Mr Chairperson,

Just a few weeks ago I was at the United Nations in New York, marking its 80th anniversary and delivering to the UN General Assembly our annual report. 

Among discussions about the UN system and its relevance today, it was absolutely clear that the IAEA stands out as crucial to peace and security and that it delivers on the world’s priorities, from non-proliferation to economic development.

IAEA inspectors are back in the Islamic Republic of Iran and have carried out inspections and design information verifications at many of the facilities unaffected by June’s military attacks. But more engagement is needed to restore full inspections, including at the affected sites, so that Iran fulfils its obligations under its NPT Agreement. I am in regular contact with Tehran and urge Iran to facilitate Agency access at its affected facilities and especially of its inventories of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and High Enriched Uranium (HEU), whose status needs urgently to be addressed. I will return to the subject in more detail later in my statement.

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You have before you my quarterly report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On 9 September 2025, I signed an agreement with Foreign Minister Araghchi in Cairo that provides an understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation in Iran, in the aftermath of the military attacks in June. 

Since then, Iran has facilitated access to the Agency for inspections and design information verification, with advanced notice, at almost all the unaffected facilities in Tehran. This is welcome. 

The Agency has yet to receive from Iran a report for the affected facilities and associated nuclear material which, in line with its obligations under the safeguards agreement, needs to be provided without delay. To date, the Agency has not conducted verification activities at any of the nuclear facilities in Iran affected by the military attacks.

Though I note Iran’s cooperation on inspections at a number of facilities, further constructive engagement is needed.  I urge Iran to facilitate the full and effective implementation of safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and I reiterate my disposition to work with Iran on this matter. 

As I have already said, the establishment of the current status of Iran’s inventories of LEU and HEU needs to be addressed urgently. The Agency’s 5-month-long lack of access to this nuclear material in Iran means the material’s verification – according to standard safeguards practice – is long overdue.

It is critical the Agency be able to verify this material as soon as possible.

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