MR. ERELI: TGIF, everybody. So first question on the last briefing of the week goes to --

QUESTION: Iran being the issue.

MR. ERELI: Iran.

QUESTION: More conversion of uranium announced by the Iranian Government. Anything to say about that?

MR. ERELI: This is a subject we spoke to yesterday. What we're seeing today, I think just repeats what the information we had yesterday. In my comment on it, I would repeat what I said yesterday, which is that Iran's announcement that it is converting uranium is of concern to us. It contravenes commitments made to the Europeans. It contravenes Board of Governors resolutions. The most recent one, which was in September -- which called on it to end all enrichment-related activity. And it is the subject of discussions between Under Secretary Burns and our partners in the EU, Russia and others, ahead of the next Board of Governors meeting.

Yes.

QUESTION: I think the question of my colleague was about the fact that the IAEA was handed by Tehran documents --

MR. ERELI: I think the question was about the --

QUESTION: -- describing how to make explosive core of an atom bomb, so it's a new step.

MR. ERELI: I think you're referring to the report that Director General ElBaradei released today about Iran's implementation of its safeguards obligations. That is a report that we are reviewing. I think that it -- I wouldn't at this point be in a position to comment on its specifics, but it's clear that what we see in the report is what we've seen in previous reports; that Iran continues with its conversion activities. It continues to contravene its commitments under the Paris Agreement. It continues to fail to respond to all the questions of the IAEA. There are issues that are raised in the report that I think are certainly troubling. We will study it. We will, again, consult with our friends and we'll see what kind of consensus emerges.

QUESTION: Your ambassador in Vienna said that this definitely opens new concerns about weaponization.

MR. ERELI: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: You didn't go -- well, you were a little more obscure.

MR. ERELI: He's seen the report.

QUESTION: Right.

MR. ERELI: I haven't.

QUESTION: Oh, you haven't seen the report back here?

MR. ERELI: Uh-uh.

QUESTION: Does this lead you to want to go back and question A.Q. Khan? I mean, is that matter closed to the United States, because as you continue finding out more and more things that he did and you don't have access to him personally --

MR. ERELI: I wouldn't make that connection. What I think our -- obviously we continue to, I think, tie up the loose ends on the A.Q. Khan issue but we've, I think, pretty much gotten to the bottom of it, although obviously it's an issue that continues to be of interest to us.

With respect to Iran, however, it's clear that there were activities and connections with A.Q. Khan. And what we need to see with regard to Iran, which is different than the A.Q. Khan investigation, is a complete and transparent accounting from Iran about its nuclear program which we haven't gotten and which I think has been the substance and import of these director general reports. And yes there are suspicions, yes there are concerns as articulated by our ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna and that's why it's important, we think, that Iran be more forthcoming in responding to the IAEA and the questions that the IAEA has posed and the IAEA's request for access to facilities. And to date, it hasn't been.

QUESTION: Since your relationship with Pakistan is significantly better than your relationship Iran, why don't you try to go that route?

MR. ERELI: I think that we've -- in our dealings with Pakistan, we are satisfied with the kind of cooperation and the kind of information sharing we've gotten, but there's another side to this and that side is the Iranian side, which has information, which is engaged in activities that only Iran can account for and that's why it's important that they be responsive to what the IAEA is asking of them.

Yeah.

QUESTION: You spoke about consensus so I suppose you favor a consensus -- the consensus of the international community, which is to keep open dialogue with Iran? What do you think you can do if Iran unilaterally decide to cut any dialogue?

MR. ERELI: Well -- (laughter) -- that would -- that would be pretty bad for Iran.

QUESTION: But what can you do?

MR. ERELI: If Iran unilaterally decides to cut dialogue? Well, I'll put it this way, I mean, if a nation wants to -- if a nation thinks that it's in their interest to tell the rest of the world to go take a leap, they can do that. But that would certainly be unusual and ill advised.

QUESTION: Adam, that's the first time I've ever heard you take on a hypothetical. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: If we asked you another one, would you answer it? (Laughter.)

MR. ERELI: Look, I think, the message to Iran from the United States, from the EU-3, from the Board of Governors is clear: You've given the world cause for concern. The international community doesn't like what it sees and it doesn't like the kind of behavior that you've been exhibiting over the last several years. So you've got a chance to make things right with the world. Take that chance as opposed to continuing to increase your own isolation and your own -- and your being at variance with the rest of the world. It doesn't do you any good, it doesn't do your people any good, and it doesn't do the region any good.

And so in a sense, there is a way forward, a positive way forward for Iran. It is represented by the process of negotiation that the EU-3 has initiated and that has our support and the support of others and that's where we're trying to take things. But as we say in so many examples of international diplomacy, it takes two to tango. And right now, on one side you've got the international community and the other side you've got Iran. We're ready to go, but they so far have not yet proved themselves a willing partner.

QUESTION: It sounds like the U.S. hasn't any cards to play, except shame. They're not isolated. They do terrific -- business with China, thank you, which is one reason China's likely to veto anything you try in the UN. You have Iraqi politicians who think it's good to have good relations with Iran. They're a neighbor. Iran is -- you're not talking about North Korea.

MR. ERELI: I think if you look at Iran's position in the international community, you'll see that it is subject of a number of restrictions, a number of sanctions, a number of -- a lack of participation in international affairs as a full and respected and accepted member and that that causes them no small amount of concern.

QUESTION: Do you think?

MR. ERELI: Yeah, I really do.

QUESTION: So, you said, "it takes two to tango;" that the U.S. has no meaningful dialogue.

MR. ERELI: I said the international community -- that Iran is not responding to the way forward presented to it by the international community.

QUESTION: There are senators like Chuck Hagel who say that the U.S. should be having a dialogue with Iran.

MR. ERELI: Don't see a useful point in that in this -- useful point to that at this time.

QUESTION: Can you give us any update of what Nick Burns has been doing in London?

MR. ERELI: I don't really have too much new to report to you on that. He arrived there -- he left yesterday afternoon so he must have arrived there early this morning. He's been in meetings, frankly, most of the day with his -- with the Russians, with the EU-3, with others, hearing from them their views on the latest developments on Iran's decision to resume conversion activities, what that means and how we should respond and what the EU-3's ideas are about moving forward in negotiations.

QUESTION: Do the Chinese participate in this meeting?

MR. ERELI: We are -- we do discuss this with the Chinese. I don't know if they're specifically -- if Nick has meetings on this specific trip. But they are very much a part of our conversations.

QUESTION: Did they talk about Bosnia, too?

MR. ERELI: I'm not sure if the subject might come up but really the focus is Iran.

QUESTION: Is there a --

QUESTION: This has been asked before but is there a judgment here that Bosnia needs a constitution, one that's less, in fact, in which -- one of which there is no sectarian acknowledgement?

MR. ERELI: I don't have anything on that for you.

QUESTION: What about the Russian idea on Iran? That they would construct a separate facility and that then the -- some conversion could take place in Iran but the fuel cycle could not be completed there.

MR. ERELI: I think our -- the National -- the President's National Security Advisor spoke to that just a little while ago and he said it's an interesting idea. I think without sort of evaluating proposals, specific proposals and handicapping them and that sort of thing, what I would say is that the, as I said before, the EU-3 is trying to find a way forward with this. The Russians are presenting ideas. They're working, I think, productively with the EU-3. We're supportive of that.

What we want to see, frankly, is assurances that Iran does not have the capability or technology to use the nuclear fuel cycle to develop nuclear weapons and that's the goal we're all working toward. Russia certainly has shown in the past a concern about Iranian activity and an eagerness to take action to prevent diversion and use of nuclear fuel to develop nuclear weapons, as evidenced by the Bushehr take-back deal. So they've played a helpful and important role in this and it certainly is our experience that they continue to do that.

QUESTION: The Iranians rejected the Russian deal, didn't they?

MR. ERELI: Frankly, I -- for the latest back and forth on the discussions between the Russians and the Iranians and the EU-3, I'd refer you to them. Our view on all this is that what the EU-3 and Russians are doing is positive and useful and important and the Iranians should again resume negotiations with the EU-3 and suspend enrichment-related activity.

QUESTION: Will there be a U.S. presence at the EU talks with Iran?

MR. ERELI: No.

QUESTION: I mean even a silent presence?

MR. ERELI: Not that I'm aware of, no.

QUESTION: The U.S. isn't going to sit in as an observer?

MR. ERELI: No, no, it's an EU -- we're not a party to those negotiations. We've made that very clear from the beginning.

QUESTION: Well, you've got a vital interest in them, but all right.

QUESTION: Security Council referral can you -- is this like where you see this going?

MR. ERELI: It'll be a subject of discussion at the next Board of Governors. I think that the last Board of Governors, you look at the resolution that said that they're in noncompliance with NPT obligations and that's a matter for future referral. And how that plays out will obviously be a subject of discussion, but I wouldn't want to predict anything, one way or the other.

. . .

QUESTION: Adam, I'd like to -- have you seen this ad that Iran took out, this full-page ad in The New York Times?

MR. ERELI: I must have missed that one.

QUESTION: You missed that one?

MR. ERELI: If you go online, you don't see the ads.

QUESTION: Okay. Yeah, well, it's rather detailed.

MR. ERELI: Small print.

QUESTION: And in it they, you know, kind of lay out their side of the story as far as they're concerned in terms of Iran's alleged nuclear program or its alleged nuclear weapons program, and says that the -- all of this is based on misperception and outright lies. I understand you haven't seen it, but they're still sticking to their guns that they do not have a nuclear weapons program and are putting the onus on the EU-3 and the West for the broken promises and, you know, raised expectations that happened in -- you know, over the last couple of years.

MR. ERELI: Yeah, and the question is? What do I think of an advertisement I haven't seen or charges that --

QUESTION: No, I mean, but a lot of it -- you've heard these --

MR. ERELI: Let me --

QUESTION: You've heard these points before.

MR. ERELI: Let's be clear. I think that the international community's position with regard to Iran is based on a large body of evidence -- documents, findings by international organizations -- not on hearsay, not on unsubstantiated charges, but on a well-documented pattern of deception and -- deception and evasion by Iran documented in nine reports by the Director General, numerous Board of Governors resolutions, numerous reports by the IAEA inspectors. And therefore this isn't just something that people are making up. This is a very clear and well- documented pattern of deception and evasion and failure to comply with treaty obligations that Iran has demonstrated.

So you know, if you're -- if Iran -- as I said earlier, if Iran is really interested in addressing this question in a useful and productive way, it would be better to be forthcoming in negotiations with the EU-3 or in receiving and allowing access to IAEA inspectors and providing documents that the IAEA has requested. It would be more useful to do that than to take out expensive advertisements in The New York Times.

Yeah.

QUESTION: In regard to both Iran and Syria, there was a column someplace I read today about the hazards of going the sanctions route because if you get to that point, using Iraq as an example, while it seems like a noble idea to put sanctions on a country, sometimes the reality is far different from what your goal was and, you know, you may be enriching some government but while hurting the people. How do you feel about this thing of ultimately using sanctions as a tool and how effective it is given the recent history of sanctions?

MR. ERELI: Rather than get into a theoretical discussion of the utility of sanctions, let's keep the focus where it belongs, which is Iranian actions. And the response of the international community is going to depend on and be determined by what Iran decides to do or not to do. And sanctions are a hypothetical based on a certain course of Iranian action. What we're saying, what I've been saying since the -- and the State Department has been saying consistently is; negotiate with the EU-3, provide the international community assurances that, and confidence that, you are not going to use a nuclear program to develop weapons and we don't have to worry about sanctions. We don't even have to have a discussion about sanctions. So that's the issue. Let Iran -- Iran is in a position to decide its future and its -- and its future relationship with the international community by what it does and by the decisions it takes in response to a set of circumstances of its own making.

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