Firstfield Engineering

Also Known As: 

Firstfield Engenharia e Sistemas de Segurança, Lda.

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile


Rua Nossa Senhora do Carmo, Lote C2A, Agualva Cacém, 2735-142, Portugal


+ 315 214 322 238-39


+ 315 214 322 240


Supplier Web Site:

A Portuguese company owned and operated by Paulo Vicente; allegedly unlawfully exported U.S.-origin goods, services, and technology with both military and non-military applications to Iran without the required licenses.

Involved in a conspiracy to purchase controlled equipment from U.S. manufacturers for ultimate end use in Iran on behalf of Reza Rejali, an employee of Kiyan Saynpaniz International (KSP International), an Iranian government engineering company that purchases items for several government agencies; also involved in the conspiracy were Canadian businessman Ghobad Ghasempour and Chinese businessman Yi Xiong, who jointly controlled a number of Chinese front companies that were used in the conspiracy, including Modo International, Todi Enterprises, and IBC Trade Co.; others involved in the conspiracy included Turkish businessman Gokdan Gokdat and his company Gokdat Foreign Trade Consultancy, as well as Portuguese engineer Joao Manuel Pereira Da Fonseca.

In 2015, attempted to purchase a Nanotech 250 UPL (Ultra Precision Lathe) (ECCN 2B001), an item controlled for export to Iran for national security, nuclear non-proliferation, and anti-terrorism purposes, from a U.S. company; in May 2015, sent a letter to the company certifying that the machine would be installed at a Firstfield warehouse in Portugal, and would not be sold, transferred, or exported outside of Portugal except to the United States or another specific country, not including Iran; hired Fonseca to travel to the U.S. manufacturer in October 2015 to receive training on the machine's installation and operation; an October 27, 2015 e-mail from Rejali to Gokdat indicated that KSP had paid approximately $788,000 for the machine, including $18,750 for installation in Isfahan, Iran; the intention of the conspiracy was to transfer the machine to Isfahan after it had been installed by the manufacturer in Portugal, with Fonseca calibrating the system and providing training to the Iranian end-users; in December 2015, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) contacted the U.S. company about the purchase, which informed HSI that Firstfield had paid $411,300 for the machine, as well as for training and installation at Firstfield's warehouse; on February 10, 2016, HSI detained the machine at JFK International Airport as it was being exported to Portugal.

In May 2015, was tasked by Rejali to obtain an inertial guidance system test table from a U.S. manufacturer; placed an order with the manufacturer for a 2002PG-28-TL-SR120 two-axis positioning and rate table system including AERO 4000 motion controller, for $341,175; the system (ECCN 2B120) is controlled for export to Iran for missile technology and anti-terrorism reasons; declared that the end-user was Firstfield, while the intention of the conspiracy was to resell the system for 315,540 Euros to a Chinese front company, which would then transship the system to KSP in Iran for 550,040 Euros; in September 2015, Firstfield received a $150,000 down payment from a Chinese front company, Modo, which it transferred to the U.S. manufacturer; in October 2015, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security approved the export of the system through a Spanish distributor Alava Ingenieros to Firstfield; in January 2016, HSI contacted the U.S. manufacturer about the purchase; in March 2016, Firstfield contractor Fonseca traveled to the United States to receive training in the operation of the system;Fonseca was detained by HSI on April 3, 2016, pleaded guilty on July 17, 2017 to one count of conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods and technology to Iran and defraud the United States, and was sentenced on September 14, 2017 to 20 months prison and one year supervised release; the test table was not exported from the United States.

From July 2015 to February 2016, was involved in a conspiracy with Ghasempour, Rejali, and Xiong to export TAU 2 640 thermal imaging cameras from a U.S. company to Iran, via China; in July 2015, Vicente contacted Rejali and offered to sell one TAU 2 640 camera through a Chinese front company for 8,047 Euros; in August 2015, shipped the camera to the front company, which transshipped it to Iran; in October 2015, sent an offer to Xiong to sell 1,000 TAU 2 640 cameras for 3,694,995 Euros; in February 2016, shipped 99 cameras to a front company in China, which transshipped them to Iran; TAU 2 640 9Hz cameras (ECCN 6A993) are controlled for export to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes and TAU 2 640 30Hz cameras (ECCN 6A003.b.4.b) are controlled for export to Iran for national security, regional stability, and anti-terrorism reasons.

Provides consulting, engineering, installation, and maintenance of electronic and security systems; NIF number is 507675789.

Date Entered: 

October 30, 2018

Date Last Modified: 

October 30, 2018