Executive Summary

In its September 2014 report on Iranian nuclear program, IAEA stated: "The Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile."

Answering the question of whether Iran’s nuclear program has a military aspect is central to the crisis related to that program. An accurate, correct, and detailed answer to this lingering question is of paramount significance and is an indispensable part of any possible comprehensive agreement between Iran and P5+1.

In its November 2011 report that has been the most detailed study of possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, IAEA underscored “The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”

Three years later, the IAEA stated in paragraph 56 of its November 7, 2014 report: “The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The Agency has obtained more information since November 2011 that has further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex.”

In its September 2014 report the IAEA had also stated: “The Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."

The following study provides a review of the most prominent and most essential aspects of this question, which has now remained open for more than a decade. Furthermore, this report details the current status of each of these topics, and scrutinizes Tehran’s statements and actions with regard to them.

The study established that two systems have been fully functional during the whole period of the study. A civilian system includes Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and universities, while a military system constitutes the secret aspect of this program. These two structures resemble two concentric circles, working in tandem. Over the years, the military part of the program has gone through reorganization or name changes but has moved forward including recent activities. According to available information, records,and documents, the military aspect of the pr ogram has been and remains at the heart of
Iran's nuclear activities.

The report has drawn on all IAEA reports since 2003 (the year in which Iran’s clandestine nuclear  program was placed under the spotlight following the revelation of secret sites at Natanz and Arak by the National Council of Resistance of Iran in 2002), on reports by the Iranian opposition, and on studies and reports by credible think thanks and non-governmental organizations.

In this study, 10 of the 12 primary issues of the most important aspects of possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program are scrutinized. These are among the most important issues that IAEA has been pursuing over the years, on which it has sought answers directly from Iran.

The 10 topics under review are:

1. SPND (organ in charge of weaponization)
2. Procurement of dual purpose equipment and its possible use for military dimensions of nuclear program
3. Secret enrichment of uranium
4. Enrichment using laser technology
5. High explosives tests and trigger mechanism
6. Neutron initiator
7. Manufacturing uranium metal (uranium hemisphere)
8. Hydro-dynamic tests and explosion vessels at Parchin site
9. Research on nuclear warhead
10. Key scientists and researchers engaged in possible military dimensions of nuclear program