REP. DUNCAN HUNTER (R-CA): Let me make a little statement about -- talk a little bit about the air strike that killed Abu al-Zarqawi in Iraq, and we've all heard the news this morning. The success against him and his top lieutenants manifest, I think, the importance of persistence and reflects the extreme competence and capability of our counterterrorism efforts in Iraq.

And I know that the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton, who chairs the Anti-Terrorism Subcommittee and the subcommittee that oversees special operations, has received some follow-on briefings, which are extremely encouraging, that surround the facts of this particular strike.

Today we're meeting to talk about another threat to our national security, and that's the current challenges posed by Iran, and to discuss what options we have to confront that threat.

Earlier this year, in February, we held a hearing where we heard from witnesses who addressed the potentially catastrophic implications of a nuclear Iran. And this morning, barely four months later, we continue to remain engaged and focused on this critical issue.

And we look forward to the testimony of two experts on the Middle East and Iran, and they are Dr. Patrick Clawson, deputy director for research, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Clawson, thank you for being with us this morning -- appreciate it.

And Mr. Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. So, Mr. Takeyh, again, thank you for taking time from your valuable schedule to come over and talk to the committee about this very important issue. We look forward to your testimony and your perspectives on the latest developments, including the recent proposal to offer Iran a package of incentives in return for restrictions on its nuclear program.

And while the details aren't public yet, recent media reports indicate that this proposal would allow -- at some point, would allow Iran to enrich uranium. I hesitate to prejudge the proposal, but I must admit that I'm skeptical of any plan that allows Tehran to enrich uranium, even if it's for supposedly peaceful purposes.

My skepticism is based on several concerns. First, the history of Iran's nuclear program is replete with examples of deceiving and defying the international community. How will this new diplomatic effort ensure compliance?

Equally troubling are Iran's other policies. We continue to hear that Iran is supporting militant groups in Iraq, and there are press reports that U.S. forces have found Iranian-supplied explosives in Iraq. Outside of Iraq, Iran's support of terrorism extends throughout the region. According to a 2006 State Department report, and I quote, "Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism."

Advancing these policies is a regime that is driven by an ideology that derives from the 1979 Iranian revolution. The conduct and statements of Iran's newly elected president should, at the very least, give pause to those who think Iran can be deterred from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. If Iran were to possess nuclear weapons, it would destabilize the security balance of the region by either threatening their use, by proliferating such weapons and technology to terrorists, or by encouraging other states to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.

I'm also concerned about China's and Russia's economic ties with Iran. In the last decade, Russia has been a steady supplier of nuclear capabilities to Iran. China has also shared nuclear technology with Iran, while increasing close energy ties with them. In 2004, for example, China and Iran signed an oil and gas deal worth an estimated 100 billion (dollars).

I hope the witnesses today will share their perspectives on how China and Russia might back a future Security Council resolution or a possible sanctions regime, given these very substantial financial and economic dealings. And while I understand the need to pursue a diplomatic track and value the benefits of multilateral cooperation and agreements, we must also look at the other options available to us. Are there alternatives that might provide a viable remedy to this serious impasse?

For example, in our earlier hearing, our witnesses discussed strategies to encourage internal regime change and the potential consequences of sanctions. Would a regional containment strategy that strengthens existing partnerships with the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, be able to counterbalance a nuclear Iran? Are there other options that our witnesses believe we should be pursuing?

We may not reach the same conclusions today as we continue our dialog and focus on Iran, but one fact is clear: The acquisition of nuclear technology by Iran is serious and poses a significant national security challenge.

And now, before we go to our witnesses, I'd like to turn to my partner and colleague on the committee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he'd like to make.

 

OPENING STATEMENT OF

IKE SKELTON
A Congressman from Missouri, and
Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee

 

REP. IKE SKELTON (D-MO): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And let me welcome our witnesses as well. I understand they are experts in this field, and we look forward to your comments. I understand you speak Farsi, each of you, so do it in English for us today, if you'd be kind enough.

This is the second full committee hearing this year on Iran. The committee has also received a number of briefings on this subject. It's critical that the committee understand the challenges posed by the Iranian regime -- and they're varied and they're complex. I believe that developing a comprehensive strategy to address these challenges must be a top bipartisan priority. These challenges threaten the security of our nation, our success in Iraq, the stability of the Middle East, and the future of a non-proliferation regime.

Iran's recent announcement that it has enriched uranium is cause for serious concern, and it follows repeated calls by the international community to suspend enrichment-related activities in a March 29th presidential statement by the United Nations on that matter. Uranium enrichment also brings Iran dangerously closer to having a proven nuclear weapon capability.

I'm pleased to see the administration is finally changing its strategy for dealing with the nuclear situation, and I'm hopeful it'll be more effective than actions to date. The administration seems to have recognized that isolating Iran is not the answer, and it must seriously pursue the range of tools at its disposal. I'm particularly encouraged by the prospect of direct talks with Iran. While we must plan for all scenarios, there's still time to work with our international partners -- it's very important -- our international partners, to ensure that Iran does not acquire that nuclear weapon.

At the same time, the challenges involving Iran are not limited to the nuclear situations. I'm quite troubled by continuing reports about Iran's involvement in Iraq. From the provision of explosives to the funding of insurgents, Iran has strategic interests in Iraq that intersect and diverge with our own in various ways, and I'm not confident that the administration is doing nearly enough to address the problems that Iran poses in Iraq. We've invested too much in Iraq for Iran to emerge with the primary benefits of that conflict.

So gentlemen, what do we do? You are the experts, and I hope you will help illuminate the challenges posed by Iran and suggest the policies that we should be pursuing as a country. What are the prospects for direct talks between our country and Iran? What about the proposal delivered to Iran this week and backed by the administration and the Security Council and our European allies? Good questions. Reports suggest the proposal does not address Iran's involvement in Iraq. Should this matter be handled separately?

What are the prospects for future United Nations Security Council action? What, if any, should they take? In addition, at the committee's last hearing, experts advised us that our country should significantly expand its human intelligence capabilities regarding that country. In my view, that's critical.

We should strengthen cooperation with China, Russia, other key strategic partners, and we should cultivate American support among the Iranian population and promote efforts that may encourage the population to demand more moderate leadership. How do we do that?

We should recognize the considerable limits and obstacles to using military force. Do you agree?

There are obviously no easy answers or simple solutions, but there are many tools at our disposal.

And, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing our key witnesses today with their recommendations and their thoughts. And thank you for calling this hearing on this very important subject. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you.

REP. DUNCAN HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

Well, gentlemen, thanks for being with us. Dr. Clawson, what do you think?

MR. PATRICK CLAWSON: Thank you very much for having me here today, Mr. Chairman, and I've got a --

REP. HUNTER: And without objection, both your statements will be taken into the record, so feel free to summarize to whatever degree you want to.

MR. CLAWSON: Thank you.

You mentioned the death of Mr. Zarqawi yesterday, and this event is a good opportunity to reflect on the nature of the problem that we face with Iran, in that one would think that Mr. Zarqawi, with his threats to kill all Shiites, would be somebody that the Iranian government would be eager to see put behind bars or eliminated. Yet, in fact, the Iranians play a shadowy game of sometimes supporting him in certain ways. So, the Iranians acknowledge that a number of important al Qaeda leaders are on their territory, claim that these people are under house arrest, but refuse to provide us with even the names of these individuals who they're holding, much less with evidence that they're under house arrest.

And that illustrates the shadowy nature of how the Iranian government operates in many ways, and I'm afraid that we are going to be in some kind of a shadowy conflict with Iran for the foreseeable future, and that we, therefore, are going to have to find ways to deter and contain Iran from making use of some of its more aggressive instruments for its more aggressive ambitions.

And, indeed, in my prepared statement I suggest that it's unlikely that inducements that we offer Iran are going to be enough to persuade them to abandon their nuclear program; in part, because any inducements that we offer will be seized upon by hardliners in Iran as proof that their tough stance is working and that all they have to do, therefore, is just wait a while longer and the West will offer them some more, and that Iran can persist in its program. That said, I am prepared to accept the statements of the Russian and Chinese leaders, that they really do believe that inducements are the best way to get Iran to change their -- Iran's behavior.

Some people have suggested that, in fact, Russian and Chinese actions are based on commercial interests but, actually, Russia's commercial interests are best served when the price of oil goes up, and isolating Iran would serve that purpose. As for the Chinese- Iranian commercial ties, it's clear that Iran has signed a great big, huge, multi-billion dollar investment deal with the Chinese, but the terms were so unattractive that that deal is going nowhere. And that's true also of the deals that the Iranians have signed with the Indians and the Japanese. The Iranians want to have their cake and eat it too. They want to use big investment deals more to gain influence, but they refuse to offer attractive terms.

So, I don't think that it's commercial interests that are at stake here, as much as a real Russian and Chinese conviction that inducements are the way to go. I suspect that they're going to see that that's wrong, and that when we've now walked that extra mile, by offering a very attractive deal to the Iranians, and the Iranians don't seem to be really that interested in this deal, then hopefully that will persuade -- broaden the coalition in the international community that we have to press the Iranians.

When it comes time to press the Iranians, economic sanctions are going to be the first thing on people's minds, but I would suggest that we also ought to consider other instruments for pressing them, besides economic sanctions. And, in particular, I would look at the security realm and ways in which we can use deterrents and containment in order to persuade the Iranians that this nuclear program of theirs is a bad idea because it risks starting an arms race, which they are certain to lose; and that by making the Gulf a more dangerous place, it's going to lead the United States and other major powers to deploying more military assets to the region, that'll leave Iran worse off from a security point of view.

So, I would press the Iranians by saying, your nuclear program is not addressing your security concerns. At the same time, I would consider offering Iran some security inducements of the sorts that we used during the Cold War, namely, confidence- and stability-building measures, which are designed to lock in the existing status quo. We, after all, are interested in preserving the status quo in the region, whereas the Iranians want to upset it and want to use their military program in order to expand their influence in the area in ways their neighbors don't want. So, if we can get confidence- and stability- building measures locked in place that help reinforce the status quo, it's in our interest; and I suggest a number of such measures in my paper.

At the same time, I'll have to tell you that I suspect that we are going to have a tough time using this kind of pressure instrument in order to persuade the Iranians to abandon their nuclear program. In particular, Iran's president is so committed to that program, he's not going to voluntarily back down. Fortunately, real power is not in his hands; it's in the hands of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- and his title gives you an idea of the extent of his powers; he really is the supreme leader. And if we can persuade him that, in fact, the confrontational approach of Iran's president is too risky, he may well back down. But we should prepare for the eventuality that that will not happen and that we may have to use preemption if we want to stop Iran's nuclear program.

But even if we do use military preemption against Iran's nuclear program, we still will need containment and deterrence, because it's quite possible that Iran will react to whatever military instruments we use against it, and we are to be prepared for that eventuality. There's been a lot of speculation about non-conventional Iranian response in the event of American military action against Iran.

Permit me just to cite a conventional way in which Iran might respond. And in recent years, the directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency have learned, in the words of Vice Admiral Jacoby, in March 2005, in speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, quote, "We judge Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz," end of quote. Well, if that were actually to happen, that would be a very interesting time to be in the oil trading business.

And, indeed, Iran's supreme leader, just the other day, on June 4th, warned, quote, "If the Americans make a wrong move towards Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and Americans would not be able to protect energy supply in the region," end of quote. Well, given the Iranian threats and given this DIA assessment, it would behoove the United States to demonstrate vigorously that, in fact, we can defend energy supplies in that region, by both deploying assets into the region to defend the Strait of Hormuz, and by exercising them with our allies.

We have been able to organize a number of multinational exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, designed to interdict proliferation and to stop terrorism. And I cite in my prepared testimony, for instance, the Sea Saber exercise held in January 2004, including ships from Great Britain, Canada, France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Japan and Australia, with observers from Denmark, Germany, Poland, Turkey and Portugal. Well, given such wide consensus that the Straits of Hormuz is a really vital sea lane of communication, it would do well for us to step up the pressure against the Iranians by showing that we are determined indeed to defend those waters.

Iran's threats to the Straits of Hormuz illustrate its essential ambitions: it wants to be a regional power whose wishes are accommodated by its neighbors. And that desire on the part of the Iranians is precisely why their nuclear program is so dangerous and where we have to persevere with these efforts one way or another to make sure that that program is, indeed, frozen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HUNTER: Dr. Clawson, thank you.

And Dr. Takeyh, thank you for being with us today, sir.

MR. RAY TAKEYH: Thank you.

REP. HUNTER: What do you think?

MR. TAKEYH: I'll just try to complement some of the things that Patrick said, by focusing maybe on some other aspects of Iran's relationships.

I think, as Patrick was talking about Iran's -- the ramifications of the Zarqawi death on Iran, I'm largely in accord with that. But I would say that the recent death of Mr. Zarqawi, which is an extremely welcome news, has a couple of ramifications. The first is for al Qaeda's infrastructure within Iraq itself, which, I think, is weakened, particularly in the light of the fact that some of its leadership has already been picked up and arrested. And despite the fact that al Qaeda is known to replenish its stock of leaders, he was a character of some charisma and capability, and it will be difficult for him to be replaced easily. So, I think this does do some significant damage to its ability to recover.

Number two, in terms of this ramification for Iraq itself, I think Zarqawi was an individual that triggered the sectarian conflict, but that sectarian conflict is a reality now, so I'm not quite sure if it'll have that much of a ramification for the level of sectarian violence that we have seen.

And, finally, his death for the region, I think, certainly benefits states neighboring Iraq, such as Jordan, which were increasingly being victimized by al Qaeda and its projections beyond Iraq itself.

Focusing on Iran, I'll just try to focus on three areas of concern. If you go back to the 2005 inaugural speech by President Ahmadinejad, he, essentially, outlined Iran's foreign policy as the focus of it being the Islamic lands, the Persian Gulf and the eastern bloc. So, it is a regime that has already come to power demonstrating some degree of insensitivity to the opinions and predilection of the Western community -- the United States, the Europeans, in particular.

In terms of Iraq, I think much has changed in the Middle East since 9/11 tragedies. The invasion of Iraq has offered Iran a remarkable opportunity to expand its influence. For the foreseeable future, Iran is likely to emerge as one of the most powerful states in the critical Persian Gulf region. Such developments are natural consequences of the strength and, to some extent, policy -- U.S. policy -- that has removed barriers to assertion of its influence.

In a peculiar way, Iran views projection of its influence in Iraq as being actually contingent on the democratic process, because it is that process that empowers the Shia community, marginalizes the Sunni community and, nevertheless, retains the rest of Kurdish minority within a territorial Iraq.

I'm not quite sure if Iran's still a revolutionary state, but it's certainly an opportunistic one, and is likely to take advantage of more favorable circumstances to become the dominant power in the immediate Persian Gulf neighborhood. In that particular sense, Iran today can be categorized as the second most important country in Iraq and the second most important external power in Afghanistan; quite possible destined to be the most important in two.

Let me just talk a little bit about one of the most critical and perhaps peculiar of Iran's relationships, namely, that with Russia. This is a relationship that is not just about opportunism and economic and commercial trade, but I think it has some strategic gaps, which, in the end, I suspect will make Russia reluctant to accept onerous economic sanctions on Iran. Since the end of the Cold War, the Islamic Republic has been Russia's most stable partner in the Middle East.

Although we tend to focus on the nuclear cooperation between the two powers, we forget that Russia has also been willing to sell Iran a large quantity of conventional arms, including rather sophisticated air defense network and submarines and so forth. In addition, unlike the Western countries, which tend to buy mainly raw material from Russia, Iran is willing to purchase a variety of industrial goods. So, in essence, a vast number of lobbies have been created within Russia itself to sustain that relationship.

Given that reality, I suspect that, as I said, in the end the Russians will be unlikely to accept economic pressures on Iran, despite its nuclear infractions. This is a relationship that also is peculiar in another sense -- is the Russians simply don't view Iran's nuclear threat with the same degree of immediacy and urgency that the European countries and the United States does. For them, the most dangerous and unstable country on their periphery is Pakistan -- a country with nuclear weapons capability, some degree of instability, and a country that has been involved in terms of Chechnyan affairs and trying to project this power in central Asia at the expense of Russia itself, not to mention Iran. So, they don't necessarily view their periphery as being endangered by Iran.

As was mentioned by the chairman, the emerging ties between Iran and China are, at this point, less developed but, I think, destined to grow as Beijing becomes more dependent on Middle Eastern oil. At a time when China's industrial power is becoming contingent on access to reliable sources of energy, Iran appears a valuable and safe market. In addition to the $100 billion contract that was alluded to, I believe last year, the Chinese import of Iranian crude oil increased by 25 percent.

China would have to balance its relationship with the United States with those of its relations with Iran and determine how far it will go in terms of supporting rigorous action through multilateral organizations. I suspect, at the end, it will be a balancing act, but once more, the Chinese, on this particular issue, are likely to follow the Russian lead as opposed to the European countries and the United States.

Finally, let me say a few words about Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs. Really, this goes back to probably the end of the Cold War, where Iran has emerged, and pursuing the determined nuclear capability and a sophisticated military establishment. Since the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran has embarked on an extensive program of expanding and modernizing the totality of its military force. The imperative, however, of reviving this economy has diminished its enthusiasm for bearing the heavy costs of maintaining a large, conventional army. To bridge the gap between its aspirations and capabilities, Iran has opted for an entire range of weapons of mass destruction.

So, it's a program that derives not so much from ideology, but from strategic calculations that may be difficult to adjust. I think, at the end, we may have to confront the reality that the Middle East is likely to feature in Iran with a robust nuclear infrastructure.

Perhaps through imaginative and multilateral diplomacy, a provision of packages of incentives and a clever mixture of penalties, it may still be possible to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold and actually assembling a weapon. But I think a notion of a complete disarmament along the lines of the Libyan model is increasingly untenable.

And that's just where we're at, in the sense that Iran is likely to become a growing, significant and important power in the region, with important commercial relationships that will remain unaltered by the United States, and a military capability that may, in fact, be growing.

I'll stop here, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

REP. HUNTER: Doctor, thank you for a very concise statement.

And both of our witnesses, you've opened up lots and lots of areas for inquiry. One thing: as we move forward -- and we hopefully move forward with the support of the Russians and the Chinese -- I think a good threshold question is the sincerity of those two parties, and you've addressed that to some degree; their desire to -- whether or not there is a desire to truly partner with the United States, in terms of dampening the nuclear weapons development by Iran.

You know, I would think that, as we saw the school-house terrorism that took place in Russia, and the -- followed Chechnya and saw in their military, in their security apparatus, obviously a growing concern for what they think now is going to be their piece of the war against terror, or the effect of terrorists on their security -- you've got to think that in the back of the minds of the military advisers in Russia, who are advising the politicians who are shaping their Iran policy -- in the back of their mind they must entertain the possibility that if Iran develops nuclear systems, that first suitcase device or maybe bigger device may end up being delivered by a Chechnyan terrorist to a location in Russia.

And they must see that there is, to some degree, a potential threat to their own security that will emanate from this development, despite their economic ties and despite, I think, in some cases, their desire to tie down the Americans, to consume us with the -- see us consumed with the Iranian question and the economic interests that obviously are manifested in Iran's oil supply and other resources and their location.

So, in shorthand, do you think that the Russian military is sensitive to that, cares about that, and do you think they're delivering that message to Russian political leadership and thereby forming a Russian or serving a Russian policy -- creating a Russian policy that will truly attempt to dampen this emerging capability by the Iranians? Do you think it's real? And do you think they're concerned? And do you think they really will help us in the end or do they intend to pull a rug out from under us?

MR. CLAWSON: Mr. Chairman, in a word, the Russians do consider the threat real. Indeed, in Moscow, in October, I heard from many people that, after all, Chechnya was part of Iran until 200 years ago; and that a nuclear-armed Iran might well feel that this provides it with an umbrella that gives them an impunity to provide assistance to radical Islamists in Chechnya or elsewhere in the Russian Federation; and that, therefore, there is a real understanding on the part of the Russians that it would be a mistake for them to repeat what they did with regard to China 40 years ago, where they ignored China's development of nuclear weapons on the grounds that if the Chinese ever got nuclear weapons, they would be directed against the United States and not against the Soviet Union.

And yet within four years of China having nuclear weapons, Russia -- the Soviet Union -- and China were on the brink of a nuclear war. So there is a sense in Moscow that a nuclear-armed Iran is very much not in Russia's interests. However, there was no interest in partnering with the United States in order to stop this; in part, because of Russian self-confidence with high oil income and economic growth; in part, because of anger at perceived American arrogance and what we've done in places like the Ukraine and Georgia; and, in part, because of the conviction that the approach that we're taking is the wrong approach, and a real sense that the only way to deal with the Iranians is, at the end of the day, to offer them sufficiently attractive inducements and to assuage their pride.

REP. HUNTER: The Russians disagree with the inducement strategy?

MR. CLAWSON: The Russians want to induce Iran. They think that --

REP. HUNTER: They do agree with it --

MR. CLAWSON: They think that's the only way to persuade Iran, and they think that anything other than inducements is just not practical; that they wouldn't work; that it would just make the Iranians more stubborn and proceed. I happen to think that, in fact, the glove works best when there's a fist inside it, and that IAEA director, Mohamed ElBaradei was right when he said that diplomacy works best backed up by force. But the Russians, so far, don't agree with that; and that is, I think, the biggest single problem we face; added to that, that they're not interested in partnering with us.

MR. TAKEYH: I think it's correct to say that the Russians, in all earnestness, would not want Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability. However, then, the question becomes all the issues that were raised.

Now, in terms of central Asia, it actually, since the collapse of the Soviet Union -- Iran has not been mischievous in central Asia and trying to inflame emerging Islamic sentiments there. And much of what has happened in Chechnya was a Sunni sort of a violence. There was al Qaeda channeled through Pakistan and so on. It wasn't necessarily Iranian. So, as a matter of fact, the two powers even cooperated in terms of trying to negotiate an end to the Tajikistan civil war. So, Iranian policy toward central Asia has been one of Realpolitik, not so much one of ideology, and that has assured Russians, to some extent, regarding the stability of the Iranian state.

Finally, in terms of how far the Russians are going to go along with them, and I think all the things that Patrick says -- there are a number of obstacles to that level of cooperation between the United States and Russia. Number one, as I mentioned, is the strategic and economic ties between the two countries. Number (three ?) is the Russians don't see the Iranian bomb with the same degree of immediacy and urgency that we see it. They tend to downgrade Iran's technological capabilities, even after the things that have happened as a result of IAE disclosures; so they think that -- they have a sort of a view that Iranians are still not going to get this technology right at any time soon.

And finally, there is a tense relationship between United States and Russia that tends to limit the incentives that Russians may have had in terms of actually cooperating with the United States. And I suspect that one of the few levers we have remaining on the Russian behavior is the G8 meeting that is happening in July 21st. But a G8 meeting is like Christmas: You build up to it, and at some point it's over. And after that, I think you begin to see the Russians becoming even less cooperative, given the fact that the glare of the international media is going to be removed from St. Petersburg, so that -- particularly a lever, that has had some sort of a meaningful impact on Moscow, is likely to evaporate within a month-and-a-half or what have you.

And that's why what the Russians are saying to the Iranians at this particular point is, take your time with the deal. Take your time in consideration of this deal. Basically, don't turn it down before the G8 meeting.

So, our levers are going to be -- are limited and are likely to be less -- so.

One category of countries that do maintain some sort of a leverage on the Russians are actually the Europeans, particularly the Germans, and I think at this particular point, in their hearts of hearts, the Germans would be willing to grant Iran a limited enrichment capability to avert the crisis. And if they do so, I don't think the Russians will be too far behind.

REP. HUNTER: Thank you.

The gentleman from Missouri.

REP. SKELTON: Dr. Clawson, you spoke about inducements. On the one hand, you spoke about economic inducements, and on the other hand, you spoke about security inducements, and you prefer security-type inducements. My question to you: is that not somewhat of a dangerous game that might be played -- because Clausewitz says there's always of friction involved with this type of effort -- and could something more likely go wrong?

MR. CLAWSON: I would just suggest that it's in our interests to see the status quo in the region locked in, by putting in place security arrangements that guarantee the existing situation in the Gulf, whereas it's the Iranians who want to disturb the existing situation and to use their greater power that they would acquire through their nuclear program, in order to compel their neighbors to pay attention to the Iranians, to bend to the Iranian will. And if we can lock in place security arrangements which make it harder for the Iranians to do that, that's in our interest and not in the Iranian interest.

And so, confidence- and stability-building measures, which help lock in place the existing security arrangements in the Gulf. would serve our interests. I suspect that, in fact, the Iranians probably won't be that interested in these kinds of inducements that we offer them. It'd be wonderful if they were, but I think we would be able to say to the Iranian people, and we'd be able to say to Europeans and Russians, that, look, we're prepared to do things to address Iran's legitimate security concerns.

And if, in fact, the Iranians aren't interested in these kinds of inducements that addressed their legitimate security concerns, that suggests that Iran's real ambitions with its nuclear program is illegitimate security purposes, namely, being able to bend others to its will. And that would help us, then, in gaining broader support for pressing and isolating Iran, if that turns out to be necessary.

REP. SKELTON: Dr. Clawson, you made reference to our allies, should they shut down the Straits of Hormuz, that we would have allies to help us in our effort there. (Given ?) the fact that we have been short of allies in Iraq, what makes you think that we would have plenty of allies in opening up the Straits of Hormuz?

MR. CLAWSON: Exports is a wonderful way to concentrate the minds of a lot of oil-importing countries. And indeed, the last time that the Iranians were scattering mines out in the Persian Gulf at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the navies of nine countries showed up in order to sweep those mines. And it takes quite a bit to persuade the Belgians and the Dutch and the Danes to send their ships to that region, but the Iranians managed to do it.

And this time around, I suspect that even more countries would say, this is a vital sea lane of communication; don't mess with it. So the defensive principle of saying that a vital sea lane of communication ought to remain open is something that is going to draw broad international support. Indeed, I am impressed how the Iranians are thinking about threatening to do the one thing that would bring so many of the world's powers together against them, namely, threatening so much of the world's oil supplies at the Strait of Hormuz in what would be a blatantly aggressive action in violation of international law.

REP. SKELTON: Thank you so much.

REP. HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

REP. JIM SAXTON (R-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Your discussion this morning on the one hand is discouraging, but on the other hand, we have seen what appears to be some progress in beginning to deal with the Iranian problem through diplomatic channels. Presently, all the attention, however, seems to be focused on the diplomatic track and the possibility of our country negotiating directly with the Iranians.

I, for one, as you appear to agree, am very skeptical about our chances of success using this approach. In my mind, we can't be blinded by the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough and neglect other possible avenues where we might be more successful, particularly with regard to the notion of Iranian containment through the development of relationships with regard to a containment policy in the region.

I'd be interested in -- I know we've had a lot of talk about Russia, the U.N. What are the possibilities, in your view, of a containment policy focused on the immediate neighborhood, if you will, and the cooperation of some non-traditional allies, perhaps, in that area?

MR. TAKEYH: I'll just start with that. I think, at this particular point, I don't see the regional states -- particularly the Gulf States, the Gulf community -- coming together in a robust containment of Iran for several reasons. First of all, the Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of a weak collection of countries whose historic approach to their larger neighbors in the north has been one of balancing between they and the United States. That's been their historical approach, which is no longer tenable, given the fact that the American presence in the region will ultimately recede and, more importantly, that presence has become the subject of much political controversy within those particular countries.

So in terms of, as Iran becomes more powerful, I suspect the Gulf States will react with some degree of appeasement as opposed to confrontation and containment of Iran.

The other actor that historically was a barrier to projection of Iranian influence is Iraq. It's hard to predict what kind of Iraq will come about but, if the constitutional process is correct, it is likely to be Iraq with a weak central government and strong provinces. Weak central governments don't have strong armies. And therefore it is unlikely that Iraq will emerge as it was before -- a strong central state with a powerful army willing and able to contest sort of Iranian hegemonic aspirations in that particular region.

So in a sense, Iran's immediate neighborhood is too weak to constitute a constellation of states willing to contain Iran. And if Iran plays its cards correctly, namely, it doesn't become too excessive in terms of its ambitions, doesn't become too inflammatory in terms of its rhetoric, and I think it's likely to remain like that -- less intrusive -- then I think those countries are likely to be one that would accommodate, as opposed to confront, Iran.

MR. CLAWSON: I'm rather more optimistic than Dr. Takeyh, for one thing because the current Iranian president, with his inflammatory rhetoric, has done a wonderful job of feeding the historic Arab fears about Persian domination in the region. And indeed, he's done wonders for my ability to get free trips to the Gulf so I can be lectured by Gulf leaders about the importance of the United States taking a strong stand against Iran. And indeed, many of the smaller Gulf countries are quite prepared to cooperate with the United States in a containment policy of Iran, so long as we have the good taste not to point out publicly what they're doing. And indeed, there's a certain eagerness in some of those countries to see the United States take more of an (cross-talk).

Indeed, the Gulf monarchies have tried to carve out a way in which they can express their disquiet to Tehran. They have, in their recent meetings, started to be speaking out rather vigorously about the environmental threat represented by Iran's nuclear program. And they've sent, now, some delegations to Iran, theoretically to discuss this environmental threat of the Iranian nuclear program. I'll leave it to your imagination if you think that that is, indeed, the core of their objections to the Iranian nuclear program.

And by the way, there is also very important another neighbor of Iran, which is to say Turkey which is, after all, a NATO ally and a country to which we have a treaty obligation to help defend.

I think it would be very useful if leaders and military planners, who I don't think are overly burdened with other work at the moment, were asked to remind us what are any of those plans for defending Turkey from a potential danger from the East. And indeed, at a time when Turkey is involved in the accession talks with the European Union, it may be worthwhile reminding our European Union allies that they're talking about letting in a country which has a 300-mile long border with Iran, so that Iran may soon become their neighbor and that they need to be -- perhaps they should be interested as well in what we see becoming this country on their borders.

REP. SAXTON: Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up for -- and it will only take 10 seconds.

In my limited opportunities to talk with Middle Eastern leaders in Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia and in Qatar, I come away with the impression, in all three cases, that the number one concern in the region is Iran, relative to the security of those -- at least those three countries. And so I haven't had a chance to talk to other leaders in other countries, but at least in those three cases there is a great deal of concern.

REP. HUNTER: The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Snyder, is recognized.

REP. VIC SNYDER (D-AR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you being here. I appreciate the leadership of the committee holding this hearing today. It's obviously an important topic.

I'm just going to ask one question. We have had -- the United States has had -- a certainly entertaining relationship with Iran through the last century and into this one, and probably the two key events were the 1953 coup that the Iranians give us a lot of credit for -- overthrowing their democracy with the prime minister at the time; and then the 1979 event in which we take great offence at the fact that they're taking our embassy employees hostage and holding them for so long a time. And it's been stormy since.

Having said that, would you respond to the kind of the people-to- people issue in which we have a Persian nation that, in many ways for the last half of the 20th century, at the person-to-person level -- my impression was that the Iranian people see themselves as being Western in a lot of ways; that they have a lot of affinity with -- not with the U.S. government but with ideas that come out of America.

I had a conversation several years ago with a man -- an Iranian who lived in Iran -- who was telling me how popular American self-help psychology books were. You know, like Men Are From Mars, Woman Are -- that kind of stuff -- how popular they were. And so would you -- I've looked through your opening statements and I think they're both very thorough in terms of looking at the government-to-government, but how to you see this, over the long term, in terms of the interaction between the people of Iran and the people of the United States -- I don't mean in a Pollyanna way. But do you agree that there is somewhat of a natural affinity? That if we can get past this, there could be a very robust personal relationship between the Iranian people and the American people? And anything else that you want to take off on it.

And that's my only question, Mr. Chairman.

MR. TAKEYH: I think you're right in that there's a sort of reservoir of good will for the United States and for the American people. I mean, we see this in whatever polling. And even anecdotal evidence that comes across is Iran is one of the few places in the Middle East where there's a strong appreciation for American values; and also not just American consumer products, but American democratic values and the ingenuity and progress that the American society has made over the years.

Unfortunately, that particular sentiment is not always reflected at the leadership level -- at the governing level. But over the long term, I think that could be a basis for a more -- for a different relationship between the United States and the Iranian state.

And here is one of the problems with the nuclear issue if it becomes -- gets to the point at some point where there is employment of military force by the United States -- it could, at least for a while, evaporate that good will, and you would begin to see some degree of Iranian nationals consolidated and solidified against American intervention. It would be part of the narrative, like 1953 and 2007 where American military actually intervened in Iran.

MR. CLAWSON: Indeed, if I may take over on that, the challenge for us is to find a way for us to present Iran's nuclear program as a threat to Iran's nation, and to show the depth of our interest in working with the Iranian people to end this threat to the Iranian nation being caused by an authoritarian regime. And that narrative, on our part -- that this is the regime's nuclear program and not the nation's nuclear program -- has not yet been successful.

The contrary narrative from the Iranian government -- that the nuclear program is a proud accomplishment of a great people, which the American government is trying to take away in order to keep the Iranians down -- has, unfortunately, been much more successful.

And the challenge we face is taking advantage of this sympathy for America and America's attitudes to present the nuclear program as being the regime's way to try and stay in power, rather than something which is helping Iran as a nation.

REP. HUNTER: I thank the gentlemen. He yields back his time.

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley is recognized

REP. JOEL HEFLEY (R-CO): One of you mentioned about their conventional forces. Could you speak a little bit to that? How sophisticated and how extensive are their conventional forces? I take it that that's not really where they put their hope in, but would you comment on that?

MR. CLAWSON: You're quite right that that's not what they put their hope in, but I am concerned that if the directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency have, for several years now, stood up and said before Congress that, quote, "We judge Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz," end quote, that we should take that seriously. It would be quite an event if, indeed, Iran were able to do that. And since the Iranians have acquired a large number of assets for that purpose, whether it's submarines, whether it's advanced airplanes, and they also seem to have developed a relatively sophisticated strategy of how to surge out a large number of small ships, perhaps as many as 400 small craft that could be used to harass shipping in the Gulf -- we should take this as a serious problem.

And certainly I'm not an expert on the United States Navy and what it's doing about this and I know that the new littoral combat ships are designed, in part, to deal with these kind of problems, but this could become quite an acute problem. And Iranian leaders regularly threaten that, in fact, they will do something in this regard.

So in addition to all our concerns about Iran's unconventional potential for supporting terrorism, attacking U.S. forces in Iraq, we should not overlook this rather important and rather conventional threat to the Strait.

MR. TAKEYH: I just add to that, that increasingly there is a sort of a division between the regular army in Iran and the revolutionary guards which is about 120,000-strong. There has been much more investment in that, because it's more of a reliable, ideological pillar of the regime, so they tend to be more sophisticated. And I'm not sure of the operations that has been discussed is likely to come from them, as opposed to the regular armed forces, which are rather starved of sophisticated and advanced technology.

I would say that actually in terms of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, I would suspect that's rather an exaggerated threat, because Iran recognizes that the Gulf is the lifeblood of its economy. It is its most reliable access to the international petroleum market, and it's unlikely to actually commit economic suicide.

Second of all, in any confrontation with the United States that may provoke consideration of closing of the Gulf, Iran is likely to try to isolate the United States and garner international opinion on its side, and a provocative action such as the closing of the Gulf is unlikely to serve that cause.

So although I think that to use any military to prepare for contingencies of the enormous list of concerns that we should have with Iran, I'm not quite sure if the closure of the Gulf should be uppermost on that list.

REP. HEFLEY: The new President says some nutty things. Are we dealing with a nut there? Or are we dealing with a politician who does like American politicians sometimes and demigods to his constituency?

MR. CLAWSON: Well, the principal audience of the Iranian president, like that of most politicians, is his domestic audience and not his foreign audience. I just suggest that the Iranian president is not a particularly important figure in determining the country's foreign policy, and there is no evidence to suggest that the current Iranian president has been more important in setting the country's foreign policy than his two predecessors.

And both of those predecessors, Mr. Rafsanjani from '89 to '97 and Mr. Khatami from '97 to 2005 came into office full of language about how they were going to completely change the country. In Rafsanjani's case, economic reform was going to be the centerpiece of his program -- in Khatami's, his political reform -- and in both cases they got about two or three years in and the system brought them to a screeching halt.

The Iranian system of checks and balances is even more developed than the American system, and not much happens in Iran as a result. And if you want my guess, it's President Ahmadinejad -- with all of his fiery rhetoric -- is going to discover that he actually doesn't have that much say over policy. His fiery rhetoric sounds great right now, but if it looks like Iran actually is going to have to pay a price for his confrontational attitude, I suspect that the supreme leader is going to say, well, we're going to change our policies and be, in fact, more accommodating -- back off from an open confrontation with the West.

MR. TAKEYH: I think the relevance of Iran's president stems from the fact that he represents a constituency. He represents a cohort, hard-line elements within the state -- much of it -- much of the generation that came out of the Iran-Iraq war security services, the revolutionary guards. So he represents a perspective within the regime that cannot be ignored. And also, I think the dynamics between the supreme leader and the president are largely unknown in the sense that this is a president that doesn't easily back down. So any rebukes and rebuttals from that leadership may not have an effect on him.

Second of all, in terms of his audience, it's not just a domestic audience, but it's an audience in the Islamic countries. And polls show that, throughout the Middle-East, Indonesia and others, he actually has some popularity -- the anti-Israeli rhetoric, the Association of Nuclear Rights -- as an issue of development between the north and south nations. That actually has resonated beyond Iran's borders.

Now that doesn't impress the incumbent regime, but it has garnered him some degree of popularity. So in terms of his opinion and perspective, they have to be taken into consideration by the leadership as it contemplates its foreign policy course. I don't think you can easily exclude it from those counsels of power as his predecessors were.

REP. HEFLEY: Thank you.

REP. HUNTER: Thank you. The gentleman yields his time.

The gentlelady from California is recognized, Ms. Tauscher.

REP. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER (D-CA): Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I'm interested in the last part of the conversation because we're getting, now, down to the place where I think we have a challenge -- because we've had so little Human Intel coming out of Iran for so long; because for a time there after Ahmadinejad was elected, we were actually convinced that he was one of the kidnappers of our embassy employees and our diplomats in 1979. And I think there are still people out there that allege that he was involved in that. So what really concerns me is this issue of what are we going to do in the short term to get the long-term outcome that I think we want.

Since we apparently have no credible military threat to really present to the Iranians, since our European allies have done a very good job for well over 18 months of going in and meeting with them, but after they got past hello in the third meeting, they had nothing much more to say and those meetings promptly stopped.

Now that we have begun to engage -- as I think we should have quite a long time ago -- I think the real question here is, what is our real goal here? Is our goal here to deal with Ahmadinejad who, as my colleague from Colorado has indicated, is crazy, and he certainly says heinous and crazy things, specifically about Israel, but he apparently is a pretty damned-good politician.

And I think he's putting out two separate messages as many of us have to do in politics. One is to the Iranian people that they, like everybody else, deserve to have a nuclear program, because it is something of nationalistic pride. It is something about that. But I guess the other question is -- going back to the president's State of Union address of January 2003 before we attacked Iraq, and when he named the axis of evil -- is this really also to say I've learned the lesson of Iraq? And the lesson of Iraq is that if the United States targets you, the way to really stop them and cause them to pause is to have a nuclear weapon.

So my question is do we have somebody who is really that smart? Do we have in Ahmadinejad somebody who is really that cagey; that he understands that there are multiple messages that he's putting out there; that he is stirring up nationalistic pride in Iran; that he tells them that they deserve to have it; this is the goal that they should have, that this creates with them a sense that they come out of the dark ages; that they've been really working for 20 years in isolation and this is a reward for them?

And is it also a message that this is to hedge their bet? This is to hedge the bet of dealing with the United States and a way to prevent any kind of preemptive attack by our government?

MR. CLAWSON: President Ahmadinejad is an excellent politician with regard to Iran, but he knows very little about the outside world. He has rarely visited the -- he was only once outside of the country before he became president. After his visit to New York where he spoke at the U.N. General Assembly, he came back and he told his mentor that the world's leaders were so transfigured by what he had to say that they couldn't move their heads or blink their eyes for 20 minutes while he was talking, and the great light was shining behind him -- and there's every indication from his body-language and his words that he really believed that.

He is not someone who is going to have a sophisticated understanding of how the rest of the world works, and there is no indication that he has any particular input into Iran's negotiating strategy. Those involved in the discussions with the Iranians will tell you that the negotiators openly make fun of -- the Iranian negotiators openly make fun of -- Ahmadinejad, and say that the leader has decided it was a mistake to let him be elected president. So I see no indications that, at present, Ahmadinejad is formulating the country's strategy with regard to the international community.

What he is doing is selling this at home, where he is using this program, as you said, to stir up nationalistic pride and to help restore revolutionary values. His view of the outside world is shaped by the Iran-Iraq war where what he sees is that the outside world doesn't follow through on all the fine words that it says about things, like chemical weapons being banned. And he is convinced that Iran has to rely on itself and itself alone and stand against the outside world, which will all come to help Iran's enemies, and that if Iran is just tough enough and revolutionary enough, then it can win. That's his viewpoint. Fortunately, he is not the key person who is going to make the decisions at the end of the day.

MR. TAKEYH: How does the Iranian national security establishment -- I think is the question -- perceive its defense policy in light of the America's war in Iraq in March 2003. It is inconceivable to me that that has not had an impact on their beliefs, because there are certain lessons you can draw from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

First, that mere possession of certain categories of unconventional weapons is not likely to deter a determined American president -- that just because the United States perceived that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, that did not constitute deterrence. Meantime, at the same time, the lessons of the Korean Peninsula -- namely that a presumed nuclear capability will lead to external powers to come to the negotiating table offering some commercial economic security guarantees -- is not a bad way to go.

Well, what happened last week was Secretary Rice announced a very fundamental revision of the United States policy -- not to mention the Bush administration policy of the past six years -- whereby the United States will engage in direct negotiations on a limited issue without concern for other areas of Iran's behavior.

What that shows you is nuclear weapons aspirations, not even measurable capability, can extract significant concessions from what was the most hawkish administration on US-Iran relations since the 1979 revolution. I mean, axis of this, outposts of that, central banker of terrorism, and none of that is any longer part of the administration's rhetoric -- at least at this point. When Secretary Rice, asked about the character of the regime that she so often criticized, she says this is about regime behavior and not the character of the regime. So is Iranian diplomacy succeeding? It is impossible to argue against it.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HUNTER: The gentleman from Maryland is recognized, Mr. Bartlett?

REP. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT (R-MD): Thank you very much.

The oft-confirmed observation, that desperate people do desperate things, may be particularly appropriate to the situation we are now in with Iran.

Now, I want to return for just a moment to the question of the Straits of Hormuz through which I think, what, about 40 percent of the world's supply of oil moves. If that strait was shut down for any protracted period of time, the world's economies would collapse. Now, in want one observer has described as the magnificent arrogance of the West, we have had a peculiar inability to understand the Asian mind and the middle-Asian mind. If I were there reflecting on the golden age of Islam when that culture clearly was dominant in the world, I might argue that returning all of the countries to one size would vastly benefit my future, particularly since I would sit atop 70 percent of all the world's supply of black gold.

The most powerful nation in the world has not been able to maintain the oil supply in Iraq. Saddam Hussein pumped two-and-a-half million barrels a day. We're lucky if we can get a million-and-a-half barrels a day. I would submit that it's not improbable that our mind is not the Iranian mind, that shutting down the Straits of Hormuz, they might argue that ultimately -- and they think much longer term than we do -- our businesses cannot see beyond the next quarterly report, and we who sit here have great difficulty seeing beyond the next election. They see a whole lot further down the road that that.

I would like to suggest that it's not inconceivable that they could argue that shutting down the Straits of Hormuz -- which I think they could do for a protracted period of time -- vigorous mining, sink several super-tankers there, and with the armaments and submarines that they have, I think they could very effectively shut down that Strait. And I'm not sure that they couldn't argue that this could ultimately be in their best interests. What confidence do you have, if that was their mindset, that we could in fact prevent them from doing that?

MR. CLAWSON: Sir, I would suggest that it really is for us to look at what it is that they're preparing to do and what is it that they say they want to do, rather than speculating about what we would do if we were in their shoes, because as you suggested, we may not be well aware of what is their mindset. And I'm always leery of constructing these elaborate explanations about why they must be prepared to do X or must be prepared to do Y, or what lesson they must have drawn from something. I would much rather instead look at what it is that they're preparing to do and what it is that they say they want to do.

And what concerns me about the Strait of Hormuz is that is the area where Iran has held the most military exercises in the last 15 years. The Iranian leaders have repeatedly said that this is something that they would close if their country were under attack. And while I think that that is kind of nutty from their perspective, because it would unite the outside world against them, it is what they've been preparing to do and what they say they would do. And so we ought to take this risk seriously.

I would just suggest, sir, that actually closing the Strait is going to be a very difficult task. During the Iran-Iraq War -- during the so-called tanker war -- there were over 300 attacks on ships in the Strait. They managed to sink exactly four of those 300 ships. It turns out to be much harder to sink an oil tanker than you might think. They are actually great, big ships and they can take a lot of damage. And so I actually am surprised at the DIA's director's judgment that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz briefly. And I suspect that he may be overly pessimistic. But given the fact that he has said this, we ought to take it seriously. And it certainly would be in our interest to find ways to calm world oil markets and financial markets in the event that the Iranians were to try to do what they keep saying and keep practicing to do -- namely to close those straits.

REP. BARTLETT: With the present tight supplies of the world's oil at about $70 a barrel, it wouldn't take much disruption to drive oil prices so high that the world's economies would be gravely threatened.

MR. CLAWSON: Actually you're quite right about where we've been, but that may be changing. For instance, in the last six weeks, Iran has not been about to sell about 450,000 barrels a day of its oil output and has been storing it at sea because it can't find a market for it. And the Saudis have had to throttle back their production by half-a-million barrels a day because they can't find a market for it.

So we seem to be returning to a world in which there is substantial unused capacity -- or some unused capacity. And the last two times that we had very high price increases in oil both in 1973 and 1981, that only lasted about four years before so many people brought on extra production capacity and there were oil conservation measures that the price of oil crashed. So I would just suggest that what's now a tight oil market may not remain a tight oil market that long, and that if, in fact, the U.S. intelligence community is correct, that Iran's nuclear program is proceeding relatively slowly, and by the time Iran's nuclear program reaches a particularly dangerous stage in a few years, the oil market may look very different than it does today.

REP. BARTLETT: I hope you're right. I think you're wrong.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HUNTER: The gentlelady from California is recognized, Ms. Davis.

REP. SUSAN A. DAVIS (D-CA): Thank you.

Thank you gentlemen for being here.

I wanted to go back for a second to your comment that, essentially, the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, is really calling the shots, and wondering whether you think he shares the president's enthusiasm for pursuing a nuclear weapons program. And what will it take? Where do you think he would begin to kind of reign him in essentially, and reign in some of that rhetoric?

And if I may, I also wanted to just focus in a different area as well, which would be the current extent of Iranian cooperation with terrorist groups, either Hamas or Hezbollah in Lebanon. Where do you think that is? And what do you think is happening with the international community cutting off aid to the Palestinian Authority?

MR. TAKEYH: With the question about where the supreme leader lies, in terms of nuclear -- and I will say a national security decision -- as far as we know, some degree of humility has to be injected in this discussion, because there is much that we don't know. But it appears that all the relevant political factions have a seat at the table and they do express their opinion.

The final decision will be made by the supreme leader, but he has to be cognizant of these constituencies and of these opinions and of what the security forces are saying, what the revolutionary Gaza is saying, what the right wing is saying, so he has to essentially have a strategy that meets some of the aspirations. I don't think he can easily and effortlessly overrule them, despite the awesome nature of his title.

Second of all, in his history, Ali Khamenei has been a rather -- in my opinion -- an indecisive politician, much beholden to the right for his -- not just ideological credibility -- but his power base as such. And in some cases, he has been defied by the right when it suited their purposes. However, on this issue I think he will have the final say.

But going back to your question, I have not seen evidence that the supreme leader of Iran has become less suspicious and antagonistic to the United States. He's judicious; he's not irrational; but, you know, he's a hard-liner. The days when we used to talk about how would the reformers contain Khamenei, now we talk about how will Khamenei contain people to his right -- shows how far right the political landscape has moved.

So now in depictions, he is viewed as a judicious person and I think he is in a sense that he's not rash, and he doesn't make impulsive decisions. But I think they have made a decision to have some sort of a nuclear capability.

The one thing that would change this calculus, in my view, is the very fundamental and profound transformation of U.S.-Iran relations, which the current bargaining diplomacy is not intended to. It's more tactical, dealing with a specific measure of concern.

And just to say more briefly about Iran's terrorism portfolio -- over the years, Iran's terrorism portfolio has shrunk in a sense that they are no longer assassinating Iranian dissidents abroad and so forth, but it has maintained links to Hezbollah, which is the most mainstay of Iran's support group. I think its relationship with Hamas has always been tentative. Hamas draws its own source of support from within the Palestinian community and the Persian Gulf States -- Saudis and others -- but there is the Iranian connection with much smaller but much lethal Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

MR. CLAWSON: I would like to agree with what Dr. Takeyh had to say. Just a comment that the decision to change the strategy towards the nuclear program seems to have been made in the spring of 2005 before Ahmadinejad's election on the basis that this was a remarkably propitious moment for Iran to push ahead, because the United States was tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and because oil prices were high, and that in any case, the West was basically just full of hot air, and that if the Iranians ignored the Western objections, that it could just plow ahead. And that decision seems to have been made, based in no small part, on the calculation that, for all the tough words, it might be said that Iran would not pay any serious price for proceeding with its nuclear program.

And all of the statements coming out of Iran in the last week would suggest that the way in which the offer of Vice Secretary Rice runs is being interpreted is proof that this was a correct-type judgment, and therefore just reinforcing the attitude that says that Iran should run with its nuclear program and ignore outside objections -- perhaps not with the fiery rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad, perhaps with a more conciliatory rhetoric. But we know from Iran's previous nuclear negotiator, Hussein Rohani, who wrote a fascinating article in which he described about how his strategy in the negations was, in fact, to stall -- to stall while the program proceeded forward.

REP. HUNTER: The gentlelady's time has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Dr. Schwarz is recognized.

REP. JOE SCHWARZ (R-MI): I thank Dr. Clawson and Dr. Takeyh. for discussing the Strait of Hormuz in a straightforward way which we have not been able to seem to do with some of the active duty military who have come here and discussed the Strait of Hormuz. So thank you very much.

I have two questions. If, in fact, Iran feels it is not in their national interests to blockade the Strait of Hormuz -- if they felt they had to react somehow to the West in some way -- what would be the first overt of defiance, vis-a-vis the U.S. or Russia or China, that Iran would commit, would think of?

Secondly, from the U.S. standpoint, what would be the most productive diplomatic move that we could ask of our allies and quasi- allies -- the Russians, the Chinese, the E3 -- to help create more stability and less angst, vis-a-vis Iran?

MR. TAKEYH: I'll take the second of your questions first. What type of diplomacy could work, and maybe there isn't one. Maybe there's no diplomatic possibility. But the type of diplomacy that could work would be, as I said, a larger attempt to change the dynamics -- political, diplomatic and economic dynamics -- between the United States and Iran.

It's sort of -- the negotiations that are taking place and they are contemplating today deal with the very specific scientific procedure. It's like when in Vienna, U.S. and Soviet arms control negotiators used to talk about throw-aways on individual missiles. When the overall U.S.-Soviet relations were reasonable, the throw-away issue took care of itself. When the overall relations were not good, the throw-away issue remained unresolved. I think the nuclear issue cannot be resolved barring a transformation of political and economic and diplomatic disputes between the U.S. and Iran, because there's a symptom of a problem. And so while there is a larger problem that is unameliorated, then it is unlikely that the symptom can be cured.

How would Iran react, you were saying, to a potential military confrontation with the United States, as I understand it? I would actually suspect that Iran would react the way it has historically reacted, with all the intensity of regulated terrorism, where it can strike on Americans with impunity, which necessarily means anonymity. That would be Iraq, Afghanistan, but it has larger set up targets at its disposal. So in that sense, they can make like in Iraq much more difficult for a reconstruction effort and American presence than it is today -- similarly, Afghanistan and so on. But it has a larger set of options beyond that, before it gets to a provocative and inflammatory procedure, such as closing a waterway -- an international waterway -- that the entire global economy depends on.

MR. CLAWSON: I would agree with Dr. Takeyh that Iran has in the past used irregular warfare as one of its most potent instruments to get at the U.S. interests, when you think of the marine barracks bombing in 1983 for instance. A difficulty it's going to face is that its allies in Iraq are not likely to be happy about this. And they have their own agenda, and their agenda is, in fact, the establishment of a Shia-led government in Iraq and they're not necessarily going to be pleased with the idea of having to fight both the insurgents and the Americans at the same time. So the notion that Iran can just mobilize the Shia community in Iraq to do its bidding strikes me as very exaggerated -- that Iran would have to rely upon its own agents of influence, its intelligence personnel and the like, to make life difficult for us in Iraq.

On the question of what our allies could do that would most help, well, (for instance we ?) may be in a position to offer Iran carrots, our allies are in a position to say to the Iranians that the threat of a stick is a real threat, and that if we're going down the route of this strategy of bigger carrots and bigger sticks, we need to have both the possibility of larger carrots in the United States and the possibility of bigger sticks from our allies. And it would be very useful -- very useful -- if European friends were to be each more explicit about their willingness to apply tough restrictions on Iran, irrespective of what the United Nations does, if Iran does not proceed down this negotiations path, because if we keep saying to the Russians and the Chinese that you are always going to be subject to some really tough restrictions; now do you, Russia and China, want to be part of the process of deciding what those restrictions are, or do you want to sit on the sidelines while we decide and we do it ourselves?

It's more likely that the Russians and Chinese would say, hmm, we'd like to be part of the decision-making process and so, therefore, let's move this to the security council. But so long as the Russians and Chinese have the impression that nothing is going to happen if they exercise their veto, then Russians and the Chinese have every reason to threaten to use that veto. So the more in which we can proceed down the route of the de facto sanctions, which this administration has been pushing, the more, I suspect, that we will be able to accomplish at the United Nations. And there, our economic pressure on Iran, through the financial system, has already gotten the attention of the Iranian banks and quite vigorously.

And it would be useful if the European stepped up their nascent efforts to also urge their banks and their industrial companies to reflect seriously on just how attractive is the Iranian market and how much do companies really want to be involved and seen as helping a country with a nuclear program and active sponsorship of terrorism.

MR. TAKEYH: Let me just way one brief thing about he punitive measures -- the sticks -- that the Patrick was talking about. The documents of the U.S. offer which has been in the press -- I don't know how accurate it is -- there is nothing punitive about those punitive measures. I mean, A through H -- there is nothing in there that the Iranians need to worry about. You know, a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in nuclear negotiations -- that's six people; prohibition of financial investments in nuclear industry -- that's every bank in Russia, which means it's not going to happen.

I mean there is -- I mean, it's hard to -- it would be very hard to augment that in the successive stages of diplomacy, given the fact that your starting point is where you are. Those of us like me, who have advocated engagement, we would have got much further than this in terms of a diplomatic package. I mean, as least we would have mentioned terrorism. So this is a very watering down of the previous U.S. position, both in terms of what it offers Iranians in terms of inducements, which are minimal and insignificant, and what it contemplates in terms of punitive measures which are, as I said, not particularly punitive if they are actually spelt out.

REP. SCHWARZ: Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

REP. HUNTER: The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, is recognized.

REP. JAMES R. LANGEVIN (D-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony here today.

I know we've been talking quite a bit about the Iranian nuclear program and looking at it from different perspectives. I guess what I would like to ask is, along the lines of, Iran has repeatedly stated that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes, though its emphasis on developing its own nuclear -- its own enrichment capabilities suggest that it seeks to build a nuclear weapon. So obviously, an Iran with nuclear weapons would radically change the security outlook in the region, and really would require a major shift in U.S. posture.

So my question is, in your professional opinion, is there any chance that the Iranian nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes, or do you think that it has the specific goal of developing weapons? And on a scale of zero to 100 percent, how confident are you on whatever assessment you would make on that point? And finally, if the goal is to pursue weapons, what ultimately motivates that goal and how likely is it that they can be deterred?

My second area of questioning, if you could, is with respect to the relationship between Ayatollah Khamenei and president Ahmadinejad, how would you characterize that relationship between the two? For years, the supreme leader has held basically unparalleled power in Iran, but Ahmadinejad's inflammatory comments, in efforts to surround himself with hard-liners, have heightened his profile, both in Iran and on the international stage, as you have already mentioned.

Do you think that a modern Ahmadinejad's escalated rhetoric has the tacit approval of Khamenei, or is Ahmadinejad basically acting on his own in moving Iran away from Khamenei's preferred direction? Basically, do we see Ahmadinejad potentially consciously trying to undermine the authority of the supreme leader and thereby weaken that power base that Khamenei has held for so long?

MR. CLAWSON: On the first question, Iran's pursuit of a nuclear fuel cycle means that Iran would have capabilities which, in the words of IAEA Director ElBaradei, would put Iran, quote, "a few months" end quote, away from having a nuclear weapon. So what Iran has openly told us it wants to do -- proudly tells us it wants to do -- is to have a capability which would put it a few months away from having a nuclear weapon.

Now, it's possible that Iran actually hasn't made the decision as to whether or not it's going to make nuclear weapons yet. It may be that Iran is, in fact, postponing that decision until a later date when it gets close to handling to the fissile material or having enriched uranium which it could quickly make into highly-enriched uranium from which it could make the weapons.

So it's possible that, in fact, Iran has not yet crossed that threshold and decided whether it not it makes a bomb. I don't think it's very likely. But even if Iran is just building this enrichment facility that would put it a few months away from having a nuclear weapon, that's a big problem, because Iran's 18-year track record of lying to the IAEA about what it was doing and concealing its activities suggests that we can't trust it to be transparent and open with what it's doing. And so, therefore, the IAEA is calling for Iran to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program before Iran resumes enrichment.

And that's -- after all, what has gotten Iran in trouble today is its record of lying about what it's been doing to the IAEA and not any allegations that it has been involved in a nuclear weapons program, but instead its concealment activities.

On the second question about the relationship between the supreme leader and the president, one assumes that -- as with the two previous presidents - that there's a fair amount of tension there, and that the president chafes at the restrictions of the supreme leader. But at the end of the day, the supreme leader is, in fact, the person who can, indeed, limit the president, who orchestrates the systems of checks and balances that keep the president's power rather limited. The supreme leader, really, has much more influence over the revolutionary institutions -- be it the revolutionary guards, be it the ministry of intelligence, be it the revolutionary foundations which control so much of the economy -- that are the real power centers in Iran.

And so, therefore, I would just argue that, like his two predecessors, this president is being used in order to bring vigor to the system by trying a new tack. And this president, like his two predecessors, really believes in what he's arguing. And he'll be allowed to get a certain distance down that road before the system will yank him back. And indeed, one of the reasons that president Ahmadinejad is likely to crash and burn is that his policies are pretty stupid.

And his economic populist approach, for instance, has scared off Iranian investors from putting their own money into their own country and, instead, there's been massive capital flight from Iran. In a time of dramatically-high oil prices where the rest of the oil- producing countries are having pretty good economic booms, Iran's economy, in fact, is not doing that well and the mood in the country is pretty bad. The stock market continues to fall. It's fallen by over 35 percent in the last year-and-a-half. And I suspect that the bills kind of do you for all these populist promises that Ahmadinejad has made and, if he can't pay those bills and can't deliver, then he's going to lose a lot of his popularity.

MR. TAKEYH: Has Iran made a decision to have a nuclear weapon? I think it's impossible to say that. What we can say is that Iran is determined to have an elaborate nuclear infrastructure that could provide it with that option. I suspect, at this point, they have not made a decision definitively to cross the nuclear threshold because they haven't had to make that decision. And this is a state that is prone to procrastination when it doesn't have to definitively make a decision.

Now, down the road, they may have to confront some hard choices about which direction the nuclear program goes to. And they'll make that decision based upon an entire category of domestic political factors, their regional relationships, the Iraq-U.S.-Iran relations -- and all these things will come into the mix.

The relationship between Ahmadinejad and the supreme leader Khamenei -- if you go back to the 2005 presidential election, particularly in the run off, the one candidate -- Rafsanjani's entire candidacy was explicitly predicated on the fact that I can counter balance the supreme leader -- I have my own claims -- I have my own stature -- I have many supporters within the institutions of this state.

The other candidate did not make such claims.

He said, I'm here as a president who was fully supportive of the supreme leader, not seeking necessary to challenge him.

Now, since then, Ahmadinejad has taken steps that I think were injudicious from the perspective of the supreme leader, particularly the inflammatory rhetoric on Israel. So to some extent, he is prone -- the president -- to go out and make speeches and do things without necessarily clearing them, particularly to domestic audiences. Those speeches are not clear. When he goes abroad maybe his speeches will be. But he is capable of moving beyond the authority of the supreme leader in that sense.

But what we have the concern about is not whether one consolidates power against the other, or whether one is seeking to undermine the other -- it's a meeting of minds -- it's the consensus. And I think, on large issues, there's an agreement between the two -- maybe not on all the tactics, but on essential issues of internal and maybe even foreign policy issues.

REP. HUNTER: The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Texas is recognized, Mr. Conaway.

REP. MICHAEL CONAWAY (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning.

Talk to us a little bit about -- we've obviously got the president's view on what he thinks about Israel. Will you flesh out the overall picture within Iran towards Israel, and also Israel's view back toward Iran, would be one question? The second question is, in the overall grand scheme of trying to contain Iran, do we have to have both Russia and China working with us to make this work, or do we isolate one or the other against each other -- Russia and China -- in order to effectively deter whatever Iran is trying to do with this nuclear program?

MR. CLAWSON: On your second question about Russia and China, there's a lot that the United States can do with its European allies to press Iran in parallel to whatever we may be doing at the United Nations or in a broader coalition with the Russians and the Chinese. And it would be useful for us to pursue those measures that we can accomplish with the European 3 countries that are negotiating with the Iranians, if for no other reason than to say to the Russians and Chinese that they are not indispensable and that, look, we can press Iran on our own.

The fact is that we can put an enormous commercial pressure and financial pressure on Iran without the Russians and the Chinese who really aren't in a position -- they just don't have the institutions and the dense network of relationships. And so they aren't in a position to provide a lot of what it is that the Iranians want. For all of China's dramatic economic growth, the simple fact remains that the Chinese do not have the experience, the connections, the ties. And the Iranians aren't particularly interested in commercial dealings with them the way they are in dealings with the Europeans, and especially the United States.

So there is much that we can do on those fronts. And certainly on the military contingent front there's much we can do without the Russians and the Chinese. And I think it would behoove us to proceed on those front without them.

I think I'll leave it at that.

MR. TAKEYH: I'm going to pick up the (second ?) part of your question on Israel. For a long time, the policy of the Islamic republic that enjoyed consensus across the spectrum was that Israel is an illegitimate state. It's a usurper of Islamic lands. It is an agent of American imperialism. So its essential right to exist was contested, which goes farther than the Iranian position towards the United States.

The Iranian position towards the United States is America is a reprehensible imperial power, but they don't contest our right to exist. I mean, they acknowledge that. And they don't call for us.

In the late '90s under their reformist tenure, there was an amendment made to Iran's anti-Israeli policy, mainly that we don't -- we think Israel is an illegitimate state, but if the Palestinians and others want to accept a peace treaty with Israel, we're willing to concede to it.

What Ahmadinejad tried to do in his speech -- Israel must be wiped off the map -- but that wasn't the most important passage. Down the road, in some passages, he suggested that essentially, even if other countries accept peace with Israel -- Saudi Arabia, Palestinian Authority, and so on -- we're not obligated to accept that. And he was rebuffed on that front by the regime.

So I think the essential policy of Iran is, we don't think that Israel has a right to be a part of the community of nations in the Middle East. We will support militant groups who share that perspective. But if the Palestinian Authority, if the regional states, come to some sort of a peace accord with Israel, we are willing to grudgingly and reluctantly concede to that.

REP. CONAWAY: Kind of go in the other direction -- Israel's view back toward Iran and how they view the threat.

MR. CLAWSON: Well, the Israelis are determined to see the Iranians' confrontation with the world the nuclear issue not be converted into an Iran-Israel confrontation, because that does not serve Israel's interests in the least. And indeed, I would suggest that the United States government has also put a lot of efforts into making sure that the nuclear issue is seen as a matter of Iran fulfilling its treaty obligations under the nonproliferation treaty, and not a dispute between the United States and Iran.

So long as the Israelis are reasonably confident that the world community is addressing this problem in a timely manner, then they're quite satisfied. Their great worry is that the Iranians are going to succeed at stalling.

And there, we've got a problem, which is that the U.S. intelligence assessment is that the Iranian nuclear program is proceeding quite slowly, whereas the Israelis are by no means convinced of that. And they're worried, in fact, that the Iranian program may be making more progress than we think. And they would point out that, when the Iranians unfroze their enrichment activities recently, the Iranians made dramatic progress very quickly which, to their minds, suggests that Iran may have had some clandestine activities in which it was making progress which it could then suddenly bring out into the open.

So this is going to be a more and more difficult problem as go forward, if we are in a protracted sporadic negotiating process, which the United States sees as being rather successful, because we're broadening the international coalition, whereas the Israelis get worried that the Iranians, meanwhile, are proceeding with their program. Managing the differences in perceptions is going to be a real challenge as we move forward.

REP. CONAWAY: Thank you very much.

My time has expired. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HUNTER: The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is recognized.

REP. RICK LARSEN (D-WA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Clawson, the first question is for you. In your testimony, you talk about a deter-and-contain policy that could happen, but in order to contain you need to build the box. And what we heard in testimony is that the Gulf Cooperation Council would hardly be cooperative in helping us to build that containment. So could you walk through some of the steps that we could take if we went to a deter-and-contain policy on Iran?

MR. CLAWSON: Well, I would suggest that, in fact, many of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries realize that they're small, and that Iran's this large country, and that Iran's going to be their neighbor for the a long time. And so, therefore, they don't want to be in the lead and they don't want to be perceived as the ones who are charging ahead again the Iranians.

But that's the typical problem of small countries on the border of a large country, whether its Belgium worried about how to confront the Soviet Union or whether it's the United Arab Emirates about how to deal with the Iranian threat.

And the response, I would suggest, of the GCC monarchies has been rather like that of the small European countries, mainly to seek a large outside power which can play the dominant role, while quietly encouraging that large outside power to take a tough stance. And indeed, there have been any number of political thinkers and those close to the regimes in a number of the GCC countries who have suggested that, if it came down to it and it were necessary, those GCC countries would be prepared to provide access to the military facilities on their countries for use by U.S. forces in carrying out attacks on Iran.

And indeed, I hear quite a bit about that, all in that direction. But they would hope that the United States would have the -- would understand why it is that the GCC countries want to keep this discreet, because they don't want to be seen as the ones that are out there in the lead.

REP. LARSEN: I have a very short time and I want to get to Dr. Takeyh.

MR. CLAWSON: Thank you.

REP. LARSEN: It would seem, though, pretty obvious to me that, once we had U.S. troops stationed in any of these countries, what was going on -- there wouldn't be anything discreet about it. And so we'd still get a level of non-cooperation from countries that we'd like to have cooperate.

Sorry, I'm just trying to figure out what specific steps could we take on a containment strategy.

MR. CLAWSON: We'd like to see them more actively involved in protecting the Strait of Hormuz. We'd like to see them talking more actively about the threat from the Iranian nuclear program. If they want to discuss it as an environmental threat, let them. But the fact that they're sending the Omani foreign minister and sending other high-level delegations to Iran to raise their concerns about this program, that's useful.

REP. LARSEN: Okay.

MR. CLAWSON: In fact, they issued a statement recently in which they said that there should be a nuclear-free zone in the Persian Gulf -- not in the Middle East, which -- you know, they said, look, don't get Israel involved in this. Let's just have a nuclear-free zone here.

So they've taken some steps. I'd like to see them take a bunch of steps more in that direction. In particular, I'd like to see them call upon us to have an exercise in the Strait of Hormuz.

REP. LARSEN: Okay.

Dr. Takeyh. Is it Takeyh?

MR. TAKEYH: Yeah, that's fine.

REP. LARSEN: Sorry, yeah. Saw you on Farid Zacharia's show, you got me very interested in this issue.

On China, what approach -- in talking about North Korea a while ago -- I think Michael O'Hanlon was here and said a problem with dealing with North Korea at the time was that we had an approach to North Korea. We just didn't have an approach to any of our partners in dealing with North Korea. And so that's since changed. But I think that the same theme would be -- what approach do we take to, say, China, to get them to where we would want them to get to when it came to the U.N. Security Council? Are there things that China would be interested in us helping them get to a point where they could be more helpful?

MR. TAKEYH: I actually think China is less of a concern than Russia is because, as you say, the Chinese have a lot of different relationships with the United States -- an expanding commercial relationship, expanding trade relationships. And in terms of East Asian security, the Chinese have to be cooperative with the United States' stabilization of the North Korean Peninsula. So there's a lot of areas of cooperation and agreement between the two countries that are going to effect how the Chinese behave toward Iran, irrespective of their energy relationship that is growing as well.

But ultimately, I think there is a structural ceiling to how far China, and for that matter Russia, will go in terms of the Security Council. I think you can probably get the Chinese and the Russians to have some sort of a resolution in the Security Council under Chapter 7 that decries Iran as a source of international threat and stability, but not much beyond that.

And the last time when the oil issue was at the table, it was one of the rare occasions that the Chinese actually threatened to use their veto power, and that was over an issue with Sudan, as everyone knows. The People's Republic of China, since assuming a seat at the Security Council, has been rather parsimonious about its veto power outside Taiwan.

So would the Chinese threaten to veto a resolution on their own? No. If the Russians take the lead, would they follow the Russian leader? I suspect they would. So there's a ceiling on how far these countries are going to go.

And there's another issue that we're not discussing here that haunts these U.N. deliberations; there's the specter of Iraq, namely the perception out there -- erroneous or otherwise -- that this is a process that the United States is going through to justify and give illegal protection to its predetermined policy of use of force. We don't want to talk about it, because there's also enough damaging talk East, but that's there, that's the perception. And the Russians have spelt it out, that this is not going to be Iraq re-talks.

I will say one brief thing about containment of Iran. Bahrain is a country of 700,000. Bahrain isn't going to contain Iran. The regional containment of Iran has to come from the larger powers -- Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Iraqi premier has gone on and said Iran has a right to enrich uranium and Iraq is unlikely to be a barrier to Iranian influence. It's a fractured state; it's a destabilized state; it's a weakened state without measurable armed forces. Bringing American troops back to Saudi Arabia -- the other large country in the region -- they don't want us there in that level of visibility, and I think for the sake of stability of Saudi Arabia, we should not be there.

REP. HUNTER: The gentleman's time has expired. I have questions that I haven't asked. I'm next on the line. What I'm going to do is temporarily recess the hearing and invite any members that want to come back for whatever time we can take, so we will recess until this vote is over.

(Recess.)

REP. CURT WELDON (R-PA): The committee will reconvene, and the hearing will continue. I don't know how many members we are going to be joined by, but I will take some time for questioning, and if no other members show, then we will adjourn.

We may submit some questions for the record. I would ask you both if you would consider responding to those.

I want to thank you again for your appearance today. This is an issue that's been very troubling to me as a member of this committee for a number of years, primarily because I have a very severe lack of confidence in the intelligence committee's assessment, other than technical intelligence, of what's happening inside of Iran, and I think our -- my own opinion is our intelligence community has been a dismal failure when it comes to understanding the changes occurring inside of Iran, and second, my concerns relate to -- in my opinion -- our mishandling of our relationship with Russia, and the significant presence that Iran has in Russia to a number of lobbying interests that are very prevalent inside the Russian Duma and the Federation Council.

I travel to Russia quite frequently -- I've probably been there 45 times -- and I know the Duma inside and out, and I can tell you Russia has a significant presence inside of Moscow from Iran. And in talks I had this past year with General Chemezov, who is the 4-star general who runs Rosoboron Export, as you all know they exported $6.1 billion of arms last year, and a significant market for those arms is Iran.

In fact, it was this committee that led the effort back in 1997 when the Israelis came out with evidence that Iran was getting cooperation on a new missile system that we took action. We introduced the Iran Missiles Sanctions Bill, which simply said that the White House at the time enforced the treaty. The Missile Technology Control Regime says that Russia cannot be cooperating with Iran on this time of missile system.

The bill garnered significant support in the House and Senate and passed with veto-proof margins -- 398 House votes, 98 Senate votes -- and that summer, President Clinton vetoed the bill. As you all know, Iran has a Shahab-3 missile system. In fact, not only did they deploy it two years ago, but on May 23rd while the Israeli Prime Minister was here in Washington, they tested it. That test was reported in the public, and while I won't go into classified information, the classified response is not different from the public response.

So in effect, our own policies and our own mishandling of our relations with Iran and Russia have caused us partly, in my opinion, to be where we are today, and I think the same thing is true of the nuclear program.

Three years ago, the head of the Kurchatov Institute, Yevgeny Vilokoff, along with the head of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minister Rumyantsev, approached me and said they would be willing to establish a joint American-Russian oversight of the fuel for the Bushehr Nuclear Reactor. And I went to the administration and they did nothing with it. And now today, we are worrying about Bushehr and whether or not this is a precursor -- which I am convinced of, there is no doubt in my mind. You both said that you are not sure. Well, I can tell you I am absolutely certain Iran is crashing on a nuclear weapons program. It's not just for the conventional needs of their quality of life. It is also part and parcel of their military.

So therefore, my own opinion is that we have to have a proactive strategy -- not for war. That's the last thing that we need, and I do not support that. That would be a tragic mistake, because the Iranian people are not the problem. In fact, they want to be friends with the West.

I did live interviews on the Iranian TV networks in California three months ago, for four hours, and we took 200 phone calls from inside of Iran, and we took them in Farsi and we took them in English, on Zia's television show on NITV, and the response was overwhelmingly the same -- that they want to get rid of this radical regime headed by this puppet of Ayatollah Khameini.

So I feel that we need to put more effort in the external support for those forces in Iran, like the students and the readers that in fact want to try to bring out real reform in Iran, but I also think that we have to have a strategic relationship with Russia, and we don't have that.

Now it's easy to blame Russia for all of that. I blame our own policies in the '90s and even in this administration for not building the trust and the confidence, and to allow the Russians to believe that we truly respect them. Two years ago I gave the administration a 4-part strategy to bring Russia back into the fold -- four steps that we could take that do not hurt us at all -- to allow Putin to come back and save some face with the FSB crowd that he's now pandering to and to use Putin as a lever to assist us in getting Russia to significantly support our objectives.

If I were a Russian today, I would have significant reason to want to support America's position relative to Iran. I'd be looking at my own parochial interests, and my concerns about Iran developing capabilities. But they have their thumb on Iran -- they have their thumb on Iran. They designed the Bushehr plant, they designed the Shahab missile system, and they have an extremely close relationship with Iran. We don't have a relationship with Russia that will allow us to have that kind of leverage with the Iranian regime that we need at this point in time.

I do have a couple of questions I would like to ask you. I asked these questions at the classified brief that we had yesterday. Now, I'm not going to reveal what they said, but I want to compare what they said, classified, to what you say publicly. My colleagues will know the answers and will be able to justify the two, even though I can't reveal them in public.

The first is: there have been at least five major press reports that Bin Laden has been in and out of Iran since 2001. You've read some of those press reports quoting from anonymous intelligence officials. Well, yesterday on the record, I got the intelligence community to officially respond on the record, and that's a matter of the record today.

In your assessment as academics, have you seen any evidence, and do you believe there is any credibility that Bin Laden himself has been inside of Iran? Now, we know his son has been there -- I'm asking about Bin Laden himself.

MR. TAKEYH: I just haven't seen that, but that's not something that I would come across. I mean, that's more of an intelligence community assessment, but what I rely on is public sources, press reports, speeches and so on. So I just -- I'm just unaware of that.

REP. WELDON: Do you think it's out of the question that Bin Laden would travel to Iran since the attack on September 11th?

MR. TAKEYH: I think where Bin Laden probably feels most safe would be in the uncharted Pakistani --

REP. WELDON: Baluchistan.

MR. TAKEYH: -- territory in Afghanistan, Pakistan, where he can rely on the tribal networks and so forth. And that has been a very effective means of concealing his presence in his network. So long as that's not disrupted because of the Pakistani -- lack of cooperation from Pakistani intelligence, I'm not quite sure if there is a compelling reasons for him to leave.

MR. CLAWSON: I would share that assessment. Is it out of the question that the Iranian government would allow Bin Laden to visit Iran? No. The Iranian government's approach to these matters has always been to look for bargaining cards, and it might pay to keep their options open.

REP. WELDON: Do you think the leaks that we can consistently see out of the intelligence committee relative to Iran -- how significant have they, if at all, harmed our ability to deal with the situation there? And I refer specifically to a series that was written by Dana Priest in The Washington Post as a precursor to the articles that ultimately gave her the Pulitzer, when she -- through anonymous CIA sources -- revealed that French intelligence was really a key part of our assessment by the CIA, and specifically our assessments of what was happening in Iran. So have the leaks affected us that much? I mean, are they something that we should be worrying about, and what impact if any have they had?

MR. TAKEYH: I think it was largely known that the best intelligence on Iran was from the French. I mean, that's something that people heard. Now, do leaks damage the -- I mean, if I knew about it, I'm sure the Iranians knew that the French intelligence was the best on their country.

I would say the American Intelligence Services assessments of Iran, in terms of their political assessment of Iran, is rather weak because of, simply, the lack of expertise and capability that apparatus. Now, whether the news reports actually retard American efforts to penetrate Iran in terms of intelligence, I just have -- I just don't have an informed opinion on that.

MR. CLAWSON: The U.S. intelligence community started raising concerns vigorously about Iran's nuclear program in the early-1990s. In retrospect, what we now know from the revelations to the IAEA is that's about the same time that Iran's nuclear program was making considerable advances, and Iran was starting a lot of nuclear activities.

So perhaps it's coincidental, but I don't think so.

REP. WELDON: The Iranian elections that occurred last summer -- I want to get your assessment and what you were saying before those elections, and I asked this question also of the Intelligence community yesterday, both the individual agencies and the collective assessment, and there was general agreement -- and I don't think this is necessarily classified -- but the conventional wisdom was that Rafsanjani was going to win the election. Did either of you report prior to the election, and if so, what was your assessment of what was going to happen in the Iranian election last summer?

MR. TAKEYH: I think actually both of us thought the run-off -- the second round of elections, that Ahmadinejad would win.

REP. WELDON: No, I mean the first -- the first election.

MR. TAKEYH: First, I thought that actually the candidate that would make it through the run-off with Rafsanjani was former parliamentary speaker Karubi, and I think, barring electoral irregularities, that would have been the case.

REP. WELDON: But on the second run-off, you both thought that Ahmadinejad was going to win?

MR. TAKEYH: Yeah, yeah.

REP. WELDON: Did you predict that publicly?

MR. TAKEYH: I think I might have done it in a program with Farid Zacharia. I don't know -- yeah, I will look at the transcripts.

MR. CLAWSON: Now, you called me up and asked me who I thought was going to win and I said I thought -- I thought, in the end, Rafsanjani. I thought Rafsanjani, in the end, would win.

MR. TAKEYH: Oh, okay.

REP. WELDON: Well, the collective wisdom of the intelligence community and the American leaders and leaders around the world was that Rafsanjani is going to win. Do you really believe that the elections were valid?

MR. CLAWSON: Well, you know, Rafsanjani gave a very interesting interview about 10 days ago, a little less, in which he was asked about his statements the day after the election, that he had many complaints about the election but he would reserve them for the Divine Court of Justice. And he was asked if, well, gee, perhaps you'd like to revisit that, and he said, no, because it would only add another page to the complaints that outsiders were making about the legitimacy of our government.

REP. WELDON: But do you personally, as professionals, think that the elections were legitimate?

MR. CLAWSON: Well, given that Rafsanjani has provided some considerable detail about how the elections were not, and since he's a man who has a lot of experience in knowing how to rig the elections, I think he recognizes how the elections are rigged.

I will just also point out that Iran's Interior Minister, who noted that the document which is used by people when they vote -- because that's how the voting takes place in Iran is there is a document that's called the -- people call it their birth certificate in which a stamp is placed once you vote -- the Interior Minister noted that there were millions and millions of extra ones of them floating around.

MR. TAKEYH: The first round of elections, I think you can make a case that Ahmadinejad had gone from eighth place in the polls to second was rather dubious. Second round of elections, I think Ahmadinejad was capable on his own, with a clever campaign that he ran, to beat Rafsanjani, given the fact that he illustrated the differences between them -- one was an austere humble person serving the people, the other one was corrupt and living in luxury and opulence. I think that message would work.

MR. CLAWSON: Hey, I actually agree with that, but I just don't think that that's what happened. In other words, I think it's possible Ahmadinejad would have one the second round of elections, but I don't think that's what actually did happen. They reported this massive turn-out and this massive election victory by Ahmadinejad and I don't think that's --

REP. WELDON: Well, maybe it was a coincidence, but I had a source that I've been cultivating for several years who actually, four days before the election, faxed me the results of the Iranian presidential election. And I took that piece of paper that was faxed to me from a Paris hotel to the fourth floor of the Capital building for a meeting with Chairman Pete Hoekstra, who is the chairman of our Intelligence Oversight Committee, and we had three staffers in the room, and I said, Pete, here is who is going to win the Iranian election in four days, and he said, what do you mean, and I said, well, look, here it is; if it's wrong, then this person is obviously an embarrassment; but if it's right, then maybe we should ask the intelligence community what their assessment was. Well, the prediction was that Ahmadinejad would win with 60 percent of the vote, and four days later, he won with 62 percent of the vote.

So I asked Pete Hoekstra to go back to the intelligence community and ask them what their assessment was in the daily brief to the president before the election. I asked the same question, by the way, yesterday. Conventional wisdom was that they thought Rafsanjani was going to win but they did not give the President a prediction.

Now in spite of what you all may say about, oh, we knew this was going to happen, our intelligence community didn't, because they did not make a prediction to President Bush. In the daily brief, they said they could not make that prediction. Yet four days before -- not one day before -- the source that I gave to Pete Hoekstra in a written document said that Ahmadinejad would win with 60 percent of the vote.

What bothers me is that our intelligence community just doesn't get it -- much like one of the highest-ranking KGB defectors in history, Vasili Mitrokhin, when he tried to emigrate to the West in 1992 and offer us a treasure-trove of KGB secret documents. He walked into our embassy in London and our CIA station chief said, thanks but no thanks; we don't want your data -- even though he'd been the chief archivist for the KGB.

So instead he went to the British intelligence service and they took him in, and they granted him status in this country. He lived there until he died last year. And they allowed Vasili Mitrokhin into what was British intelligence, in what they called the largest treasure-trove of information in the history of the KGB. And then they assigned him to work with a friend of mine, Dr. Christopher Andrews, at Cambridge who, in 1998, published the first of two documents called The Mitrokhin Files -- the secret files of the KGB. The Mitrokhin files, in the end, our own intelligence admit, were a key piece of information about what the KGB have been doing for decades that we just did not want to take in because we reject walk- ins.

And one of my biggest frustrations is, again, the CIA, in the case of Iran, has failed to pursue human intelligence, because of linkages to people in the past, have embarrassed the CIA, like Ghorbanifar. I never knew Ghorbanifar. He was a CIA creation. He was created by the CIA in the Iran Contra Affair.

But to deny us relevant intelligence about the steps that were being taken in Iran over the past three years, almost all of which now have come out to be true -- the Iranians sending teams up into North Korea to acquire nuclear technology; the attempted assassination plot against Mullah Sistani; the funding by Ayatollah Khameini of $50 million into Bani Sadar before anybody in America knew who Bani Sadar was; the establishment of the Council of Nine as a separate group advising Ayatollah Khameini, separate from the government; the fact that they were crashing on a nuclear program not just at Bushehr but at Isfahan.

All of that was given to the CIA three years ago, and now it's all coming out into the light. So my problem has been what I perceive to be a lack of reality on the part of the agency to deal effectively and aggressively with understanding what's happening in Iran.

I remember a trip I led to Iraq a year ago. Senator Biden was with me; it was a congressional House delegation, but he asked to join us. We ended our classified briefing from the intelligence community and they talked about the intelligence in Iraq and Syria, and they talked about the surrounding countries.

And when we went to Iran, the briefer, who was a 1-star, said, it's a black hole; we just don't have information. And to me that's part of the reason why we have a problem. The failure of our intelligence community to give us solid information based on opportunities that we've missed, but also to aggressively pursue a more constructive relationship with Russia. With that, I will turn to my friend and colleague -- because I know he has questions -- Mr. Franks, and then I'll come back for some more of my own frustrations.

REP. TRENT FRANKS (R-AZ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen.

I wanted to go back, Dr. Clawson, to a point that you'd made earlier, and that is that this disparate view between Israel and the United States' predictive notions on when Iran might gain a nuclear capability, and I guess, first of all, I would ask you: do you believe that Israel's questioning our prediction is predicated at all upon the notion that we didn't predict North Korea very well? I mean, first of all, was North Korea something that we saw coming getting a nuclear capability? And, if not, what do you think the basis of that failure was? And does it have anything to do with Israel's questioning of our predictions now?

MR. CLAWSON: We had a great deal of difficulty knowing what kind of progress Libya or Iraq or North Korea were making on their nuclear programs, and that would just suggest that this is a very hard thing to do, or at least the U.S. hasn't figured out how to do it. And, indeed, I would suggest that there's not much evidence that other intelligence services around the world have done much better than the United States at this. So it would be prudent for the Israelis to assume that, in fact, this is something that's really hard to do, and not surprising that, therefore, they may be very cautious in their assessment by assuming that Iran is making quite a bit or progress.

REP. FRANKS: I guess -- I think that's my central point here, and it leads me -- Israel cannot possibly countenance a nuclear capability by Iran. It puts Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in unimaginable danger, and any leader of Israel has to recognize that, if the rest of the world does not intervene and make that not happen, that they would probably have to do some type of preemptive effort there to protect their citizens.

And I think that that is a recipe for world destabilization, and it occurs to me -- and I guess it's really my last question here to you -- it occurs to me that if we're about trying to stabilize, you know, the world peace on this plant -- that if we're going to have any foundational premise with Iran, it has to be that Iranian nuclear capability, in terms of weapons, is absolutely not a possibility from the United States' perspective, whether or not the rest of the world joins us in that commitment or not.

Because it occurs to me that if we start on any other premise, that it could change the whole construct of our foreign policy there and how we move forward with Iran. It seems like we have to start out with the foundational premise that it is not in the best interests -- nor can the United States accept, an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. And do you agree with that? And if not, what is to stop Israel from being in the untenable position of having to respond if the rest of the world does not?

MR. TAKEYH: I think the president has said that, that Iran's nuclear weapon is an unacceptable thing. The question is, does Israel have the military logistical capability of actually disarming Iran's nuclear infrastructure that, based upon all we know, is disbursed on the ground; in some cases urbanized; in lots of cases we don't know where it is. So in that sense, Israeli concerns are not matched, I think, by the Israeli capabilities, as we understand them, unless there's some other things happening.

The ramifications of Iran having a nuclear weapon are just dramatic. They're dramatic in terms of -- none more so than on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the international non-proliferation regime -- it would spell the end of the NPT. And I think NPT, since its inception in 1968, despite the fact that it has some structural problems and requires modernization, has served a valuable role in regulating the spread of such weapons. So the impact of Iran -- if Iran becomes the second country, other than North Korea, that actually develop a nuclear capability under the auspices of NPT -- North Korea has left -- that'll actually mean NPT is no longer a relevant treaty, and I think it'll be discarded. And I'm not -- I'm actually certain that that's not a good thing.

REP. FRANKS: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I just have to say to you that it looks like in, you know, North Korea's case, we paid the ransom but did not secure the hostage. And in this circumstance, I think it's incumbent upon you and the rest of us to really, cognitively understand the significance of Iran having a nuclear capability, and trying to mobilize ourselves to interdict that, because I do think Israel can respond effectively. It may not be to, say, disarm them, but they can certainly destroy Iran, and I think that that's, you know -- we'll reach that ultimate end. And I just think that that is such a danger to the world if we don't prevent that inevitable conflict from occurring, if Iran should gain a nuclear capability or get close to gaining one.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. WELDON: I thank the gentleman.

And building on the gentleman's line of questioning, it amazes me that, again, the intelligence community and the administration back in the '90s were denying the fact of what India and Pakistan were doing. I mean, we saw the transfers of technology going from China to Pakistan: the M-11 missiles, the ring magnets. We weren't stupid, and we knew that Russia was supplying some help to India, although a lot of their capability was indigenous. And I remember -- I think it was in '98 -- when the administration came out and expressed indignation that India and Pakistan had both medium-range missiles and nuclear capability, and I wrote an op-ed for the L.A. Times and I called it, you know, "Shallow Indignation."

And my concern is that we don't head down that same path with Iran. We pretend that things aren't happening that are happening, and all of a sudden we wake up one day and, oh, well, Iran now has a nuclear -- we already know they have a medium-range missile, because a Shahab-3 has already been deployed -- and they had the audacity, on the very day that the Israeli prime minister was in Washington meeting with the President Bush, to test the Shahab-3, to test it in a way that obviously was to send a signal to us. It wasn't just a random test. It was a test that was evidently, apparently, eventually picked up by the international media.

So my concern is in line with what the gentleman has said. And I've met with Israeli defense leaders repeatedly. They do not believe what I think is a very naive approach of the national intelligence estimate and John Negroponte, that they will not have a nuclear weapon for 10 years. That's almost as funny as NIA 9519, which this committee challenged, when the CIA said, in a political way, to justify the president's veto of our defense bill that year, that there would be no ballistic missile threat to the U.S. for at least 15 years.

Three years later, North Korea launched the Taepo Dong over Japan. And the Taepo Dong, the CIA had to acknowledge, had a capability to provide a late payload against America's landmasses. Three years -- not 15.

And my concern is the overly optimistic assessment that Ambassador Negroponte has put forward publicly, that it will be 10 years -- and I asked this in great detail with the intelligence community yesterday, and I can tell you, while I can't give details, the intelligence assessment was not necessarily as optimistic as the assessment by the ambassador. But I can tell you that the Israelis believe that it's going to be far shorter than 10 years, perhaps as much as two years, for a crude nuclear capability.

Now, I assume, based on what you both said today, that you don't share that; that you don't think there's any way they can have a nuclear capability within two years even if they're able to do it through proliferation. Is that correct, or is that not correct?

MR. CLAWSON: I would be concerned that the longer time goes with regard to the additional protocol investigation inspections by the IAEA, we don't have a clear picture of how the Iranian program is proceeding.

And, certainly, when the Iranians unfroze their enrichment activities earlier this year, they seemed to make such rapid progress that that could be consistent with them having clandestine enrichment facilities someplace else. So the degree of uncertainty about the Iranian program seems to be rising.

And a lot of the judgment about how quickly it will be before Iran gets a nuclear weapon is based not on a technical question, but on a question of Iranian intentions and policy; namely, does one think that Iran is going to make an all-out effort to build one nuclear weapon, or is Iran going to instead try to have an arsenal of at least several nuclear weapons when it first builds one? Because, after all, if you just build one and then you test it, then you don't have anything. And if Iran were to make that mad dash for just one weapon, that could be done much more quickly than if Iran decides to, instead, aim at having quite a stockpile of fissile material that it could converge into several weapons in a rapid break-out. That's not a technical question. That's a policy question, and we're not in a good position to answer what the decision will be about that.

MR. TAKEYH: I actually think that probably the best assessment of Iran's nuclear program was done by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think-tank, when they issued a dossier -- I think it was last year. They estimated, I think, within five years. I mean, the physics of this largely eludes me, but it seems it was a very detailed document about how long. So there are varying assessments of it.

And a lot of it has to do, I think, with what Patrick was saying about political decisions as opposed to technical progress. Is it a crash program? Is it an accelerated program? Is it a suspended program. Is it a program that we know anything about? And here, again, the absence of intrusive IAEA inspections, I think, increasingly puts us in a black box about how far the country may progress.

REP. WELDON: Well, I share your concern, and, again, I do not support military action against Iran. And, in fact, as I have, with both North Korea and Libya, I believe that in spite of pronouncements by the administration, we in the Congress should reach out and attempt to have some dialog; not undermining the administration, because that's not the purpose of the Congress, but, rather, to allow those parties to know that we, in fact, support the administration's ultimate objectives, but that we want to assure them that if they follow through on the commitments that we seek, that we in the Congress, as democrats and republicans, would support the movement toward normalization of relations, as we're doing with Libya.

In fact, I made an overture to the Egyptians when they were in my office a month ago, to have a conference in Alexandria that would involve members of the Russian parliament; I would bring a team of American members of Congress; the Egyptians would host it; and they would invite members of the Iranian Parliament to attend for low-key discussions, off the record, just to try to establish some kind of dialog. So, in spite of being the vice chairman of this committee, I don't think that always having the big stick up in the air is the answer. I believe that aggressive diplomacy is necessary.

But I believe, to have aggressive diplomacy, you've got to have good intelligence; and if you don't have good intelligence, then it's very hard and difficult to make a decision and to understand what your ultimate options are. And I also believe that we have to have Russia as a key partner here. The ultimate solution for Korea is going to involve Russia; it's going to involve Russian energy, because we're never going to agree to a nuclear agreement like we did with Akido (ph). It's going to involve oil and gas probably coming down from Sakoli. And the ultimate solution to Iran has got to involve Russia as well.

Now, let me ask you another question. We have finally put some money on the table, American tax money, to help fund the Iranian -- I guess you would call it diaspora here in our country, which is, I guess, well over a million-and-a-half people, primarily in California. I support that. Do you believe that funding these proactive groups of Iranians living in America is the right course for us to be taking? I think we're, this year, putting $80 million on the table. Should it be more? Should it be less? Is that the right strategy for us in terms of reaching out to the Iranian people?

MR. CLAWSON: Reaching out to the Iranian people is an excellent approach, and the core of what the administration has proposed is greater funding for international broadcasting; and the additional funding that's proposed includes funding for human rights organizations and other non-governmental organizations. I would hope that we could find ways, if we can, to support organizations in Iran or with close links with Iranians. I note that the Europeans have had some success with some $6 million of their own money in funding non- government organizations in Iran primarily working for U.N. agencies. And I would hope we can find effective ways to look at those funds.

I'm skeptical about funding Iranian diaspora organizations here in the United States. Frankly, their politics are quite complicated, quite Byzantine and quite fractious, and it would be unfortunate if there were the impression created that we were in the business of picking and choosing who were the representative organizations in Iran. I'd much rather try to find ways in which we can fund even modest and largely apolitical efforts inside Iran by organizations that, as large as possible, are somewhat independent of the government. And, as I say, the Europeans have been working at this with a lot of problems, and I think we could have even more problems than they would have. But that's where I would concentrate my core effort for funding non-government organizations.

MR. TAKEYH: I must say, the task at hand should be to reconnect the two societies, the Iranian-American societies that have been estranged for a long time. I think a more judicious use of money would be a scholarship for Iranian students, more people-to-people exchanges. I'm not quite sure if the broadcast is the way to go, because Iran is not an information-starved society. There are satellites, T.V.s. There is all kinds of access to BBC radio and all that. Whenever you ask administration officials and say, what kind of a radio program do you want to finance, they say, well, a politically- neutral program like BBC Persian Service.

The problem with that argument is there's already something that does that. It's called the BBC Persian Service. So, in my estimation, there is a passivity and a lack of political activism on the part of the Iranian people. Why is that the case, given the deficiencies of the Iranian regime? That's a penetrating analytical question. It's not because there's a lack of radio broadcasts. There's all kinds of information getting into Iran, and even Iranian newspapers still have some degree of discussion, debate and dissent.

But if the money is used, as I said, to connect the two societies together more at a people level of exchange, particularly in terms of student scholarships and so on, then I think that could be a more effective use of that funding.

REP. WELDON: Are you saying that you do not support the Voice of America Persian broadcasting to the country?

MR. TAKEYH: I actually -- one of the people that do watch Voice of America, just to improve my Persian comprehension, and I'm not quite sure if Persian if VOA broadcasts are necessarily a complement to BBC radio, which has a much better Persian service. It's 24 hours and it's all radio, where much of the nation can have access to shortwave exchanges.

MR. CLAWSON: But we don't even know that what the administration's proposing is, in fact, to shut down the VOA radio and focus entirely on television, which the BBC does not do. And the BBC is seeking additional funding to expand and improve its radio. So I think that we've got something of a division of labor going on here, with them taking over radio, and us doing satellite television.

REP. WELDON: Personally, I think we should be supporting both the BBC's broadcast and Voice of America's. I understand the concerns you raise about picking and choosing other services, and there are at least 13 that I'm aware of, both TV and radio. And I've appeared on them, because I think it's important to have a free and open dialog. In fact, when I took the calls from Iran, from hundreds of callers over a four-hour period that we did this live dialog -- and one caller, only one out of the entire series, defended Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khameini -- I said, well, I'll tell you what, have the supreme leader invite me to Tehran. And being an academic and a professor at a Philadelphia university, I'll come and give a speech or I'll debate in there. If there really is an openness, then let's have a debate and a dialog, and let's do it at the university, in front of the students.

Well, obviously that's not going to be the case. I think it's important that we do reconnect and find every possible way to have linkages to student groups, to business groups, healthcare groups. But I also think that we have to encourage and push that, as well as the second track, which is to try to find a way to bring Russia back as a strategic partner in, ultimately, solving the Iranian problem.

I want to thank you both for being here today. I know you have a time limitation. I have a personal interest in this issue because of my involvement on this committee, but I do really appreciate your work. I read your work, and while I may not always agree with you, I think you have excellent insights, and we deeply appreciate that service to our country and for our colleagues to share. Thank you very much.

This hearing now stands adjourned.