Jaber Ibn Hayan Research Department (JIHRD)

Also Known As: 

Jabir bin al-Hayyan Laboratory
Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories
Jaber Ibn Hayan Research Laboratories
Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratories
Jaber ibn Hayyan Laboratory
Jaber Ebn Hayan Laboratories
Jaber Ibn Hayan Laboratories
Jaber Ibn Hayan Lab
Jabber Ibn Hayan
Jaber Ebn Hayan Laboratories
Jaber Ibn Hayan

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear


- P.O. Box 11365-8486, Tehran, Iran
- 84, 20th Av., Entehaye Karegar Shomali Street, Tehran, Iran
- North Amir Abad Ave., Tehran 14374, Iran




An Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) laboratory involved in nuclear fuel-cycle activities.

Intended recipient of a nitrogen production plant, the procurement of which was denied on April 30, 2002, by a member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Established in 1990 as a center for nuclear technology training; existence of the facility was declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in March 2003; placed under IAEA inspection as of June 2003; located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC); houses hot cells; functions as a backup complex for research and development for the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle, and produces 99Mo, 131I and 133Xe radioisotopes; provides a wide range of laboratory services for the Nuclear Fuel Production Division of AEOI (now NFPC); equipped with a gamma-ray spectrometry system, an Alpha-Particle spectrometry system, neutron activation analysis facilities, and a radiocarbon dating laboratory.

The location of conversion activities using undeclared nuclear material imported (allegedly from China) in 1991, including:

  • uranium metal conversion experiments carried out between 1995 and 2000 using natural uranium (the equipment used in these experiments was dismantled;)
  • uranium metal production that had been intended for use in a laser enrichment program;
  • pulse column testing and pellet production using UO2;
  • uranium conversion and purification for potential use at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF);
  • production of UF4 using UO2; processing of gram quantities of UO2 that had been irradiated at the Tehran ResearchReactor (TRR).

Has served as the storage location for:

  • cylinders containing imported UF6, some of which was used in centrifuge tests at Kalaye Electric Company;
  • a small amount of separated plutonium;
  • waste from reprocessing experiments at TNRC that had first been moved to Anarak;
  • uranium metal secretly imported in 1993, some of which was used in laser enrichment experiments at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad;
  • imports and domestic production of uranium metal used in atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) experiments, a technique used for laser enrichment of uranium.


As part of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran, added on November 5, 2018 to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13599, which targets entities controlled by the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions.

Previously added to the SDN list on August 12, 2008, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; removed from the SDN list in January 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Listed in an annex to U.N. Security Council resolution 1803 of March 3, 2008, because of links to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; removed from the U.N. list in January 2016 by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on April 23, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; removed from the E.U. list in January 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.

Mentioned Suspect Entities & Suppliers: 

Date Entered: 

January 26, 2004

Date Last Modified: 

December 10, 2018