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You have before you my latest report on Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). As you are aware, the Agency has not been able to perform JCPOA verification and monitoring activities in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate for two and one quarter years, including the period after June 2022 when no surveillance and monitoring equipment related to JCPOA was installed and operating.
The report indicates that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium has risen by over a quarter in three months. This includes its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, which is approaching half a ton, and its stockpile of high enriched uranium – enriched up to 60% U-235 – which is well over 100 kg.
You will find information regarding how we are implementing the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran, as well as implementation of the Joint Statement of 4 March, in my latest report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is also before you.
In that report you will see that the process of implementation of the Joint Statement has started and some progress has been made, but not as much as I had hoped. For example, in early May the Agency installed surveillance cameras at workshops at one location where centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows are manufactured. In addition, in order to monitor the enrichment level of the HEU being produced by Iran at declared facilities, the Agency has for the first time installed an enrichment monitoring device at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant as well as at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz. This will help us detect more rapidly any variations in enrichment levels at these facilities.
But this is a fraction of what we envisaged and what needs to happen now is a sustained and uninterrupted process that leads to all the commitments contained in the Joint Statement being fulfilled without further delay.
Iran has provided a possible explanation for the presence of depleted uranium in one part of the location known as Marivan. I note that our assessment for the location still stands and I reiterate that the remaining outstanding safeguards issues stem from Iran’s obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the Agency and still need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.