As we assess the current negotiations with Iran over its illicit nuclear weapons program and measure the efficacy of our sanctions, our overall Iran policy, and the quality of our negotiations themselves, a few things become clear. From the 35,000 foot perspective, looking at more than just Iran, we see that despite the vast economic, military, and in most cases political superiority of our nation vis-a-vis our adversaries, we have rarely achieved anything of note in negotiations over nuclear weapons programs without some deus ex machina. Consider U.S. efforts over the years with the North Korean, Pakistani, Indian governments over their nuclear programs. While in no way equating the nature of these governments, one consistent theme emerges: Despite assiduous efforts to roll back, eliminate, neutralize or otherwise alter the trajectory of each country’s program, we failed in almost every case, bar one, and that is Libya, where Qadhafi’s assumption we would use force caused him to relinquish most (though not all) of his nuclear program. Indeed, only where governments have fallen or systems have changed (as with the collapse of the USSR, or the end of apartheid) have countries negotiated away advances to their nuclear programs. This lesson should guide any assessment of efforts regarding Iran.