Ghobad Ghasempour

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile

Address: 

4355 Canada Way, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5G 1J3, Canada

Phone: 

001 604 4541299

Fax: 

001 604 4541399

E-Mail: 

An Iranian-born Canadian citizen; involved in a conspiracy to illegally export U.S.-origin goods, services, and technology with both military and non-military applications to Iran without the required licenses.

An Iranian-born Canadian citizen; involved in a conspiracy to illegally export U.S.-origin goods, services, and technology with both military and non-military applications to Iran without the required licenses.

Arrested on March 28, 2017 in Blaine, Washington while entering the United States; pleaded guilty on May 4, 2018 to one count of conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods and technology to Iran and to defraud the United States, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR); on August 20, 2018, sentenced to 42 months in prison.

Involved in a conspiracy to purchase controlled equipment from U.S. manufacturers for ultimate end use in Iran on behalf of Reza Rejali, an employee of Kiyan Saynpaniz International (KSP International), an Iranian government engineering company that purchases items for several government agencies; also involved in the conspiracy was Chinese businessman Yi Xiong, with whom Ghasempour jointly controlled several Chinese front companies, including Modo International, Todi Enterprises, and IBC Trade Co., which were used to transfer money and re-export goods to Iran; others involved in the conspiracy included Turkish businessman Gokdan Gokdat and his company, Gokdat Foreign Trade Consultancy, Portuguese national Paolo Vicente and his company, Firstfield Engineering, and Portuguese engineer Joao Manuel Pereira Da Fonseca.

From September 2013 to April 2015, conspired with Xiong and Rejali to attempt to export a $93,000 thin film measurement system (ECCN 3A999.f) from a U.S. company to Iran using money deposited by  Rejali in Modo's bank account; the system is controlled for export to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes; in June 2014, the system was intercepted and detained in the Netherlands and U.S. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was notified.

In December 2014, Modo wired a payment of 24,672 Euros to Gokdat Foreign Trade to be used for the purchase of a second, less advanced thin film measurement system, which was delivered to Iran in April 2015.

From June 2014 to July 2015, conspired with Xiong, Rejali, Fonseca, and Vicente, using his company Firstfield Engineering, to attempt to purchase a 2002PG-28-TL-SR120 two axis positioning and rate table system (ECCN 2B120) from a U.S. company for shipment to Iran; the system is controlled for export to Iran for missile technology purposes; Vicente declared its end user was Firstfield Engineering in Portugal;] the system was to be purchased by Firstfield, which planned to resell it to one of the Chinese front companies for 315,540 Euros, which would then resell it to KSP and ship it to Iran for 550,040 Euros; as part of the conspiracy, Fonseca would travel to the U.S. manufacturer to receive training in the operation and calibration of the system; Fonseca would then travel to Iran to install and calibrate the system; in October 2015, the U.S. company was granted a license to export the machine through its Spanish distributor Alava Ingenieros to Firstfield Engineering in Portugal; in late March 2016, Fonseca traveled to the United States and received one week of training on operating the equipment; Fonseca was detained by HSI when he attempted to return to Portugal; the test table was not exported.

From January 2015 to March 2016, conspired with Rejali, Xiong, and Vicente for the export of 110 TAU 2 640 thermal imaging cameras from a U.S. company to Iran; 10 cameras were exported to Iran in early 2015 through Todi in China; 100 cameras were exported to Iran between August 2015 and March 2016, through Firstfield Engineering in Portugal and several of the front companies in China; TAU 2 640 9Hz cameras (ECCN 6A993) are controlled for export to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes and 30Hz cameras (ECCN 6A003.b.4.b) are controlled for export to Iran for national security, regional stability, and anti-terrorism purposes.

Beginning in 2011, allegedly assisted his father's friends in Iran to illegally launder money and procure goods for Iran in circumvention of U.S. sanctions.

38 years old as of July 2018.

Date Entered: 

October 30, 2018

Date Last Modified: 

October 30, 2018