Press Conference with Foreign Minister Lavrov on P5+1 Meeting (Excerpts)

January 17, 2006

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Question: What levers is Russia going to use to influence the Iranian situation after yesterday's meeting in London?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: Deputy foreign ministers from the European trio, the US, China and Russia met in London yesterday to discuss the situation created by Iran's steps to resume uranium enrichment. Teheran calls this work, this stage of this work R&D work. It says it's nothing more than research. But I must remind you that some time ago Teheran agreed, within the IAEA, to a moratorium on all types of work related to uranium enrichment for the duration of the talks, primarily with the European troika, on the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

As President Putin emphasized yesterday after his talks with Federal Chancellor Merkel, we are going to act very carefully and avoid unnecessary sharp moves that may artificially create additional problems and exacerbate the situation. Our absolute priority on this issue is to ensure the inviolability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the meeting in London yesterday all sides expressed serious concern about Iran's intention to resume uranium enrichment activities despite the international community's calls not to do so. They also agreed it is very important to ensure that Iran fully suspends such activities and resumes negotiations. There was also an exchange of views on the forms of further joint work. As President Putin stressed yesterday, Russia is determined to cooperate closely with all key parties to the negotiations. Different options were discussed, including the European troika's proposal to call an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on February 2-3, 2006. Russia will be ready for such a meeting. We have some ideas about what such a meeting could do and reach, primarily within the context of the recommendations we get from the IAEA leadership. These are professional recommendations, based on the need to ensure the IAEA mandate and the inviolability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. So, I hope that as we prepare for the next discussion of this issue at the IAEA, we will not just cooperate closely with our partners, but will work out a concerted position.

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Question: Sergey Viktorovich, to what measure do the positions of Russia and China as UN Security Council members coincide in what concerns the settlement of the Iran issue? Thank you.

Foreign Minister Lavrov: I hope that not only the positions of Russia and China coincide, but also the positions of all permanent members of the UN Security Council and all other countries coincide in the main aspect, namely that our main goal is ensuring the observance of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime. I am convinced that if we all proceed from this main goal, we will be able to find a common approach to resolving this problem. I don't think it is worth adding to this process, the process of ensuring the observance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, adding some political considerations that are unrelated to the nuclear problem proper.

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Question: Back to Iran again. Will Russia oppose a potential imposition of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council? Thank you.

Foreign Minister Lavrov: You know, this question puts it all upside down. We have a common goal and I am convinced that it is a goal of any country that is concerned about security problems. It is that we should ensure the inviolability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. So, the sanctions issue as though puts the cart ahead of the horse. First of all, we should do everything possible to get, in the IAEA framework, professionally, on the basis of inspections carried out in Iran, as much information as possible to be able to answer questions we used to have about the nuclear program Iran used to have. IAEA inspectors now deal with that.

Iran should do much more than it has done already, even though there has been some progress in the provision of information. Still, much more is required from Iran. And our common efforts should be aimed at finding solutions that would let us get answers to all questions asked by IAEA inspectors without any exception. We have discussed ways to do this better in London today. We will continue to discuss those ways during preparation for another debate on the Iran issue during a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. Sanctions are certainly not the best and not the only way to resolve international problems. We know a record of sanctions against Iraq. We know what this led to. And we still have to deal with the effects of that situation Iraq has found itself in.

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Question: Do you think it is possible to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone after the example of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America as applied to the Middle East and how do you regard the prospects for the development of relations with Latin America in the coming year?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: I consider possible the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, just as the world community does. In the resolutions of the UN Security Council, including, by the way, the resolutions which were passed on the settlement of the Iraq crisis after the end of the war in the Gulf, there is the provision on the necessity of creating such a zone - free of weapons of mass destruction - in the Middle East. How to approach this task specifically is hard for me to say thus far, but that such a task is set by the decisions of the UN Security Council and remains on the agenda is a fact. As to the prospects for the development of our relations with Latin America, these relations have been developing very intensively in recent years; the visits of the President of Russia and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to a number of states of this region have taken place and additional contacts are currently scheduled. We regard Latin America as a very promising partner, not only from the viewpoint of Russian bilateral relations with the countries of this region, but also in terms of the activation of the potential of the integration processes that are developing very rapidly in Latin America and at which we look closely both from the viewpoint of drawing on the experience that would be suitable for the integration processes in the CIS space and from the viewpoint of the expansion of our commercial, economic and investment cooperation with the Latin American countries. I shall note that this cooperation has been increasingly developing in the realm of high technologies; both many Latin American nations and Russia have achievements in this field, including, of course, space technologies and joint projects. Relations with regions are increasingly on the agenda; well, as to cultural and humanitarian ties, here too the field for interaction is most extensive. People in Russia treat Latin America and its culture with immense sympathy, appreciate the temperament of Latin Americans and I think that this will largely be cementing our interstate relations.

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Question: Esteemed Sergey Viktorovich, there were many questions on Iran today. We express our appreciation that you also gave a possibility to ask a question. What is the place of Iran, in Russia's opinion, in the safeguarding of the stability and security of the region, and also what kind of prospects do you see for multifarious cooperation between our countries, including that in the nuclear sphere? Thank you.

Foreign Minister Lavrov: I consider that Iran occupies a very important place in the matter of ensuring security and stability in this region. It is a major country, a country with huge potential, a country with ancient culture and traditions and with brilliant diplomats, I shall add, with whom I have happened to jointly work more than once. I am convinced that this potential must be realized. It can be realized through interaction, through cooperation with reliance, of course, upon international law. Which presupposes respect for the rights of each other and presupposes respect by each country of the region for its obligations. I shall recall that when a couple of years ago the process of the settlement of the Iranian nuclear problem began, the talk was about solving in the negotiations with the European trio not only the specific questions that arose as a result of Iran's previous nuclear activities, but also about solving the tasks of intensifying economic cooperation, investment cooperation, the tasks of drawing Iran more fully into dealing on an equal basis with regional problems; that is, into political processes. And we actively spoke for that, just as we actively spoke in concrete terms for ensuring that the forums on Iraq held last year and the year before necessarily envisaged the participation of all its neighbors, including Iran. This was not merely a tribute of respect to Iran. It is an objective necessity. Iran can, and I am certain, is keen to play an important role in facilitating a final resolution of the situation around Iraq as well. Iran is one of the key partners in the struggle against the Afghan narco-threat and generally has a very substantial potential to play a useful role for all in promoting stability and security. This can only be done together, only jointly with other countries. And it will certainly be a pity if the present situation around Iran's nuclear problem becomes exacerbated, thus creating less favorable conditions for combining the efforts of all countries of the region to ensure stability and security here. I expect our Iranian friends to heed the exhortations which the international community is now making and not withdraw the moratorium which they have agreed upon in the framework of the IAEA Board of Governors. I expect that negotiations will be resumed on just these terms. This will be in the interest of everyone and for the common good.

Russian bilateral relations with Iran are being actively developed. We have many plans for commercial, economic and investment cooperation. We have plans for cooperation in third-country markets. A regular meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade-and-Economic Cooperation is now being prepared, and of course, the project for the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr continues to be implemented; it fully conforms to all the international commitments of Russia and Iran alike and is being carried out under the full control of the IAEA and in respect of which no-one is having any questions. I hope for this project to be realized in the conditions when the regime for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will be observed in full measure.

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Question: The Iranian Foreign Ministry has circulated a statement urging the European trio to return to the negotiating table while at the same time objecting to the convocation of an IAEA Board of Governors meeting, regarding this as a continuation of the policy of threats. Your comment?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: The talks began on the basis of a mutual agreement, which envisages reciprocal obligations. On the Iranian side it was an obligation to keep the moratorium on all the work related to uranium enrichment. Iran in August of last year, just when the European trio had prepared specific proposals on the content of a possible package of agreement, resumed so called conversion. This is the chemical processing of the yellow cake into a gaseous form, into so called uranium hexafluorite. Strictly speaking, this is not an enrichment process as such. However, even then many believed this process was related to enrichment. The European trio expressly regarded this as a departure from the basic concept of the negotiations, that is a moratorium on all the kinds of enrichment related work and the negotiations in precisely such a context. I can assure you that Russia exerted a lot of effort to ensure that the resumption of the conversion work, that is the pre-enrichment stage, did not undermine the process of negotiations between Iran and the European trio. At the most diverse levels we worked with both. Our US partners were always informed of this work, and we agreed with great difficulty that this would not be an obstacle to continuation of the talks. That round of talks took place last year. The next round was scheduled for January, but there occurred what we are talking about today - the announcement of a withdrawal of the moratorium on research work directly related to enrichment. Therefore I wholly and entirely join the appeal for resumption of the talks, but presume that this can realistically be done on terms which are mutually acceptable, on terms which presuppose a moratorium on enrichment.

Question: We know that the US and the European trio are ready to refer the nuclear question of Iran to the UNSC now. When will Russia be finally ready to agree with this position? I mean a specific timeframe, a specific date.

Foreign Minister Lavrov: This is a very schematic approach. Of the kind not allowable in politics. We presume that now there is the concrete position of the IAEA, there are the specific questions which the IAEA has formulated before Iran. It is necessary to use all the possibilities which the IAEA provides in order to get an answer to them. I do not think that the potential of the IAEA Board of Governors is exhausted. The European trio also thinks so, having suggested convening the IAEA Board of Governors at the beginning of February. Now this timeframe has been named, of it I can speak. The timeframe you are talking about, is artificial.