Table of Iranian Nuclear Sites and Related Facilities

July 24, 2025

Publication Type: 

  • Weapon Program Background Report

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Table of Contents

 

Introduction

Iran has operated a number of facilities that carry out the different steps of the nuclear fuel cycle. Because of the dual-use potential of many of these facilities – they can be used to manufacture fuel for nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons – the international community has long raised concerns that Iran could use this infrastructure and expertise to make weapons.

Between June 12 and 24, 2025, Israel acted on those concerns and carried out airstrikes against a number of Iranian nuclear facilities. On June 21, 2025, the United States joined the air campaign and struck multiple sites using heavy ground-penetrating munitions (“bunker-busting bombs”). Some details about the damage caused to Iran’s nuclear facilities have come to light, though it is unclear when the full extent of damage will be publicly known.

Before the strikes, Iran’s infrastructure included mines to extract natural uranium, mills that process uranium ore into a concentrate known as "yellowcake," and a plant that converts this yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas. This gas is the feedstock for centrifuges that enrich uranium. Iran has operated several gas centrifuge plants and had accumulated thousands of kilograms of enriched uranium, which at higher levels can be used to manufacture fuel for weapons and at lower levels fuels nuclear reactors. Iran also operates reactors for the purpose of generating electricity and conducting research for medical and industrial applications.

Public knowledge of these sites is drawn largely from information published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a party to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), Iran is obligated to declare facilities involved in its nuclear fuel cycle to the IAEA and to allow some form of inspection by the Agency. The Agency’s level of access to those sites has fluctuated over time, expanding following implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2016 and narrowing again from 2021 onward. Other facilities were never declared by Iran to the IAEA. In 2019, the Agency opened investigations into four such sites where military nuclear activities might have occurred: Turquzabad, Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, and Marivan. Additional sites, such as the military base at Parchin, have long been suspected of hosting nuclear weapon-related work.

By the eve of the strikes, Iranian restrictions on IAEA monitoring of its declared sites and obstruction of the Agency’s investigations into its undeclared sites had led the IAEA to conclude that it was not “in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.” IAEA inspectors are now absent from Iran following the U.S. and Israeli strikes, and it is unclear if or when they will return.

Below, Iran’s nuclear sites are divided into two tables: the declared facilities relating to its nuclear fuel cycle and undeclared facilities suspected of being connected to its nuclear weaponization effort. Each entry gives the facility’s purpose, location, and, where known, its status following the U.S. and Israeli strikes in June 2025.

Table 1: Iran's fuel cycle facilities

Facility/Site

Purpose

Location

Status

Saghand Uranium Mine

extraction of uranium ore

Saghand

operational

Gchine Uranium Mine

extraction of uranium ore

Gchine

closed

Narigan Mining and Industrial Complex

extraction of uranium ore

Bafq

operational

Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant

uranium concentrate production

Ardakan

operational

Bandar Abbas Yellowcake Production Plant

uranium concentrate production

Bandar Abbas

closed

Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)

 Isfahan

extensively damaged; 11 buildings and underground tunnel entrances impacted in U.S. and Israeli strikes

Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)

uranium conversion

ENTC

heavily damaged

Natural and Depleted Uranium Metal Production Facility

production of metal from natural and depleted uranium

ENTC; part of the UCF

damaged; had not been operational prior to strikes

Enriched Uranium Metal Processing Facility

production of enriched uranium metal

ENTC

damaged; had been under construction prior to strikes

Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL)

study of uranium compounds

ENTC

damaged

Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL)

fuel pellet production

ENTC

damaged

Enriched Uranium Powder Plant (EUPP)

conversion of UF6 gas into oxide

ENTC

unknown; was operational prior to strikes

Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)

fuel production for the Arak reactor and light water reactors

ENTC

damaged

Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)

fuel production for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)

ENTC

damaged

Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP)

zirconium sponge production

ENTC

undamaged; was operational prior to strikes

Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) (30 kWt)

reportedly for isotope production

ENTC

likely undamaged;[1] was operational prior to strikes

Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor

research

ENTC

likely undamaged;[1] was operational prior to strikes

Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)

research

ENTC

likely undamaged;[1] was operational prior to strikes

Light water research reactor (10 MWt)

testing of nuclear fuel materials and isotope production

ENTC

likely undamaged;[1] was under construction prior to strikes

Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR)

training

ENTC

unknown; had been decommissioned prior to strikes

Isfahan centrifuge workshop

centrifuge assembly

ENTC

damaged
 

Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) Karaj Complex

production of gas centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows

Karaj

heavily damaged; main manufacturing buildings destroyed

Kalaye Electric Company

gas centrifuge development and testing

Tehran

unknown; reportedly operational prior to strikes

Natanz Uranium Enrichment Complex

Near Natanz, Isfahan Province

extensively damaged; above-ground facilities and electrical infrastructure destroyed; underground facilities struck with ground-penetrating munitions by the United States

Natanz centrifuge workshop

production of gas centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows

Natanz Enrichment Site

likely damaged or destroyed

Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center (ICAC)

gas centrifuge assembly

Natanz Enrichment Site

destroyed in 2020; rebuilding likely disrupted by strikes

New Generation Centrifuge Assembly Center

centrifuge assembly

Natanz Enrichment Site

likely damaged or destroyed

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges

Natanz Enrichment Site

severely damaged; above-ground portion destroyed; installed centrifuges likely damaged or destroyed[2]

Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)

uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges

Natanz Enrichment Site

damaged; installed centrifuges likely damaged or destroyed[2]

Fordow Uranium Enrichment Site

Near Qom

damaged; struck with ground-penetrating munitions by the United States; access roads and entrances damaged

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges

Fordow Enrichment Site

damaged; installed centrifuges likely damaged or destroyed

National Center for Vacuum Technology

manufacture, testing, and calibration of vacuum equipment

Fordow Enrichment Site

unknown; was operational prior to strikes[3]

National Materials Science and Engineering Research Center

testing radioactively contaminated materials

Fordow Enrichment Site

unknown; was operational prior to strikes[3]

Arak Heavy Water Facility

Near Arak, Markazi Province

damaged; struck by Israel

Khondab Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)

heavy water production (used as a moderator in nuclear reactors)

Arak Heavy Water Facility

damaged; distillation unit and other key buildings struck

Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR-40) (20 MWt)[4]

radioisotope production (by-products include plutonium)

Arak Heavy Water Facility

heavily damaged; reactor containment dome breached and core seal struck

Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC)

Tehran

limited damage; one building struck by Israel

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) (5 MWt)

radioisotope production

TNRC

operational; undamaged

Centrifuge rotor workshop

testing and manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors

TNRC

damaged

Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL)

research, including on uranium metal, and the production of uranium metal disks

TNRC

operational; likely undamaged

Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)

radioisotope production

TNRC

operational; likely undamaged

Waste Handling Facility

storage and disposal of radioactive waste

TNRC

operational; likely undamaged

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)

Bushehr

undamaged

Bushehr-1 (Pressurized Water Reactor) (1,000 MWe)

electricity production

Bushehr NPP

operational

Bushehr-2 (V-528 VVER-1000 Pressurized Water Reactor) (974MWe)

electricity production

Bushehr NPP

under construction

Bushehr-3 (V-528 VVER-1000 Pressurized Water Reactor) (974MWe)

electricity production

Bushehr NPP

under construction
 

Karun Nuclear Power Station (Pressurized Water Reactor) (300MWe)

electricity production

Darkhovin

under construction

Iran-Hormuz Nuclear Power Station

electricity production

Sirik

under construction

Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant

uranium enrichment using lasers

Lashkar Abad

likely inactive[5]

Karaj Waste Storage Facility

radioactive waste storage

Karaj Nuclear Research Center for Medicine and Agriculture

presumed operational

Anarak Near-Surface Repository

radioactive waste disposal

Anarak

operational

 

Table 2: Iran’s undeclared facilities suspected of a connection to its nuclear weaponization effort

Facility/Site

Purpose

Location

Status

Turquzabad (“Location 1”)

allegedly storage of nuclear material and equipment; location of undeclared uranium

South of Tehran

dismantled and sanitized by Iran

Lavisan-Shian (“Location 2”)

drilling of natural uranium to produce metal flakes;  calibration of neutron detectors; location of undeclared uranium

near Lavisan-Shian

levelled and sanitized by Iran

Varamin (“Location 3”)

undeclared pilot-scale facility for uranium processing and conversion; location of undeclared uranium

near Mobarakiyeh

decommissioned; most buildings demolished by Iran

Marivan (“Location 4”)

testing of conventional explosives; explosive experiments in preparation for use of neutron detectors; location of undeclared uranium

near Abadeh

several buildings and bunkers demolished by Iran

Parchin Military Complex

near Parchin, Tehran Province

struck twice by Israel in 2025; extent of damage unclear

Taleghan 1 and 2

allegedly testing high explosives and a neutron initiator

Parchin Military Complex

Taleghan 2 destroyed by Israel in 2024; Taleghan 1 empty as of 2015

Shahid Boroujerdi underground facility

allegedly manufacturing uranium metal components for nuclear weapons

Parchin Military Complex

unknown

Golab Dareh

allegedly testing explosives

Parchin Military Complex

unknown; construction activity observed in late 2024
 

Research Center for Explosion and Impact (METFAZ) Sanjarian facility

allegedly development and testing of a shock-wave generator and other nuclear weapon subcomponents; potentially nuclear explosives modeling

Sanjarian

heavily damaged; struck twice by Israel in 2025

Shahid Meysami Research Center

allegedly development of plastic explosives used for nuclear detonation testing

near Karaj

damaged; struck twice by Israel in 2025

Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) headquarters

weaponization-related research and development

Tehran

damaged; struck twice by Israel in 2025

SPND “Lavisan 2” campus

weaponization-related research and development

Tehran

damaged; struck by Israel in 2025

Footnotes: 

[1] Inferred from the fact that the IAEA reported no risk of off-site contamination resulting from the strikes on the ENTC. A reactor being struck would likely result in off-site contamination, as IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi explicitly stated in the context of the Tehran Research Reactor and the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. See: “Update on Developments in Iran (3),” IAEA June 21, 2025, available at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran-3; “IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” IAEA, June 23, 2025, available at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-23-june-2025; “Update on Developments in Iran (7)”, IAEA, June 27, 2025, available at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran-7.

[2] Israeli strikes on the Natanz uranium enrichment site on June 13, 2025, destroyed above-ground centrifuge cascades as well as electrical infrastructure including an electrical sub-station, a main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. The consequent loss of power to underground centrifuge cascades likely caused the centrifuges to “have been severely damaged, if not destroyed altogether,” according to IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi in an interview with the BBC. Subsequent IAEA reporting indicated that the FEP was also struck directly by both Israel and the United States using ground-penetrating munitions. See: “Update on Developments in Iran (1),” IAEA, June 19, 2025, available at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran; David Gritten, “Centrifuges at Iran's Natanz site likely destroyed, nuclear watchdog says,” BBC, June 16, 2025, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn9yll5yjx5o; “IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran,” IAEA, June 20, 2025, available at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran-20-june-2025; “IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” International Atomic Energy Agency, June 23, 2025, available at https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-23-june-2025.

[3] Both the National Vacuum Technology Center and the National Materials Science and Engineering Research Center are located at Fordow’s support site, which is up the road from the underground enrichment site that was struck by the United States. There has been no confirmation that these sites were struck by the United States or Israel. For information about their location, see: David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Frank Pabian, and Jack Toole, “Conversion of Fordow: Another Unfulfilled Hope of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Institute for Science and International Security, July 10, 2019, available at https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/conversion-of-fordow-another-unfulfilled-hope-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.

[4] The original design of the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor was for a power of 40 megawatts thermal (MWt); the JCPOA requires that the reactor be redesigned with a power not exceeding 20 MWt.

[5] Satellite imagery indicated activity as late as 2013 at the Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant, prompting the IAEA to visit the facility in March 2014. The JCPOA (Annex I, Section S, Paragraph 81) requires Iran to only enrich uranium using gas centrifuge technology, thereby prohibiting laser enrichment. The IAEA has made no subsequent mention of the Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant since 2014, suggesting that the facility is inactive.