The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has continued to defy the international community in a series of actions which have heightened concern about its intentions. It:
- Used ballistic missile technology in a launch on 12 December 2012
- Conducted an underground nuclear test on 12 February 2013
- Declared that it would reactivate the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon The Security Council has reacted to these breaches of its existing resolutions by adopting further measures and strengthening the overall sanctions regime aimed at inhibiting the country’s ability to develop its weapons of mass destruction and missile programmes.
Cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other countries
67. The Panel notes with concern the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation signed between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in September 2012, reportedly in the presence of the VicePresident of the latter and the head of its Atomic Energy Organization, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, who was designated by resolution 1747 (2007) for being involved in the nuclear or ballistic missile activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and of the Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, Ahmad Vahidi. The two countries operate sensitive nuclear programmes relevant for the production of nuclear weapons and have previously collaborated on missile development.
B. Implementation of the arms embargo
70. The Panel has learned of an earlier violation involving a large cargo of rocket fuses and of two recent potential violations involving submarine and aircraft parts. The Panel completed investigations in one of these cases, as well as in previously reported incidents of non-compliance. Other investigations are continuing.
1. Investigations closed during this mandate
Rocket fuses seized in March 2008
71. In June 2012, the Panel obtained information from a Member State about its seizure in March 2008 of two containers of rocket fuses shipped from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in violation of paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006). Because reporting on cargo inspection and seizure became a requirement only upon the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), there was no obligation at the time to report to the Committee.
72. This shipment had originated from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its declared ultimate destination was Bandar Abbas, Islamic Republic of Iran. As usual for containers originating from Nampo port, they were shipped to Dalian, China, where they were trans-shipped on a container ship operated by a major maritime carrier left unaware of their origin from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea owing to changes in documentation.
73. The shipper and consignee were entities named New Hap Heng Investment and Trading Company Limited and Arshia Trading Company. According to the Member State, the former is affiliated with the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, designated by the Committee in April 2009 for its involvement in arms and ballistic missile-related transfers. The latter is affiliated with the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group, designated by the Security Council under resolution 1737 (2006) for its involvement in the ballistic missile programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
74. This shipment, declared as “generator parts”, contained 5,000 point detonating fuses for unguided rockets and related materiel, such as setting devices and cables to connect the firing mechanism (see figure XVI). These fuses are identical to fuses found in the arms shipment seized in Bangkok in December 2009 (see paras. 75-79). It is noteworthy that, in both instances, some of their markings had been smashed (see figure XVII), possibly to prevent the identification of the producer.
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