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As requested by the Board in its resolution GOV/2025/71 adopted in November last year, I have submitted to the Board a report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As stated in the report, during this reporting period, the Agency has neither received information from Iran regarding the status of its declared nuclear material or facilities nor had access to any of those facilities to conduct in-field verification activities. Therefore, the Agency was unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities under the NPT Safeguards Agreement at declared nuclear facilities in Iran.  

Consequently, we were not able to verify their status for safeguards purposes and the associated nuclear material, and as a result I am also unable to report in relation to the implementation by Iran of relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolutions or the Board’s resolutions of November last year and June this this year.

It is more than a year since the Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of LEU and HEU enriched up to 60% U-235 at the declared nuclear facilities affected by the military attacks of June 2025. 

The Agency’s lack of information about these facilities and associated nuclear material and our inability to conduct verification activities at these facilities is a matter of serious proliferation concern. The situation needs to be rectified with the utmost urgency. 

I call on Iran to engage with the Agency constructively in order to make possible the full and effective implementation of Agency safeguards in Iran and to fulfill its responsibilities under the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

A return to diplomacy and negotiations aimed at finding a solution to issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme is imperative, and the Agency stands ready to support such efforts. The situation regarding Iran’s nuclear programme has implications on the global non-proliferation regime. 

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