Resolution Adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran (GOV/2024/39)

Resolution adopted on 5 June 2024 during the 1723rd session
June 5, 2024

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Related Library Documents: 

The Board of Governors,

(a) Commending the continued professional, independent and impartial efforts of the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat, including its inspectors, to implement Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement,

(b) Emphasizing the essential and independent role of the IAEA in verifying Iran’s compliance with its NPT-required safeguards obligations,

(c) Stressing the importance of Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations and the need for Iran to cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the Agency with a view to clarifying and resolving the long outstanding safeguards issues detailed in the Director General’s report GOV/2024/29 and in several prior reports,

(d) Noting the Director General’s deep concern that undeclared nuclear material had been present at several undeclared locations in Iran and that its current location(s) are not known to the Agency, and his assessment that nuclear material used in Iran was not declared as required under Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement,

(e) Noting Iran’s continued failure to implement modified Code 3.1, contrary to its legal obligations, and failure to provide the Agency with required design and preliminary design information regarding new nuclear facilities,

(f) Noting the Director General’s conclusion that the corrected nuclear material accounting reports provided by Iran regarding the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance at UCF indicates that the amount of uranium contained in the solid waste sent from JHL to UCF for dissolution was less than had been declared by Iran in 2003–2004, and that this new issue requires further consideration by the Agency, 

(g) Recalling that it has been four years since the Board of Governors’ resolution of 19 June 2020 contained in GOV/2020/34 which called upon Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency and to satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay,

(h) Recalling the Board of Governors’ resolution of 8 June 2022 contained in GOV/2022/34 which called upon Iran to act on an urgent basis to fulfil its legal obligations and, without delay, take up the Director General’s offer of further engagement to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues,

(i) Recalling the Board of Governors’ resolution of 17 November 2022 contained in GOV/2022/70 which decided that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran acts to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding issues, take without delay all actions specified in the resolution,

(j) Noting that despite the above resolutions and many opportunities provided by the Director General over a number of years, Iran has neither provided the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at several undeclared locations in Iran nor informed the Agency of the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment, and that in the absence of any technically credible explanations from Iran, the Agency has not changed its assessment of the undeclared nuclear-related activities at these locations nor of the origin of the uranium particles of anthropogenic origin;

(k) Underscoring the Director General’s conclusion that unless and until Iran provides technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations and informs the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or contaminated equipment, the Agency cannot confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement,

(l) Noting with serious concern the Director General’s conclusion that these issues stem from Iran’s obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful,

(m) Noting also the Director General’s assessment that the withdrawal by Iran of the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors was exercised in a manner that directly and severely affects the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran,

(n) Supporting the Director General’s ongoing efforts to obtain progress from Iran on resolving outstanding safeguards issues and improving cooperation with the Agency, including through the implementation of the Joint statement between the IAEA and Iran of 4 March 2023, recalling that both sides recognised that such engagements could pave the way for wider agreements among parties,

(o) Recalling the Director General’s readiness to follow up with the new government of Iran and his call for, and disposition to continue with, the high-level dialogue and ensuing technical exchanges commenced as a result of the meetings with high level officials of the Iranian government in early May, in order to make swift and concrete progress towards addressing all outstanding safeguards issues,

(p) Noting the recent public statements made in Iran during this reporting period regarding its technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and possible changes to Iran’s nuclear doctrine, which only increase the Director General’s concerns about the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations,

1. Strongly supports the Agency’s continued efforts to implement Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, with the aim to provide assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;

2. Calls on Iran to provide sufficient cooperation with the Agency and take the essential and urgent actions as decided by the Board in its November 2022 resolution, to resolve safeguards issues which remain outstanding despite numerous interactions with the Agency since 2019;

3. Calls on Iran to implement without delay the Joint Statement between the IAEA and Iran of 4 March 2023 and in particular their safeguards elements;

4. Calls on Iran to reverse its withdrawal of the designations of several experienced Agency inspectors which is essential to fully allow the Agency to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively;

5. Calls on Iran to implement the modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation for Iran as set out in Article 39 of the Safeguards Agreement and in the Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, and which therefore cannot be modified or suspended unilaterally, including by providing all necessary design and preliminary design information to the Agency;

6. Reaffirms its decision that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the nondiversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding safeguards issues, reiterates its call on Iran to take the following actions without delay:

i. Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran,

ii. Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,

iii. Provide all information, documentation and answers the Agency requires for that purpose,

iv. Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency;

7. Underlines that the provision by Iran of this information and access and the subsequent verification by the IAEA pursuant to Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement is essential for the Secretariat to be in position to report the issues as no longer outstanding and thereby remove the need for the Board’s consideration and action on these issues;

8. Considers that a continued failure by Iran to provide the necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, may necessitate the production, by the Director General, of a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, based on the information available; and

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.