers should be disseminated and funded from the national budget [laughter] because sometimes I am stupefied at the rate of paralysis these images give rise to and the impact on the conceptions of the enemy and their evaluations whether they are capable of breaking us, attacking us, harming us extensively and comprehensively. The conclusions of a country such as Iran are that it is necessary to break this image and to attain a nuclear capacity. I belong to those who think that their chief motive for achieving such a capacity has to do with Israel.

There were some who claimed that their main motive was the Iraqi threat against them but we see that although Iraq has now disappeared, there is not even a slight change in the Iranian desire to attain nuclear arms. This is the proof for those who claimed otherwise and passionately supported the hypothesis as against the "crazy extremists" who portray the Iranian threat. The main idea, beyond the fact that such a perception is liable to be harmful is that it is possible to tie Israel's hands. The Iranian Minister of Defense said so in the past [--inaudible--] I regret that he [the Iranian Foreign Minister] has been silent for several years but it was worthwhile to listen to him at the time.

The main idea is that it is possible to tie Israel's hands. Suppose Israel wants to react against some act of terrorism immediately they come up with the image, saying here we also have nuclear arms that can neutralize the ultimate capacity attributed to you. This changes the entire psychological picture, it strengthens extremist parties, it strengthens the Hezbollah, it provides protection and sponsorship to all the extremist parties. Therefore, such a threat in the hands of a country like Iran is impossible from the Israeli standpoint. Secondly, right away it opens up an arms race.

The fact is that Libya could have been another such country and if Libya and Iran would have possessed nuclear arms, other countries would have joined them and we already have indications with regard to others. The point of origin for this issue is that Iran has suspended its nuclear program, in the wake of an unprecedented success of the Western intelligence services, and in all modesty I can tell you that this includes our own intelligence services, it was appalled at the strength of the exposure and its depth. This was an extraordinary success in revealing the capacities and the real nature and intentions of the Iranian regime vis-à-vis those who stubbornly refused, in my opinion, to understand the true nature of Iran. But the key word here is 'suspended' rather than 'curtailed'.

This is not similar to the Libyan case. Iran is resolutely determined, despite the collapse of Iraq, to develop nuclear arms. They are currently in a stage of shock, and attempting to learn the lessons of this, and trying to consolidate a future course. This is a national objective in order to develop nuclear arms.

A second development, this regime, despite the fact that I am not in possession of professional tools to measure this; the Iranian regime is hated by a majority of the population. This is not a professional determination because it doesn't rest on professional instruments, but it's a sense [--inaudible--]

This regime is determined to remove the reformists and progressives in the image of young people who support change, etc. Beginning with the 20th of February, a very important date, conceivably there will be a tough Parliament, a tough government, a tough regime, one thing that is clear is that is determined to develop nuclear arms.

The point of origin of this lecture, in contrast to the lecture of a few months ago, the important achievement, the important development is that we have received a new lease of time, Israel has won time, we have received extra time first of all to address the immediate threat of Palestinian terrorism, as well as to analyze what we did, the good things and the things that were not quite so good vis-à-vis Iran, and to see where we are going from here. The original evaluation was that Iran would attain nuclear arms or a nuclear capacity by 2005, but this timetable now seems not to be accurate, as a result of the unexpected developments of international pressure exerted mainly by the Europeans and with the support of the Americans. In other words, we have won extra time, there is no Libyan nuclear threat, and at the moment there is no Iranian nuclear threat. This is a dramatic strategic development. 2004 and 2005 look much better than our forecasts predicted, which means we've bought ourselves some time, there is no Libyan nuclear threat, there is no Iranian nuclear threat at the moment, that's a dramatic strategic development, 2004-2005 seems much better than it should have been according to the estimates, had they become real, in the absence of treatment or response to the Iranian threat. In simple words, the decrease in the Iranian threat and the Libyan threat buy Israel some time at the moment. But Iran's determination to achieve nuclear weapons, accompanied by a regime that might become more extreme, is definitely the main threat.

Now, what can be done? During the suspension of the Iranian nuclear threat, some Iranian weaknesses were revealed. The main thing is that Iran, except for its burning hatred towards Israel, with everything related to other work areas, seems to have a flexibility that results from the pressure that's put on it. Iran is sensitive to economic and international pressure. The proof - there is no more activity of the Iranian intelligence on European grounds. That's a fact, and they've stopped as a result of pressure. The European pressure brought to a suspension. Surprisingly enough, nobody predicted this success, don't let them tell you otherwise. They might tell, but that's not the truth.

Therefore, international pressure is, at the moment, the preferred way of action. What may interrupt the international pressure is a deep and wide conflict of interests, between Iran and, even a country like the United States. They arrest their own people, though these are questionable arrests, they don't disturb the United States in Iran right now, they don't disturb in the Persian Gulf. They are also moderate with countries like Saudi Arabia, except for occasional terrorist attacks, they provide some stability. They know how to maneuver, and therefore, if you ask various foreign ministries, there are a lot of important foreign ministries, which see many benefits. But next to the great benefits, here you can have a dialogue, and get the existing influence instruments into action, by locating weak points, as I've mentioned.

An additional long-term break, I believe this regime. There are regimes like in history, in the past, that for a substantial, long term increase in the security, must vanish. That's easy to say, and hard to act, and we'll see an immediate way of action. But Iran has its weak points. There is a huge amount of Azeris who suffer from that, the youth, which are 70% - after all, how many voted for Nasrallah... I'm saying Nasrallah, Khatami at the time? 70% of the population, when he gave them democracy. 70% didn't support Khatami because they were thrilled with his personality, but it is a means of protest, to express their revulsion of the regime. Again, I suspect, estimate, that there is a very wide revulsion. I have many signs, though no solid proof, for a wide revulsion of the Iranian public.

They are missing a project executioner, it is important to fit in a very wide project that will eventually bring to the elimination of this regime, and to making the revulsion into a different reality. In brackets I'll say, it's improbable that Israel can hardly broadcast one hour in Persian, because of budget, supposedly. I recommend that Israel restrain itself, and stay off the front of the struggle against Iran. At the moment Israel stands at the front, it becomes an ideological struggle, with everything related to that, and the Palestinian aspect, and the right to exist and so on. It will also release the world from carrying the responsibility. It seems that unlike talking, such international pressure has some value occasionally. I suggest that for now, we should try and keep the international cooperation, try and fit into a general struggle, to lower the profile of our activity - especially we can do that when we have the achievement, though achieved by other, of the suspension of the program, in contrast to the determination to keep it going. Therefore I suggest we won't give a lot of declarations, cease the threats completely - the Israeli nature of threatening has one fault - any kind of threat, I've learned from my experience, which you use verbally, usually becomes immunity to that threat. Why? For two reasons:

First, the one who threatens, usually he just says that and not... there's nothing behind that. Second, the other side takes us seriously. When it takes us seriously it prepares for the possibility, and then when you want to take your threat into action, you can do it. So, don't threaten. If you have to bring to the public attention anywhere the size of this threat, you must be aware of how the weaknesses, the flexibilities and the field of action, fit into the international struggle, but not stand at the front.

I think another thing - we must cause the weakening of Hezbollah. Render it useless. The terrorism, the threat of terrorism created by Hezbollah - I don't have the time to speak of that now, because I'd like to conclude in a few minutes - but this is in fact, Lebanon is the only arena in which the revolution export succeeded. The revolution export - that's very important - has failed. In Jordan, the Jordanians eliminated every attempt at undermining, made by the Iranians' and Hezbollah's terrorism. I have no other word but eliminated. In Egypt the Iranian terrorism has failed. All the tales and the talks of the renewal of Iran-Egypt relations didn't succeed from the simple reason that the Egyptians still look with an evil eye, negatively, at the Iranians, but after all, if you look at the Middle East, they've failed.

They still haven't spoken in Iraq - that's what I'll say in the next convention - if they do act in Iraq it might change that image, but as for the moment, they've failed. It's very important to go on and stabilize this aim, and it's very important that this will be expressed in Lebanon.

In conclusion I'd like to say that - I recommend to you -

One, this is the main threat to Israel, the base of the nuclear weapons, the hatred towards Israel. This doesn't mean they'll drop the bomb now, Israel has a deterring image. The theories that Iraq is the main factor fade, in my opinion, in the current reality. Iraq is more exposed to international pressure. There is a maximum dependence on the intelligence, which is excellent, and played into our hands until now. It is very important to fit into the international struggle - not to stand at the front of the struggle, that's unnecessary at the moment. Most important, we've gained some time, the Middle East is still free of nuclear weapons at the hands of those hostile to the existence of the country.

There were some developments, and we must use them. We have a historic opportunity to properly maneuver towards the next round.

And last word - still I'd like to tell you that in my opinion, a dramatic gain has happened in Israel's position in a few aspects: there is no hostile coalition towards Israel, there is no nuclear threat towards Israel, Syria wouldn't dare to start a war, because it feels isolated - when Bashar Assad looks to the north, he sees his hated Turks, when he looks towards the east, even the Americans cover the Arabs there, in the south the unfriendly Jordanians, and in the west he's left with the Israelis. And even when looking in the Syrian country, he can't see supporters.

Therefore, Syria is isolated, the peace with Egypt and Jordan exists, and in fact, the main challenge we have today is the Palestinian terrorism, which stems from two sources I won't get into, and the nuclear threat must be prevented, since such a threat might shuffle the cards. And we've received some kind of extension, which allows us to cope with it, and we have today more tools than we thought, some of them weren't considered automatic, acceptable tools, these are not operational tools. This is a complicated problem, but the variety of existing tools, which require political, strategic and international abilities, locating weaknesses and points of strength, all these are a wide variety, a wide selection of tools, which are compelled... compel you to use them wisely, with a lot of self-restraint, towards the next step, which probably wouldn't arrive, as long as this regime exists.

Thank you.

(Applause)