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There has been much discussion of the number of centrifuges Iran should be permitted to operate and quantities and enrichment levels of nuclear material it should be allowed to retain. Also discussed, have been measures to be taken at the Arak heavy water reactor, the design of which is similar to plutonium production reactors operating elsewhere.

All of these proposed steps are necessary to create a firebreak that would prevent Iran from rapidly breaking its central Nonproliferation Treaty obligations. Yet while necessary, these measures are insufficient for a successful agreement with Iran.

Should we be satisfied with a deal that simply pushes Iran from 2 months to 6 months away from the nuclear threshold? Or should we expect more, i.e. evidence of a fundamental decision not to pursue nuclear weapons?

Accepting a situation in which Iran insists on keeping a loaded weapon on the table, but simply moves its finger farther from the trigger would not appear to offer sound prospects for long-term success. If Iran has not made a fundamental decision foreswear nuclear weapons in return for better relations with other nations, Tehran will work to erode the firebreak by means both overt and covert, and we have seen such a situation before—in North Korea.

How can we judge whether or not Tehran has made such a fundamental decision? And how might we ensure that it endures? Satisfaction on three points would provide such insight and, just as important, offer a means to verify compliance or to detect cheating. These three potential elements of an agreement focus on preventing covert activities. They are:

• resolving concerns regarding “possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program;

• comprehensive monitoring of nuclear-related procurement and manufacturing; and,

• enhanced authorities for the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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