Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
Related Country:
- Iran
- North Korea
[Unofficial translation from Russian.]
. . .
Foreign Minister Lavrov: I want to be objective and will note the efforts which the American side undertook, perhaps even overstepping itself in some respects, and made reasonable compromises with Pyongyang, thus enabling unblocking the negotiation process. That said, I shall stress that we would like to see the same sensible flexibility not to the detriment of the principles of nonproliferation, which we all uphold, with respect to the Iranian nuclear problem as well, where probably it would be possible to apply something like that, without fixing on the defense of the prestige of one's own position, but by having a look on the basis of professional assessments at the borderline which can be adopted without a risk for the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
There is little time to go on Iran. On February 21 a report on compliance with the previous resolution will already be made. We are undertaking energetic efforts to find some solutions. Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Igor Ivanov went to Teheran, where he met with leaders of the country. After this the Supreme Leader's foreign policy adviser Ali Akbar Velayati came to Moscow. We are actively working with Iran and see an objective possibility to find a compromise solution which would open the way to negotiations without a risk for the nonproliferation regime. Our contacts currently being held with the American, European and Chinese partners are directed at just this aim. I am not sure that a solution will be found. But, at least, we will do everything possible during the time left before the next IAEA report to the Security Council in order to try and find it.
. . .
Question: To all appearances, Iran will not comply with the December resolution by February. Isn't it so that Russia will not hurry with the adoption of a new resolution on Iran?
Foreign Minister Lavrov: No one actually suggests any new resolution until the IAEA report is made public. As far as we are concerned, we do not think at all whether to adopt a resolution or not. We think about how to start talks. A resolution is a means, not an end in itself. Maybe somebody wants by building up activity in the UN Security Council and adopting ever new resolutions to create a critical mass in public opinion on the non-acceptance of Iran's position. I likewise cannot praise our Iranian partners for their reaction to the position of the international community and to the many offers with which Russia and other countries have approached them, offers dictated by a sincere desire to solve this problem by diplomatic, peaceful means. But, I repeat it, a resolution, sanctions, additional sanctions are not what it is necessary to concentrate on now. We must now think of a search for ways out of the dead-end persisting so far and of creating conditions for the start of talks. If a new resolution helps to begin the talks, we will appreciate and support it. If some nonstandard move is needed for the start of talks, and we are currently with many other countries in the negotiations racking our brains over what kind of move it can be, then we also, to be sure, will actively come out for that move. This is a very complicated situation. It is much more complicated that practically any other conflict in the world, because intertwined here are real risks to the nonproliferation regime and simultaneously the legal aspects that have highlighted the fact that the nonproliferation regime is so far imperfect and that it has to be strengthened by developing additional agreements, for example, along the lines of our idea of setting up multilateral uranium enrichment centers.
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