I requested that this meeting of the Board of Governors be convened to consider the implications for the Agency of UN Security Council resolution 2231.
My report on Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 outlines the Council’s request for the Agency to undertake verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
As you know, the JCPOA was agreed by the E3/EU+3 and Iran on July 14th. Subject to the approval of the Board, we are ready to undertake the necessary work.
As a result of the JCPOA, Iran will implement the additional protocol. I welcome this development. The additional protocol is a powerful verification tool and I have been calling for Iran to implement it since I took office nearly six years ago.
The additional protocol will be implemented in Iran as it is in around 120 other countries which have already brought it into force. Once the additional protocol is implemented, we will have greater access to information and to sites in Iran.
The Board will recall that, when a country starts to implement the additional protocol, it has to present detailed and extensive information about its nuclear fuel-cycle related activities to the Agency. We then seek to verify the correctness and completeness of that information, which must be updated regularly.
Under the JCPOA, Iran has agreed to implement extra nuclear-related commitments, which are known as transparency measures. These include enhanced access for Agency inspectors to uranium mines and mills, and continuous surveillance of centrifuge manufacturing and storage locations.
These measures go beyond the scope of Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol and will help the Agency to have a better understanding of Iran’s nuclear programme.
A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the JCPOA. This is a mechanism of the countries concerned.
The Security Council requested that the Agency and the Joint Commission should “consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA.” We are ready to do this if authorised by the Board.
The Agency will require additional resources to implement the activities described in my report to the Board. We estimate that implementation of the JCPOA will involve expenditure by the Agency totalling 9.2 million euros per year.
Some 3.0 million euros will go towards provisional implementation of the additional protocol. Verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA are expected to cost 6.2 million euros, which includes the costs related to our inspectors.
My proposal on Modifications to The Agency's Programme and Budget 2016–2017 relates to programmatic adjustments and changes in the amount of unfunded activities for 2016, as described in the document.
I am not proposing any changes to the Regular Budget for 2016, which the Board has recommended for approval to the General Conference, or to the appropriations for each Major Programme, or to Member States’ assessed contributions for that year. This means that we will need to meet all additional costs until the end of 2016 through extra-budgetary contributions.
For 2017 and beyond, I will start to consult with Member States on the implications for the Regular Budget during preparation of the budget update for 2017.
The Agency has immediate funding needs related to the continuing costs of implementing monitoring and verification under the existing Joint Plan of Action. These total 800,000 euros per month. The extra-budgetary contributions which we have previously received for this purpose will be exhausted by the end of September.
Additional expenditure of 160,000 euros per month will become necessary between the Adoption Day and Implementation Day of the JCPOA, as we carry out preparatory work to facilitate the verification and monitoring.
I express my gratitude to Member States that provided contributions for our work under the JPA. I call on all Member States in a position to do so to contribute towards the financial needs of the Agency related to implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, as well as preparatory and implementation work under the JCPOA.
On July 14th, I signed a Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme with Mr Ali Akbar Salehi, Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.
The purpose of the Road-map is to accelerate and strengthen the cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and Iran with a view to resolving all outstanding issues by the end of 2015. It is part of the Framework for Cooperation agreed between Iran and the IAEA in November 2013.
The arrangements made with Iran are technically sound and consistent with established IAEA safeguards practices. They do not compromise our standards in any way.
As agreed in the Road-map, Iran provided the Agency on August 15th with explanations in writing, and related documents, for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues.
All activities under the Road-map are to be completed by October 15th and I will present my final assessment to the Board by December 15th. As with all my reports, this assessment will be factual and impartial. In the meantime, I will provide regular updates to the Board on implementation of the Road-map.
The Agency has nearly six decades of experience of implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements. We are now doing so in 173 countries. We have been implementing the additional protocol for nearly 20 years.
We have top-class technical experts, high-tech equipment and state-of-the art analytical laboratories.
In short, we have the experience and expertise to conduct the verification and monitoring work set out in the JCPOA. The combination of comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, together with the verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, represents a very robust verification mechanism in Iran.
There is now a historic opportunity to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. I hope that full use will be made of this opportunity.
As stated in the JCPOA, all provisions under the Agreement are a special arrangement and do not set a precedent. From the verification perspective, the implementation of the JCPOA is a clear net gain. I know I can rely on the full support of the Board and I also count on you to make the necessary funding available.
I ask the Board to take note of my report, to authorise me to undertake the verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments, and to interact with the Joint Commission, as set out in my report. I also ask the Board to approve the requested modification to the Agency’s Programme and Budget 2016-2017.
Thank you, Madam Chairperson.