The Consequences of No Agreement

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The failure to reach a diplomatic solution would have profound political implications inside Iran. It will certainly weaken moderates and embolden hardliners – which would most certainly impact human rights, political openness and freedoms, and other issues that concern us worldwide.

Moreover, if an agreement is not reached, the US and its allies in Western Europe will have no alternative but to fall back on adding more sanctions which presents new problems. We have learned from the past year that sanctions have worked to get the Iranians to the table to negotiate seriously about issues of great import to US national security. Yet the imposition now of more sanctions to achieve “a better deal” will not lead to Iranian capitulation on this issue.

Sanctions alone are not an objective, but a means to reach a specific goal: in this case, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Sanctions work best, or at all, only when diplomacy works. And additional sanctions during the diplomatic process could very well upend the entire course, losing the transparency gained and rolling back the important progress we have already made.

If the US were to walk away from a deal that most of the other P5+1 partners believe fulfills our main objectives, those countries are no longer likely to see value in abiding by the strict sanctions regime set in place under American leadership. This would leave the US alone to enforce largely unilateral sanctions, which we know are less effective.

The Consequences of Reaching a Comprehensive Agreement

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Such an agreement, if it holds, could mark the beginning of a longer process of further efforts by the US and Iran to resolve the many other problems between our two countries. Early efforts could take the form of confidence-building measures (CBM’s): attempts to deal with important issues such as stabilizing Afghanistan, addressing the rapidly changing situation in Iraq, and even in Syria, as well as longstanding questions such as financial disputes stemming from the time of the Iranian revolution and the fall of the Shah. The process would be long, tenuous and demanding. No early establishment of full diplomatic recognition or normalization of relations would be likely. Thirty-five years of mistrust and misunderstanding will not disappear overnight despite the emergence of areas of mutual interest, such as cooperation in Afghanistan and now quite possibly Iraq.

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It is important to note that the civil and serious relationship that has evolved over the past six months demonstrates that Americans and Iranians can achieve much through direct talks. It is not yet clear that good will can be replicated in addressing other issues in the near term, but it should be explored. We recall that normalizing relations after a long hostile relationship is not achieved quickly. The US and China took seven years from Nixon’s visit in 1972 to normalized relations. This happened only after overcoming long periods of tensions and disagreements, including a number of visits at senior levels and the “Shanghai Communiqué.” The US and the Soviet Union moved equally slowly in the implementation of new relations, beginning in 1933 and lasting until the Soviet Union was invaded by Nazi Germany, after which the US and the Soviet Union collaborated closely throughout the Second World War.

Even if the US were to expand its relations with Iran over the coming years, we are unlikely to accept Iran as a hegemonic force in the region, nor withdraw US military presence in the region. The US simply has too much at stake with the GCC States and Iraq to shift its strategic focus in the Gulf.

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More importantly, the US support of Israel’s security must and will remain the keystone of American interests in the region and US relations with Iran will not change this commitment. Rather than being taxed with building new relations with nations at odds with each other, whether it is Israel or across the Gulf, the US needs to act carefully to achieve better balances on both sides without upsetting its own relationships. This is a major challenge for US diplomacy.

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