Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
Related Country:
- Iran
[Unofficial translation from Russian.]
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Russia's well-considered approach to the situation around the nuclear program of Iran enjoys wide understanding in the world and is shared by many international experts. It is acknowledged that this problem has no force-based solution; that is, there is no reasonable alternative to its politico-diplomatic settlement. The ultimatum policy is doomed to failure.
The unconstructive position of Iran led to the adoption by the UN Security Council of resolution 1737 in December 2006 demanding of Iran the suspension of all its activities involving uranium enrichment, chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and heavy water reactors. We regard it as a serious signal to Teheran urging it to be more actively and openly cooperative with the IAEA in order to remove the outstanding issues and concerns related to its nuclear program.
The Iranian nuclear problem can be solved only in the overall context of the international and regional situation, bearing in mind that to toughen up the nonproliferation regime will be possible only in the conditions of the rule of international law in international affairs and the creation of a system of international security guarantees for all states without exception as well as of providing all states with equal, nondiscriminatory access to the newest technologies, including nuclear. Anyway the problem should not be stalemated, and the reaction of the international community must be adequate to the degree of threat to nonproliferation, which duly authorized professionals alone can determine. The proposals to set up in the Near and Middle East region a system of regional security, of which mutual security guarantees with the participation of the UNSC permanent members, Iran, Israel and Syria could be a part, also merit attention.
An important factor in this situation, as in a number of others, is the absence of normal relations between Iran and the United States. The situation is aggravated by attempts to put on Teheran the label of a country which is part of the "axis of evil," as well as by statements about the need for regime change in Teheran as the only means for ensuring a reliable solution to the problem.
Neither can we disregard the opinion of independent experts that the real aim of Teheran is not so much the development of nuclear weapons as the achievement of a capability for their quick production using nonmilitary nuclear sector facilities (the so called "threshold potential," which a number of countries, including the FRG and Japan, already possess). In this context the most productive line of the international community would be a complex of measures to involve Teheran, be it in regional affairs, including settlement in Iraq and the stabilization of Afghanistan, or the normalization of bilateral relations with it.
Maintaining normal relations with each other is the duty of all states, and no considerations, especially those of an ideological nature, can absolve states of this responsibility. What makes us cautious is the admissions by a number of US officials that the real aim of their Iran policy is a change of regime.
Recommendation. In any case the international community should not take the common risks for all that are involved with the escalation of the situation around Iran until the United States undertakes sincere, conscientious efforts to normalize its relations with Teheran. In this matter, as with the situation in the Palestinian territories, the reluctance of the US to use the "window of opportunity" created by the pro-reform government of Mohammad Hatami has had as its direct consequence the radicalization of the situation within Iran and the further exacerbation around its nuclear program.
Another, more fundamental question arises: Why go for a force option that threatens a collapse of the situation in Iraq, if the United States by its plans to deploy elements of its national MD in Europe actually recognizes the effectiveness of a strategy of containment by deterrence with respect to a presumed nuclear-missile threat from Iran?
Recommendations. If there is where to start cooperation with the US "from the very beginning," that is from a joint threat assessment, then it is precisely here until the American tactic of creeping involvement of the international community in a full-scale crisis around Iran is crowned with success. In this case the entire array of existing expert judgements should be brought into play.
- Among other things, it will require considering the implications of the Iran crisis for intercivilizational relations. The United States will have to prove that it is not getting ready for a "war of civilizations," by creating conditions for its "frontline" existence (a la Israel) - as "Fortress America," shut off from the rest of the world by oceans and Soviet-style border control, including "fences." The August trip by former Iranian president Hatami to the US shows that intercivilizational dialogue could become a useful channel of establishing contacts with Teheran for the Americans.
As to the interests of Russia, of significance to us along with nonproliferation is the important regional role of Iran, including the problem of stabilizing Afghanistan and the states of Central Asia. Washington's obsession with confrontation with Iran at all costs determines the contradictoriness of American policy as a whole. For example, the US in the light of its present policy in Transcaucasia just cannot but have a keen interest in Iranian gas supplies not only for Armenia, but for Georgia as well. The unsettledness of relations with Iran is a weak point of other American geopolitical projects in this vast region, including the plans to transport Caspian resources bypassing Russian territory and create a "Greater Central Asia."
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