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Mr Chairperson, 

Ukraine is not the only place military conflict is undermining nuclear safety. 

I have briefed the IAEA’s Board and General Conference, and the United Nations Security Council on the threat to nuclear facilities in Iran and in the Gulf area. I have also delineated this conflict’s detrimental effect on the nuclear safeguards regime. 

In my statement to the Board on Friday, I briefed you on the drone strike on 17 May that, with its significant explosive payload, damaged an electrical installation and prompted the need for diesel backup generation at Barakah NPP in the United Arab Emirates. The incident was a serious compromise of nuclear safety and undermined several of the IAEA’s seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. 

Thankfully, radiation levels at the nuclear power plant remained normal and no injuries were reported. 

Understandably, the concern in the region is high. Last week I travelled to the Gulf and met with leaders of Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to discuss nuclear safety and security in the region and the IAEA’s central role and support during this perilous situation. I also went to Barakah NPP where I had the opportunity to interact with the shift that was there and responded effectively and professionally to the emergency, which, it is worth noting, they were trained to do by the IAEA.

The IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre in Vienna is operating 24/7 and Agency nuclear safety and security staff experts are on standby to be deployed to the region to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency. 

Let me make very clear: nuclear safety is fundamental and applicable to all, without exception. There are no double or triple standards here for the IAEA. An attack on any facility, wherever it is located, is unacceptable, a no-go, taboo.

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Mr Chairperson,

You have before you my report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In February 2026, the Agency stopped conducting all in-field verification activities in Iran due to the military conflict. 

Despite the ongoing military conflict, it was possible to resume some in-field verification activity in Iran last week when the Agency conducted a routine inspection at the Bushehr NPP.

No inspections have been conducted at other declared nuclear facilities in Iran during this reporting period. 

It is now almost one year that the Agency has had no access to any of the declared nuclear facilities affected by the military attacks of June 2025, therefore the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge of the previously declared nuclear material at those facilities. This gives rise to a proliferation concern as this nuclear material includes 440 kg of highly enriched uranium, which the Agency has not been able to verify since June 2025.

As stated in the report, this lack of information and access means that the Agency has also been unable to verify the suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water-related activities as required by the relevant Security Council and Board resolutions. 

Consequently, the Agency cannot currently exercise its right and fulfil effectively its obligations under the NPT Safeguards Agreement, except for the Bushehr NPP, and verify the implementation by Iran of the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions. 

During this reporting period, Iran has not engaged the Agency on the unresolved safeguards issues described in my Comprehensive Assessment report of June last year (GOV/2025/25).

I call on Iran to engage the Agency constructively in order to facilitate the full and effective implementation of safeguards in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and implement the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions.

I call on all parties to this conflict to adhere to the seven indispensable pillars to which I have already referred. 

I have already described to you the unacceptably high risk to nuclear safety in the region and the concern of leaders I met when I travelled there last week.

The only sustainable path to peace, stability, and cooperation is one grounded in dialogue.

The long-standing problem and recurrent crises surrounding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme must be resolved through a long-lasting, verifiable diplomatic agreement.

I reiterate my full support of the negotiations underway aimed at finding a mutually acceptable solution to these issues, and I am ready – through the Agency’s verification and monitoring capability – to support an eventual agreement. 

There is a universal expectation that the IAEA has the verification role under any overall diplomatic agreement. Agreements that lack such verification by the Agency do not stand up to scrutiny.

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