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MS. AMANPOUR: Welcome back. We continue our conversation with the two secretaries sitting here. I want to know, if you can tell us, what precisely was agreed between the U.S., Iran, and the other powers sitting at that table in Geneva. Did they actually agree to ship out their low-enriched uranium?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, there were three agreements. One, that there would be inspections, and those inspections are going forward and they're going forward quickly, of the undisclosed site that the President and Prime Minister Brown and President Sarkozy announced a little over a week ago in Pittsburgh. They agreed that, in principle, the Iranians would ship out their LEU for reprocessing to be returned for their research reactor. There will be a team of experts meeting to determine exactly how that will be carried out within 10 days. And they agreed that there will be another meeting, which means that this process doesn't just drag on without any continuity.

So we think that on those three big issues, this was a worthwhile meeting. But as the President has said and I and others have also made clear, this is not by any means a stopping point. There is much more to be done. We expect much more. We know that the Iranians need to understand that they have run a nuclear program that has violated international rules and Security Council resolutions, which they have to bring into compliance, making it more transparent and accountable. So we have work ahead of us, but I think that on balance, what came out of the meeting in Geneva was positive.

MS. AMANPOUR: Just to follow up on the low-enriched uranium, you know one Iranian diplomat told the press that actually, no, there wasn't that agreement. And I'm asking you whether there is some miscommunication. Are they just agreeing to buy enriched - further enriched uranium and not ship theirs out, or do you understand that they are going to ship the bulk of theirs out?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, nothing is finished until it's finished. And there's a meeting of technical experts - I believe it's October 18th - to see how to put into action what we certainly believe was an agreement in principle. But there's a lot to be done before that actually happens.

MR. SESNO: Do you think the Iranians actually want to resolve this?

SECRETARY CLINTON: We don't know yet. We don't know.

MR. SESNO: Do you think this is credible?

SECRETARY GATES: I agree with Hillary. I think the jury's out. And what we have to do is keep them to tight enough deadlines and specific enough requirements that we have some indication of whether they're serious or not.

MR. SESNO: I mean, there's already - there's already some substantial criticism of this from some who are saying that this is another way for the Iranians to play for time and that, in effect, they're being rewarded for having flouted UN resolutions all these years if they can take the uranium that they shouldn't have enriched to begin with and get it sent out and have it brought back, enhanced, and be able to use in a power plant.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, but think about what we're seeing here. And that is that the uranium that they have enriched would be used for a research reactor, which everybody knows they've been running - which they are entitled to run - but it would not be used for other purposes. So yes, does it buy time? It buys time. It buys time for us to consider carefully their response, the sincerity of their actions. And we're moving simultaneously on the dual track. I mean, we always said we had a track of engagement, and we have begun that with this process. But we also said we would be working with likeminded nations and convincing others to stand ready with tougher sanctions were we not successful.

MS. AMANPOUR: Can I ask you, Secretary Gates, has your opinion, your intelligence, has anything changed regarding your assessment of whether they are trying to make a nuclear weapon?

SECRETARY GATES: My personal belief, all along, has been that they have the intention of developing nuclear weapons. Whether they have actually begun that program or not is hard to say, whether they've begun a weaponization program. But I think the question is can we, over time - or can we, in a limited period of time, bring the Iranians to a conclusion that Iran is better off without nuclear weapons than with them. And not just in the security sense, but economically and in terms of their isolation in the international community and so on.

And because - I mean, my view is the only long-term solution to this problem, at the end of the day, is the Iranians themselves deciding having nuclear weapons is not in their interest. And if we can't convince them of that, then an array of other options are open. But our hope, my hope for - ever since I took this job has been that we could, through both carrots and sticks, persuade them of a smarter direction for Iran.

MS. AMANPOUR: Isn't the - I mean, there are basically, I think, three policy options - an Iran with some kind of nuclear capability, a nuclear program but with very strict verification sanctions to try to get them not to enrich, which so far has not - have not worked - plenty of holes, plenty of black market, or the military option, which you yourself have cast out upon its efficacy.

Isn't the real nub of the debate right now to figure out some kind of way of verifying and inspecting and being able to know if they plan to do something else with their uranium other than for peaceful purposes, as they claim?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, that is, of course, part of the change in calculation that Bob was referring to. We have a very clear objective of trying to persuade the Iranians that their calculation of their security interests and their economic interests should take into account the consequences of sanctions, for example, of increased defensive measures taken in Europe and in the Gulf region. We just worked through this missile defense decision, and clearly, our new adaptive approach toward missile defense is aimed at protecting our NATO allies and most of Europe from a short or medium-range Iranian missile. We have begun to talk with a lot of our other friends and allies about what they need to feel that they would be adequately protected.

Now, this is not in any way to concede what Iran should do going forward, because some people say when we talk defensive, that means that we're conceding that they're going to end up with a weapon - no, not at all. We are trying to influence the calculation and the decision as to whether or not they should move toward weaponization.

SECRETARY GATES: Some people have said, in so many words, that I'm kind of wooly-headed in believing that the Iranians would see not having nuclear weapons as more in their security interests than not. But the question is would the Iranians look at that that way if there were proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East? If some of their neighbors in the Middle East beyond those that now have them would develop nuclear weapons, is that in their interest? Do they think that enhances their national security? I think that's an argument to be made.

MS. AMANPOUR: We're going to continue this line of questioning right after a short break.

(Break.)

MS. AMANPOUR: Welcome back as we continue our conversation. We were talking about Iran and some way of figuring out the way forward about Iran's nuclear program. So just a quick one before Frank wants to ask you about smart power - I just want to know, is it good enough to have a strict verification protocol? For instance, the additional protocol under the NPT or indeed, you know, to have shipping out of the LEU? Is that good enough even if it's not perfect?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, this is a question we're not ready to answer because we don't know what the options in front of us are. We don't know what Iran would agree to. We don't know what kind of pressure could be brought to bear in case they don't agree. So our goal is as it always has been - to try to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, which we think would be very destabilizing in the region and beyond, and that's what we are aimed at achieving through this engagement.

SECRETARY GATES: And what nuclear sites might they be prepared to be transparent about that have not been declared at this point.

MR. SESNO: I want to ask about - both - one last question about Iran, and that relates to what the message is to the people of Iran who have been in the streets, who have opposed Ahmadinejad, who spoke out and in some cases have been arrested, wounded, or worse, standing up to what they see as a stolen election.

The United States has a long history of standing on the side of human rights and democratic reforms, and it speaks up for those who have been oppressed. Are you concerned - because some are - that there's so much effort to negotiate with the government in Iran right now and resolve or at least make progress on this nuclear issue, that those in Iran who want real political change are going to be somehow forgotten or abandoned or will not be the focus of American comment and action?

SECRETARY CLINTON: No, because I think we've been very clear in supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people and in speaking out forcefully against the irregularities of their electoral process. But what we concluded is if you look at our dealings with the former Soviet Union, for example, during the Cold War, we always pressed them on human rights and we always talked with them about reducing our nuclear arsenals or trying to have some arms control.

These are not either-or. Human rights is at the core of who we are as Americans. We hope for all people the rights that we enjoy here, but at the same time, just as no American president walked away from summits with the Russian presidents working to try to achieve the goals that you could possibly find common ground on, that's what we're doing with the Iranians.

MS. AMANPOUR: So that was just what I was trying to press with you in terms of a verification, just as with the USSR, when there was a verification system in place where you could know whether there was any dirty dealing or cheating going on in time to respond.

SECRETARY CLINTON: But they are --

MS. AMANPOUR: You seem to be going that way.

SECRETARY CLINTON: But they got a weapon. I mean, they got a weapon and then they were a nuclear --

MS. AMANPOUR: You're talking about --

SECRETARY CLINTON: The Soviet Union, yeah. They got a weapon, they were a nuclear weapons power, and then we did deterrents and containment and a lot of negotiation. What we're trying to do in today's world, where the information about nuclear technology is much more widely known, certainly than it was in the late '40s and early '50s, we're trying to convince Iran that this is not in their interest to do. And that is a different perspective than finding out - waking up and finding out the Soviet Union had the A-bomb and we had to deal with this.

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