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It is clear that Iran won a number of critically important concessions in the JPA. In past hearings many members of this Committee have criticized the fact that the Obama Administration accepted in the JPA that Iran is going to continue enriching uranium, notwithstanding six legally binding Security Council resolutions directing them to suspend enrichment. This was an important victory by Iran: they persuaded the U.S. to set aside its oft-stated policy that Iran has no right to enrichment, as well as the even more fundamental principle that legally binding resolutions of the Security Council are indeed legally binding. Iran also won important concessions on sanctions that have broken the momentum that was previously behind that policy. But in my opinion, the single biggest concession won by Iran in the JPA has to do with what will come after the JPA.

The framework of the JPA is very simple. It provides for some confidence-building measures on both sides that are to be in effect for a period of six months. During that six-month period, the two sides—the P5+1 and Iran—are to negotiate a “mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution” that will involve additional agreed limitations on Iran’s enrichment program, as well as enhanced transparency and verification measures. But the JPA is crystal clear that in this context, “long-term” does not mean permanent. To the contrary, the JPA states that the comprehensive solution shall “[h]ave a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.” Even more ominously, it states:

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

In other words, if Iran complies with its obligations under the comprehensive solution for the agreed duration of that agreement, it becomes legally entitled to the same treatment in nuclear energy matters as Japan or Germany or any other non-nuclear weapon state with a civil nuclear program. No more nuclear sanctions of any kind. No more restrictions on its ability to procure civil nuclear items from other countries. No more Security Council-imposed limitations on its nuclear program. No more restrictions on the number of centrifuges it may operate, the level to which it may enrich uranium, the amount of enriched uranium it may stockpile, whether it may reprocess spent fuel, whether it can pursue a heavy water plutonium production program.

And this is true irrespective of whatever restrictions it may submit to on its enrichment and heavy water programs during the period in which the comprehensive solution will be in effect. The JPA is clear: once the period of the comprehensive solution expires, the restrictions accepted under the comprehensive solution will lapse.

In effect, the JPA and the comprehensive solution act as a giant get out of jail free card for Iran. All they need to do is behave during the period that these agreements are in effect, and the slate will be wiped clean; Iran’s nuclear program will be accepted as legitimate, and bygones will be bygones. This will be true even if Iran concedes that it was actively seeking to develop nuclear weapons in the past, or even up to the present day.

So as much as I agree that we need to consider, for example, how quickly Iran could break out of the JPA and produce a nuclear weapon, logically it would make little sense for them to do so. Why would they, when all they have to do is wait for a specified period of time and then they will be free to stand up a vastly more robust nuclear program, with unrestricted assistance from foreign suppliers and without international opprobrium? They would be able to break out far more effectively after establishing a more robust program than they can today. Of course, the Islamic Republic has a long history of deception in its nuclear program, so we cannot assume that they will behave in a manner that we would consider logical, but I think the odds are that they will respond to the incentives that the JPA provides them.

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It is worrisome that the Administration is committed to a process that promises Iran full nuclear rehabilitation in exchange only for behaving for a specified period of time. There have been other instances, in which countries have abandoned nuclear weapons programs and subsequently been considered rehabilitated. South Africa, Brazil and Argentina come to mind. But in these cases, our willingness to accept that they had abandoned their nuclear weapons ambitions and to begin treating them as responsible stewards of civil nuclear technology rested on the fact that they had undergone fundamental changes in government. In South Africa, the apartheid regime was replaced by the democratically-elected government of Nelson Mandela. In Brazil and Argentina, military dictatorships yielded power to elected civilian governments. It was reasonable to believe that these new governments were not committed to the nuclear weapons programs that had been pursued by their predecessors.

In the case of Iran, however, the JPA framework requires no fundamental change in government before Iran is to be rehabilitated. The passage of time alone, coupled with good behavior during the agreed time period, will be sufficient to convert Iran from nuclear pariah to nuclear partner.

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