IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (09/12/2022)

September 12, 2022

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Mr Chairperson,

My report on Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 covers relevant activities of the Agency in the past few months. Since 23 February 2021, the Agency’s verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA have been seriously affected by Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of those commitments, including its commitments under the Additional Protocol.

In my report, I have highlighted that, in the event of a full resumption of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, the Agency will need to address the gap in its knowledge of what took place while our surveillance and monitoring equipment was not in operation. To do so, the Agency would need to apply additional safeguards measures and Iran would need to provide comprehensive and accurate records to the Agency. We would also need to determine the comprehensiveness and accuracy of data recorded by our surveillance equipment between 21 February 2021 and 8 June 2022. Even then, considerable challenges would remain in order to confirm the consistency with the situation prior to 21 February 2021 of Iran’s declared inventory of centrifuges and heavy water.

You have received my report entitled NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Unfortunately, since my previous report, despite the Agency’s stated readiness to engage with Iran without delay to resolve these issues, Iran has not engaged with the Agency. Consequently, there have been no developments in this reporting period and none of the outstanding issues have been resolved. Therefore, all of these safeguards issues remain outstanding.

Unless and until Iran provides technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at three undeclared locations in Iran and informs the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment, the Agency will not be able to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Because it has not yet done so, the Agency is not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

The Agency remains ready to re-engage with Iran without delay to resolve these matters.