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QUESTION: Can I check with you on a report, a published report of the Secretary's meeting with ElBaradei?

MR. ERELI: Sure.

QUESTION: This report is that they agreed -- that there's agreement now on a joint approach to Iran containing such features as permitting Iran to develop a form of uranium enrichment that the U.S. at one point considered a violation of its promises. There's more to it than that, of course, but -- I don't know how many questions you're prepared to take -- but we can start with is the U.S. and the UN now together on --

MR. ERELI: U.S. and EU?

QUESTION: EU, I mean. Is the U.S. and the EU now together on an initiative to try to stop Iran's nuclear program?

MR. ERELI: The first point to make is there is no U.S.-EU proposal to the Iranians and there won't be a U.S.-EU proposal to the Iranians. There is a diplomatic effort underway, led by the EU-3, to have negotiations with Iran that would lead to ensuring that Iran is not in a position to develop nuclear weapons. That is a diplomatic process that we support, that we discuss with the EU-3, that we share ideas and listen to their ideas about, along with others, but it is a process that the EU-3 is in the lead on and that we believe Iran should return to as soon as possible. And I think our common goal is, as I said before, that we achieve a diplomatic solution that ensures that Iran does not have the capacity to break out and develop nuclear weapons, which is something I think that the international community has a real concern about.

QUESTION: I don't want to get hung up on technicalities. I know the goals, so that's redundant. I know what the U.S. and the Europeans are trying to do. I know that the Europeans actually sit down at the table. I know the U.S. isn't part of the delegation. I know the Europeans conduct the diplomacy. But that has nothing to do with my questions. I'm not asking about who technically is talking to the Iranians. I know the U.S. isn't talking to the Iranians, the Europeans are. The question is whether the Secretary of State, in conversations with ElBaradei or otherwise, has approved of a new approach or a different approach to Iran in these negotiations, an approach that includes some form of enrichment and that -- and frankly, that this has -- I would understand it -- that it would happen -- would cause some discord or disagreement with the --

MR. ERELI: No. No. No.

QUESTION: She has not -- she didn't when ElBaradei came in say, hey, let's -- it's important we stop --

MR. ERELI: Well, first of all, let me be clear --

QUESTION: So why don't we --

MR. ERELI: Let me be clear. I'm not going to detail for you the Secretary's conversations with Mohamed ElBaradei. That is not -- that is not what we do. That's number one.

Number two. The Secretary and ElBaradei had a meeting this week. We talked about that meeting. They discussed a number of issues, including Iran. Of importance to all of us is that Iran return to the negotiations and they do so in a -- with the aim of dealing comprehensively with the issue at hand, not piecemeal.

But it' is important to remember in all this that, as you pointed out in your question, we are not a party to these negotiations. We are not participating in these negotiations. This is a diplomatic process that the EU is conducting with the Iranians and we are ready to work with the Europeans and with ElBaradei and others to ensure that that process leads to an Iran that does not have the capability or the technology to use the fuel cycle process to develop nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: I know what your goal is -- no, I'm sorry. I'm going to have to pursue this because I don't think we've gotten to the heart of the story, whether it's true or not, in fact. Did she suggest a two-week deadline for reaching --

MR. ERELI: No, absolutely not. As the Secretary pointed out very clearly in speaking with your colleagues a few hours ago, the Secretary does not conduct diplomacy by deadline.

QUESTION: Where does the UN now stand and --

MR. ERELI: Where does the EU?

QUESTION: No, where does the U.S. now stand -- and if it is a changed position, please say so -- on taking Iran's infractions to the UN Security Council?

MR. ERELI: Well, I think the IAEA Board of Governors has been very clear on that. They found in their last Board of Governors resolution that Iran was in noncompliance with its NPT obligations, that a report would be made to the Security Council. And our position is that that report will be made at a time of our choosing.

QUESTION: Well, that's the question.

MR. ERELI: And we'll be having a Board of Governors meeting in two weeks.

QUESTION: That's right.

MR. ERELI: We will, at that time, review developments since the last Board of Governors meeting and decide on what the appropriate course of action is. We believe we've got the votes for a referral, if that's what we decide to do.

QUESTION: So what -- if you can say -- what are the contingencies? That's the wrong word. What are the reasons that the U.S. doesn't know now what it wants to do? It wants to see how the negotiations proceed? It wants to see if it can rally enough support to get it approved at the Security Council? Because you keep postponing an action that months ago you said was terribly important to get the message -- we've just been through Syria. You've drummed resolutions through the Security Council on Syria's head for weeks and months now. Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Do you want the UN to look at it or not?

MR. ERELI: Well, I think the Board of Governors resolution is clear. It will be considered by the Security Council. That's what the NPT regulations provide for. That's what the Board of Governors decide is going to happen. When and under what circumstances is a matter for discussion among the members of the Board. It will be based on, first and foremost, Iranian actions or Iranian failure to take actions. That's what's gotten us to where we are now. It's the fact that we've got years of Board of Governors resolutions and questions and inquiries from the IAEA to Iran that have been unfulfilled, unanswered, avoided and deceived by Iran.

So the Europeans have now, with our support, engaged in a diplomatic process to try to resolve some of these issues. There are others issues that the IAEA is trying to get to the bottom of based on how Iran responds to those initiatives, we'll see where we go. But as a matter of principle, it's something that should be referred to the Security Council. The timing of that will be a matter for us to decide, based on actions.

QUESTION: One last question, does the United States now support a modified enrichment program in Iran? Does the United States now think Iran should have license or leeway to convert gaseous material in a form of enriching uranium?

MR. ERELI: The United States remains seriously concerned by Iranian actions in Iranian processes and Iranian intentions, which aim to use the nuclear fuel cycle to develop weapons, whether that be enrichment or reprocessing or other activity and that is why I think we are very intent on developing and supporting and strengthening an international response to this, which is a threat.

QUESTION: So the report is wrong on that point, at least, right?

MR. ERELI: I've said what I've got to say.

QUESTION: Well, you haven't answered the question.

QUESTION: You haven't answered the question, Adam.

QUESTION: You haven' t answered anything.

MR. ERELI: The question is answered by this: The process of negotiation is something that the Europeans are leading and that we are supporting and that should lead to an outcome whereby Iran is not in a position to break out and develop nuclear weapons. Now, there are a lot of ideas out there. A lot of ideas being discussed out there. The Europeans and the Iranians will move forward and engage and produce, hopefully, the outcome that we all desire. We are -- as I say again -- not a party to those negotiations and we will, I think, work with the Europeans and the IAEA to address effectively what is a threat to the international community. Now don't ask me to say right from where we sit in this process to rule things in or rule things out. I will tell you what the outcome that we're working toward is.

QUESTION: But when the Europeans offered Iran this last -- when the United States kind of signed off on approving spare parts for aircrafts and not blocking Iran's membership to the WTO, it was again -- it an EU initiative that the United States kind of talked about with the Europeans and signed off on. Now there seems to be a new proposal.

MR. ERELI: I said there's no -- there is no U.S.-EU proposal.

QUESTION: I didn't say it was U.S. -- I think you're getting stuck on semantics here. Is there an initiative being launched by the EU and supported by the United States whereby Russia takes fuel from Iran and enriches it and then sends it back to Iran?

MR. ERELI: There are ideas that the Europeans and others are looking at that are being discussed. That's what I would say.

QUESTION: And the U.S. is only interested in the outcome, basically, as long as Iran will be prevented from having the capacity to create a nuclear weapon on its territory, the U.S. is fine with a European initiative?

MR. ERELI: The U.S. I think and the Europeans and the IAEA and the others that we are talking about this with -- Russians and others -- want two things. They want, one, Iran to respond to the long list of outstanding questions and comply with the long list or come into compliance with the long list of outstanding violations that they have -- they have as part of their nuclear program, number one. And number two, we all want to arrive at an outcome that provides security and assurances and confidence that Iran cannot use a nuclear program to develop nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: And you would say, again, you're contending that that is not a change, that that is not a change in the U.S. position whatsoever?

MR. ERELI: I'd say that that's been our goal from the very beginning. I think we've been very clear about that.

QUESTION: But in the past, you have also taken issue with other methods at coming to that outcome like Iran having various stages of production, as long as it cannot enrich.

MR. ERELI: Enrichment, yeah.

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. ERELI: Okay, so?

QUESTION: Right. But you -- I mean, you've even criticized Bushehr --

MR. ERELI: Right.

QUESTION: -- even though in that process -- the spent fuel --

MR. ERELI: With Bushehr the problem was, again, you know --

QUESTION: It's dual-use technology.

MR. ERELI: -- this is an issue that we've spent a long time talking about. The issue is, is using -- the misuse of nuclear activity and the diversion of fuel to produce nuclear weapons and that's why you've got the agreement -- why, with Bushehr, the agreement with the Russians is so important because it prevents Iran from taking the fuel for the Bushehr reactor and diverting it for purposes of reprocessing it. That's, you know, that's number one.

Number two, and I think that this is not only with respect to Iran but with respect to our approach to the issue of nonproliferation in general, a key component of our policy, as articulated in the President's speech at NDU and a regular and ongoing issue of discussion with the IAEA, as I mentioned in my readout of the Secretary's meeting with ElBaradei earlier this week, where we talked about the Safety and Verification Committee and standing that up and making it effective, as well as talking about the issue of fuel assurances, as a recognition that around the world these are problems.

QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up, Adam. Adam, if these reports, press reports, are correct that the Secretary made a promise or a two-week deadline --

MR. ERELI: I just told you they're not correct.

QUESTION: Okay, if they are --

MR. ERELI: So let's say --

QUESTION: If they are --

MR. ERELI: So you don't have a question because they're not correct.

QUESTION: No, a question. What message do you have for India if these reports are correct, because --

MR. ERELI: I just said they're not correct. I just said they're not correct, number one. Number two, with India it has been made very clear that there's the obligation to fully separate the civilian and the military programs. With Iran, they're one and the same, and that is a principal source of concern. So with India --

QUESTION: Sir, I'm not --

MR. ERELI: I'm sorry. With India, there's a very clear --

QUESTION: My question is on Iran, not on India. India will not be happy because India voted for the U.S. and the EU against Iran on a promise that Iran will not have nuclear weapons or any kind of promise (inaudible) -- or with the Russian agreement. So that's what my question is that what message do you have now for India if these reports are correct?

MR. ERELI: The reports aren't correct.

QUESTION: That the Secretary made some kind of arrangement, two-week deadline or --

MR. ERELI: As I said, the reports are not correct. She did not make such a deadline.

QUESTION: Can I go back to Jordan?

QUESTION: Can I just have one on this? What's the -- does ElBaradei have a role in this whereby when the EU-3 discusses ideas, sometimes that are shared with the United States, he can then go to the Iranians and discuss the ideas with them?

MR. ERELI: I mean, ElBaradei is the Director General of the IAEA and he will act in that capacity as he sees appropriate.

QUESTION: But I guess I'm asking, when you say we're working with him, do you rule in that role I've just described, rule it out?

MR. ERELI: Neither.

(Laughter.)

MR. ERELI: I'm not ruling things in or ruling things out.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. ERELI: Because he is the Director General of the IAEA. He'll act as he sees appropriate.

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