Report of the Panel of Experts on North Korea Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)

March 6, 2014

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile

There have been no signs that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea intends to respond to the Security Council’s calls to abandon its nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes. On the contrary, it is persisting with its arms trade and other prohibited activities in defiance of Security Council resolutions, while activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes continue.

At the present time, the Panel does not see new measures as necessary in order to further slow the prohibited programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to dissuade it from engaging in proliferation activities or to halt its trade in arms and related materiel. Rather, the Panel believes that Member States already have at their disposal adequate tools. 


Possible undetected arms shipment to the Islamic Republic of Iran

108. The Panel recently obtained information indicating that some items found in a large arms consignment (500 tons) shipped by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Syrian Arab Republic in November 2009 may have originated from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This consignment was found by the Israeli Navy inside containers onboard the vessel Francop when en route from Damietta, Egypt, to Lattakia, Syrian Arab Republic. It was considered to be a violation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of resolution 1747 (2007) prohibiting it from exporting any arms or related materiel.

109. Based on photographic evidence recently obtained, the Panel confirmed that:

  • The shape and markings of the rocket fuses found onboard the Francop are similar to fuses seized in August 2009 on board the ANL Australia (see figure XIX) 
  • 122 mm rockets bore markings similar to those of the 240 mm rockets found in the arms shipment seized in Bangkok in December 2009 (see figure XX)
  • The crates of the rocket fuses and 122 mm rockets were mislabelled as “parts of bulldozer” and “equipment for construction”, a standard deceptive practice used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex XXVIII on patterns of sanctions evasion)

110. The Panel therefore concludes that the rockets and fuses were highly likely to have been produced in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. However, because the date of their transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran is unknown, it cannot be established whether they would be in violation of the arms embargo.