Hassan Rouhani’s unexpected June 14, 2013 victory in Iran’s presidential race was another humbling reminder that there are no experts on Iranian politics, only students of Iranian politics. What was most surprising was not that Rouhani received the highest number of votes: As the lone moderate candidate on the ballot in a nation suffocating under tremendous internal and external political and economic pressure, Rouhani’s late-hour surge was a reflection of deep discontent with the status-quo rather than a deep-seated affinity for the candidate himself. 

 

What was more surprising, however, was that Rouhani was permitted to win by an unelected conservative establishment—namely Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—who over the last decade have systematically purged moderates and reformists from the corridors of power using force and intimidation. Paradoxically, the deliberate process of counting the 37 million ballots in 2013 made it clear to many Iranians that that the ballots were not counted in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s abruptly announced, and highly contested re-election in 2009. 

 

While the Iranian public reacted jubilantly to Rouhani’s victory—the equivalent of a light rain after eight years of drought—expectations about his will and ability to affect meaningful change in both Iran’s internal and external behavior should be tempered. Although Rouhani was endorsed by key reformist figures, including former President Mohammed Khatami, he is less a reformer than a consummate regime insider who is committed to the preservation of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, if he was anything less, he would not have been permitted to run. His campaign focused not on pursuing democracy, or altering the Islamic Republic’s strategic principles, but rather moderating its style more than its substance. 

 

Rouhani’s victory is unlikely to alter Iran’s foreign policy principles, and hence is not likely to create the conditions needed for a rapprochement between the two countries. If Washington’s goal is détente with Tehran, however, Rouhani’s victory was likely the best possible outcome of a deeply flawed and unfree electoral process.