Publication Type:
- Weapon Program Background Report
Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
Iran operates a number of facilities that carry out the different steps of the nuclear fuel cycle. This infrastructure includes locations where Iran mines natural uranium, plants that process uranium ore into a concentrate known as "yellowcake," and plants that convert this yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas. This gas is the feedstock for centrifuges that enrich uranium. Iran operates several gas centrifuge plants and accumulates enriched uranium that can be used to manufacture fuel for nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. Iran operates several reactors for the purpose of generating electricity and conducting research for medical and industrial applications. Because of the dual-use potential of many of these facilities, however, the international community has long raised concerns that Iran could use its facilities and expertise to develop nuclear weapons.
The facilities described above are declared by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and subject to some form of inspection by the Agency. However, recent developments have highlighted the importance of accessing nuclear facilities that Iran has not declared to the IAEA. In 2019, IAEA inspectors detected uranium particles at an undeclared site in Turquzabad, near Tehran. The IAEA rejected Iran’s explanation of the nuclear material’s presence at the site as “not technically credible” and identified three additional suspicious undeclared sites, reportedly located at Abadeh, Lavisan-Shian, and Mobarakiyeh. While Iran ultimately granted the IAEA access to a pair of those sites in order to investigate the possible presence of nuclear material or activity, such access took months to negotiate. The Agency decided that there would be no verification value in accessing the third site, because it had “undergone extensive sanitization and levelling.” These latest incidents echo past access challenges for the Agency. Before the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the IAEA sought to understand the "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program" and was often thwarted in its investigation by a lack of access to locations and key individuals.
Through the JCPOA, the IAEA was allowed access to and information about more nuclear sites in Iran. Iran agreed to provisionally implement the Agency's Additional Protocol and to allow expanded access pursuant to the JCPOA, giving IAEA inspectors the ability to request access to an undeclared site and to monitor additional nuclear commodities and components. However, Iran curtailed this arrangement in February 2021 in response to U.S. sanctions.
The table below lists Iran’s known and alleged nuclear sites and their purpose, location, and operating status.
Facility/Site |
Purpose |
Location |
Status |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Saghand Uranium Mine |
extraction of uranium ore |
Saghand
|
operational |
|
Gchine Uranium Mine |
extraction of uranium ore |
Gchine |
reported closed* |
|
Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant |
uranium concentrate production |
Ardakan |
operational |
|
Bandar Abbas Yellowcake Production Plant |
uranium concentrate production |
Bandar Abbas |
reported closed* |
|
Uranium Conversion Plant (UCF) |
uranium conversion |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
operational |
|
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL) |
study of uranium compounds |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
confirmed closed* |
|
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) |
fuel pellet production |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
confirmed closed* |
|
Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) |
fuel production for the Arak reactor and light water reactors |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
operational |
|
Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) |
fuel production for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
operational |
|
Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) |
zirconium sponge production |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
operational |
|
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) (30 kWt) |
reportedly for isotope production |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
operational |
|
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor |
research |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
operational |
|
Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR) |
research |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
operational |
|
Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR) |
training |
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) |
decommissioned |
|
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) |
uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges |
Natanz |
operational |
|
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) |
uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges |
Natanz |
operational |
|
Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center (ICAC) |
centrifuge assembly |
Natanz |
destroyed and reportedly being rebuilt |
|
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) |
uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges |
Fordow |
operational |
|
National Center for Vacuum Technology |
manufacture, testing, and calibration of vacuum equipment |
Fordow |
operational |
|
National Materials Science and Engineering Research Center |
testing radioactive materials |
Fordow |
operational |
|
Kalaye Electric Company |
gas centrifuge development and testing |
Tehran |
allegedly operational |
|
Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) |
heavy water production (used as a moderator in nuclear reactors) |
Arak |
operational |
|
Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR-40) (20 MWt)1 |
radioisotope production (by-products include plutonium) |
Arak |
redesign work ongoing |
|
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) (5 MWt) |
radioisotope production |
Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) |
operational |
|
Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) |
research, including on uranium metal |
Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) |
operational |
|
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility) |
radioisotope production |
Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) |
operational |
|
Waste Handling Facility |
storage and disposal of radioactive waste |
Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) |
operational |
|
Bushehr-1 (Light Water Power Reactor) (1,000 MWe) |
electricity production |
Bushehr |
operational |
|
Bushehr-2 (V-528 VVER-1000 Pressured Water Reactor) (974MWe) |
electricity production |
Bushehr |
under construction |
|
Bushehr-3 (V-528 VVER-1000 Pressured Water Reactor) (974MWe) |
electricity production |
Bushehr |
under construction |
|
Turquzabad site |
allegedly storage of nuclear material and equipment |
South of Tehran |
not operational** |
|
Parchin military complex |
location of alleged nuclear weapon-related work |
South of Tehran |
Partially demolished |
|
Lavisan-Shian site |
location of alleged nuclear weapon-related work |
Allegedly near Lavisan-Shian |
reportedly demolished |
|
Pilot uranium conversion plant |
allegedly conducted uranium processing and conversion |
Allegedly near Mobarakiyeh |
reportedly demolished** |
|
Abadeh site |
allegedly conducted experiments relevant to nuclear weapon development |
Allegedly near Abadeh |
reportedly partially demolished** |
|
Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant |
uranium enrichment using lasers |
Lashkar Abad |
likely inactive2 |
|
Karaj Waste Storage Facility |
radioactive waste storage |
Karaj Nuclear Research Center for Medicine and Agriculture |
operational |
|
Anarak Near-Surface Repository |
radioactive waste disposal |
Anarak |
operational |
* Facilities labeled as “reported closed” have either been declared closed by Iranian authorities or reported closed by media sources. Facilities labeled as “confirmed closed” have had their closure verified by the IAEA.
** Traces of uranium reportedly discovered on site by IAEA inspectors in 2019 or 2020.
1 The original design of the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor was for a power of 40 megawatt thermal (MWt); the JCPOA requires that the reactor be redesigned with a power not exceeding 20 MWt.
2 Satellite imagery indicated activity as late as 2013 at the Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant, prompting the IAEA to visit the facility in March 2014. The JCPOA (Annex I, Section S, Paragraph 81) requires Iran to only enrich uranium using gas centrifuge technology, thereby prohibiting laser enrichment. The IAEA has made no subsequent mention of the Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant since 2014, suggesting that the facility is inactive.