Defense Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards Engaged in Production of Centrifuges

August 18, 2005

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear


National Council of Resistance of Iran

Defense Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards engaged in production of centrifuges in the past few months.

In violation of the Paris agreement with the EU3 on November 2004 regarding freezing all activities on the fuel cycle, upon personal orders of the regime's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, building and assembling centrifuges have been resumed under the supervision of the Defense Ministry. This has continued non-stop throughout the past few months and thousands of centrifuges have been assembled in Tehran and Isfahan. These centrifuges have been stored in the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense and of the Revolutionary Guards. These warehouses are located in Isfahan and in around Lashkarak district in suburbs of Tehran.

Experts involved in the project:

I would like to introduce to you four experts of the clerical regime who are engaged in manufacturing centrifuges. They have been working in the military apparatus of the clerical regime. We insist that all of these people be interviewed by the IAEA.

1- Engineer Mohammadi, an expert in the Ministry of Defense and a key figure involved in manufacturing centrifuges. He was director of manufacturing centrifuges in Isfahan.

2- Engineer Roozi-Negar from the Ministry of Defense. He is an expert in checking centrifuges. He visits the Natanz site regularly.

3- The clerical regime vigorously pursues manufacturing P2 advanced centrifuges. Engineer Ali Karimi in the Defense Industries of the Ministry of Defense is in charge of pursuing this project.

4- A key figure in the regime's nuclear program is Revolutionary Guards' Brigidar General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. He is one of the most prominent scientists involved in the clerical regime's military nuclear program. He is based in Lavizn-2 site and is a senior staff of the Defense Ministry. Engineer Karimi pursues the P2 project under Fakhrizadeh's direction.

Use of front companies to conceal nuclear related activities

In order to conceal their activities with respect to the fuel cycle, the clerical regime has established a massive network of front companies, which carry out a major part of its secret activities.

Major portion of the above-mentioned centrifuges have been manufactured by secret companies affiliated with the Defense Ministry. The Defense industry has secret companies under similar names of Machine-Alat and Abzar Daghig (machinery and precise equipment) that are involved in manufacturing parts and assembling centrifuges. Some of the companies affiliated with the Defense Ministry are located in Isfahan.

One of these companies is Elka Felezkar Sanat Novin (Elka Metalworks New Industry). This company is involved in preparing metal parts including those used in centrifuges. The Iranian regime's Atomic Energy Organization or one of its front companies place the orders to this company. Using advanced laser equipment, "Elka Felezkar Sanat Novin" cuts steel plates according to the specifications and bends them accordingly.

Companies Fara Felezkaran and Electronic. These three companies ( these two and Elka Felezkar Sanat Novin) are located in the suburbs of Tehran. The address is Abe-ali road, five kilometers past highway patrol station of the Jajrood- after Kamrad gas station, Sang Lashgari alley, next to Nasim Traghzieh Company.

A center of the nuclear research of the Revolutionary Guards

The Malek Ashtar Indutrial University, is a major nuclear research center of the Revoultionary Guards. This university was established in 1986.It has three campuses. The main campus is in Tehran and two other campuses in Karaj (40 kilometer west of Tehran) and in Shahin-shahr in the suburbs of Isfahan. One of the projects being pursued by the university at the moment is the production of Maraging Steel for use as rotor blades in centrifuge machines. The type of steel that is being produced in Malek Ashtar University contains Cobalt and has grade of 300-350.

Owing to acute domestic crisis, regional and international challenges as well as popular resistance, the clerical regime is on the brink. In such circumstances, it is bent on guaranteeing its survival by tipping the current balance of power through dominating Iraq and acquiring nuclear weapons. For this reason, obtaining nuclear weapons is indispensable to the strategy it is pursuing.

I would like to draw your attention to a fundamental point. The three parameters which the regime needs for its survival, namely internal suppression, dominating Iraq and acquiring the nuclear bomb, are intertwined with the ascension of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. By appointing a former IRGC commander as President, Supreme Leader intends to expand his meddling in Iraq and expedite nuclear weapons production. Through Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Khamenei is trying to push aside all bureaucratic obstacles in order to put all logistic, diplomatic and financial resources at the disposal of the nuclear weapons program.

By taking advantage of the conditions created by the EU-3 nuclear talks, the mullahs are involved in procuring and completing the necessary chain to produce a nuclear bomb.

1. In several secret locations, including several sites around Tehran, the regime is working round-the-clock to build centrifuges. Thousands of these machines have already been built and are ready for use.

2. It has completed the Isfahan site during the 22-month talks with the EU-3. At present, the site has great capacity to produce Hexafluoride, UF4 and UF6. The regime is preparing itself to inject gas into centrifuges.

3. The plutonium production in Arak facility has continued.

4. The project to build nuclear warheads as well as their casings is continuing.

5. The project to build neutron initiator is continuing.

Concerning the nuclear talks with the EU-3, Secretary for the Supreme National Security Council and Tehran's nuclear point man in talks with the European Union, acknowledged, "In the past 21 months, the Islamic Republic has achieved brilliant results in technical, legal, political, propaganda and national security spheres… Today, however, we have started up, tested the facility in Isfahan at the industrial level, and produced several tons of UF6. Today, there are a significant number of manufactured centrifuges ready for use. It may seem on the surface that we have accepted the suspension. But in reality, we have used the time to alleviate many of our shortcomings. We continued building centrifuges until the Paris Accord. After June, we doubled our efforts to make up for the suspension. We have not suspended work in Isfahan, even for a second. Arak has not been suspended at any time… The decision that the fuel cycle was our red line agreed to by the regime's leaders and experts."

A few days prior, Hossein Moussavian, head of Tehran's negotiation team with the EU boasted, "As the result of negotiations, not only Iran's nuclear capabilities were preserved, and we were spared a military attack, but we were also able to complete our nuclear capabilities because of the atmosphere that was created. For example, the UCF project in Isfahan was completed in this period and can now be used." He stressed that without the nuclear talks, "large contracts in oil and gas we signed with the rest of the world would have been impossible. The nuclear talks allowed Iran to sign long-term contracts to export gas to India, China, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates."

The clerical regime is pursuing nuclear weapons full force. As I said, it has allocated all its resources to this effort. Regrettably, Tehran is exploiting EU's appeasement to obtain nuclear weapons. After completing Isfahan UCF by taking advantage of the hiatus created through protracted talks with the EU, the regime resumed work at the site in violation of the Paris Accord.

Is there anything that could stop the mullahs from getting the A-bomb? The fundamental solution is democratic change in Iran at the hands of the Iranian people and Resistance. The main impediment to this change is European appeasement of Tehran. This policy has contributed greatly to prolonging the mullahs' rule. By labeling the main Iranian opposition, the People's Mojahedin, as terrorist, EU has created the biggest obstacle to change in Iran.

If we do not want a terrorist regime obtaining nuclear weapons, the policy of appeasement must be abandoned. By referring Iran's nuclear file to the UN Security Council, the regime could be prevented from easily acquiring the necessary means to complete its projects. By removing the unjust tag on the Mojahedin, the EU should stop acting as Tehran's accomplice in cracking down on the Iranian people and remove the impediments for democratic change in Iran.