Mr Chairperson,

I have recently returned from Tehran where last week I met with President of the Islamic Republic of Iran H.E. Mr Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister H.E. Mr Abbas Araghchi, and Vice‑President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) H.E. Mr Mohammad Eslami, and other senior Iranian officials. In addition to the meetings, I travelled to the nuclear sites of Fordow and Natanz where I visited the enrichment plants that are under Agency safeguards and regular inspections, and other enrichment-related installations. I will describe the results of the trip later in my statement.

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Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Following my last report, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20% and up to 60% U-235 continued to increase.

However, during the high-level meetings between the Agency and Iran in Tehran on 14 November 2024, the possibility of Iran not further expanding its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 was discussed, including technical verification measures necessary for the Agency to confirm this, if implemented. On 16 November 2024, the Agency verified at Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and at Fuel Enrichment Plant that Iran had begun implementation of preparatory measures aimed at stopping the increase of its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. Exchanges between the Agency and Iran on this matter are expected to continue.

It has been almost three years and nine months since Iran stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including provisionally applying its Additional Protocol and therefore it is also over three and a half years since the Agency was able to conduct complementary access in Iran. Consequently, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.

You also have before you my report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran says it has declared all nuclear material, activities and locations required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. However, this statement is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations in Iran. The Agency needs to know the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment involved. Iran still is not implementing modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation for Iran, having stated it had suspended such implementation. These outstanding safeguards issues stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be able to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

During my high-level meetings in Tehran, substantive discussions of the issues covered by the Joint Statement agreed in March 2023 continued, including in particular on the issue related to the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance and possible elements to address Varamin.

During our meeting, Iran agreed to respond to the Agency’s concerns related to Iran’s withdrawal of the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors by considering the acceptance of the designation of four additional experienced inspectors, a decision I welcome.

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