Also Known As:
Step Standard Technical Components Industry and Trading Corporation
Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.
Step Standart Teknik ParÃ§a San. Tic. AS
Stap Standart Tek Par San Tic AS
Step Standart Teknyk Parca San. Ve Tyc. A.S.
STEP Standart Teknik Parca San. ve Tic. A.S.
Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi
Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic A.S.
Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S.
Standard Technical Component Industry and Trade Company
Step Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic As
Step Istanbul/Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Tic. A.S.
- DES San. Sitesi, A13 Blok No. 4, Y. Dudullu, Istanbul 81260
- 109 Sk. (Futuhat Sk.) A-13 Blok No 2-4-6
- Argentine-Square, Alvand-Street, No. 39, Tehran (Tehran Office, Fasteners Branch)
- DES Industrial Complex, A13 Block No. 4, Yukari Dudullu, Istanbul, Turkey
- Bessan Sit A Bl N 4, Dudullu, Istanbul
- Bahariye Cad., No. 44, K6, Kadikoy, Istanbul, Turkey
- Umraniye Istanbul
90-216-3646944, 0098-21-8798978, 90-216-3646946, 0098-21-8795103, 90-216-3646945
90-216-3640997, 90-216-4153009, 0098-21-8883998, +90 2164166823
Supplier Web Site:
Involved in procurement for Iran's missile program; listed by the European Union on December 1, 2011 as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, European Union member states must freeze all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by the listed entity, and prevent funds or economic resources from being made available to it; sanctioned by the governments of Norway, Switzerland, and South Korea, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries; added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on February 1, 2011, freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.
One of several companies in Turkey and Iran involved in a procurement network "providing direct support to Iran's missile program," according to the U.S. Treasury Department; also designated for involvement in the procurement network were Milad Jafari, Mohammad Javad Jafari, Mahin Falsafi (who allegedly operates the network's bank accounts at the Export Development Bank of Iran), Mani Jafari, Turkish nationals Muammer Kuntay Duransoy and Cagri Duransoy, and the companies Macpar Makina San Ve Tic A.S., Carvana Company, Multimat, Ltd. (Multimat Import and Export), and Machine Pardazan Company; provided support for Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) subordinates and was linked to transactions with front companies for Sanam Industrial Group and Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group.
Allegedly involved in attempted exports of items with aerospace applications, including 660 pounds of D6AC welding wire to Sanam Industrial Group and 4,410 pounds of temperature-resistant, hardened stainless steel to Heavy Metals Industries (HMI) in Tehran; also involved in completed exports to Iran, allegedly including three kilograms of Palnicro brazing alloy to Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO) in Tehran, 621 kilograms of commercial bronze bars to Alborz Rotating Machines Co. and Heavy Metals Industries, and a Keithley digital multimeter to Electronic Equipment Company; in 2004, allegedly involved in the exports of fiber optic testing and measuring equipment, including an Optical Time Domain Reflectometer mainframe, to Heavy Metals Industries, and 266 aerosol generators, which can be used in fire suppression systems, to Zaeim Electronic Industries Co. in Tehran.
According to media citations of a Turkish customs inspectors' report issued on May 12, 2006, alleged to have illegally shipped guided missile parts and dual-use nuclear-related material, including aluminum, steel and iron products and electronic equipment, to Iran; reportedly alleged to have falsified documents to hide the nature of the exported material and listed its destination as Turkey; reportedly exported dual-use aluminum tubes to Iran in early 2006; reportedly served as an intermediary in the attempted transfer to Iran of three aluminum containers, suitable for nuclear use and produced by the Fond company headquartered in Milan, Italy; reportedly, the ostensible recipient of the containers was to be Shadi Oil Industries of Iran, but the transaction was reportedly interdicted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) at Gurbulak in late 2005; reportedly also ordered dual-use, heat resistant aluminum containers (one of which went to Iran through Turkey in late 2005 or early 2006) from the Hungarian factory of the American company ALCOA Inc.; reportedly, according to the customs inspectors' report, purchased gyros, which are capable of improving missile guidance systems, from France and transferred them directly to Iran in 2004; reportedly also showed "Turkey" on the end-user certificate when ordering "Bearing SP3181" ball bearings, allegedly used in rocket and missile guidance units, from France's ADR company through Italy's Frusca Company; the bearings were reportedly exported to Iran's ANA Trading Company.
Operated by Milad Jafari; reportedly owned by Mohammad Javad Jafari (Mohammed Javad Jegari) and Mahin Falsafi; other "partners" reportedly include Mani Jafari, and Turkish nationals Haluk Ozcan, Renan Zeynep Ozcan and Oya Zeynep Kurtoglu; shares contact information with the Tehran offices of Carvana Company, Machine Pardazan Co., Multimat, and Macpar Makina San Ve Tic A.S.; Step's owners reportedly also set up Multimat Trading Company.