DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Good afternoon.

JONATHAN STEELE: Dmitry Anatolyevich, Mr President.

It is a great honour for us to meet with you on the eve of your first G8 summit. There is a huge amount of interest in you and in your views as the new President of Russia not just from your partners in the G8 but also from the press and public in other countries. I would like to start therefore by thanking you on behalf of us all for the invitation to come here and for this interview, this conversation.

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HAYAMI ICHIKAWA: Global security is one of the main issues the G8 discusses. North Korea's nuclear programme remains a source of concern. What Russian or Japanese or other regional programmes can be carried out to help increase security? What measures does Russia intend taking to neutralise North Korea's nuclear programme? Japan's people place their hopes on Russia in this respect. We would like to know what kind of cooperation we can expect from you as the new President.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Does your question concern Iran too or only North Korea?

HAYAMI ICHIKAWA: You can extend the question to cover Iran too.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: The situation regarding Iran's nuclear programme, and the North Korean nuclear programme (I will speak about both countries together first and then go into some individual nuances) is of concern to the United Nations of course, and to us too. We have already stated our position in the past. All of the formats for work on the situation with these nuclear programmes are based precisely on this position. We cannot remain indifferent to the development of non-transparent nuclear programmes, and neither can other countries. But we try to work by emphasising the positive. I think therefore (and our position has not changed here) that with regard to the 'problem programmes' in the countries concerned we need to use a system of positive incentives. It cannot be simply a case of we pass a resolution, and come what may, you have to comply otherwise we will look at tough international sanctions, and ultimately even a military operation. This is a dangerous approach. A system based on incentives is a lot more comprehensible and, most important, it is easier to explain, easier to put before our difficult negotiating partners.

As far as the situation with Iran is concerned, there has been some progress in some areas and we remain at a standstill in others. Unfortunately, the efforts of the countries taking part in the relevant forums and in the IAEA have not yet achieved any real breakthroughs, but the process will continue. We need to motivate the Iranian leadership to demonstrate that its nuclear programme is transparent, and this includes making it possible to discuss the programme's future if it becomes transparent. Steps and decisions that were approved with the IAEA need to be carried out, and this would reduce tension over the programme. But we must continue to offer positive incentives. Whatever the case, we need to understand how these processes work. We cannot make decisions that contradict the general course.

If we are negotiating with Iran in various formats we should not undertake action that would provoke the Iranian leadership and lead to the imposition of additional sanctions. I really do not understand why the European Union recently took this kind of decision, and I spoke about this during my recent meeting in Khanty-Mansiisk with Mr Barroso and Mr Solana. Either we are talking to them or we are trying to provoke them in various little ways.

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