The main Iranian organization for research and development activities in the field of nuclear technology.

Intended recipient of radiometric ore sorting machines, the procurement of which (through Arya Foreign Trade Corporation) was denied in January 2006 by a member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); intended recipient of advisory activity on the pilot plant for the recovery of uranium from phosphate deposits, the procurement of which (through Kanavaran Mining and Industrial Company) was denied on March 5, 2003, by a member state of the NSG; intended recipient of environmental test equipment and components, the procurement of which was denied on January 6, 2003, by a member state of the NSG.

Oversees the Bushehr-1 (Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant), an operational 1,000 MWe V-446 model light-water power reactor, and the Bushehr-2, an unfinished power reactor, both begun by Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU), a Siemens affiliate, in the mid-1970s; in 1995, contracted with the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation for the completion of Bushehr-1; operates the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) and the Nuclear Research Center for Technology at Isfahan (Esfahan); oversees the Saghand uranium mine; in 1995, negotiated a contract with Russia for a 30-50 megawatt light water research reactor, 2,000 tons of natural uranium, nuclear training and the since-cancelled delivery of a gas centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment.

Premises in Tehran served as the location for the first phase of Iran's undeclared centrifuge enrichment program between 1988 and 1995; AEOI subsidiary Kalaye Electric Company served as the location for the second phase of Iran's centrifuge enrichment program between 1995 and 2003; contracted with a Tehran-based company to develop the more advanced P-2 centrifuge; the work ended in June 2003 and all related P-2 centrifuge equipment was moved to Pars Trash; oversees Lashkar Ab'ad, a laser laboratory where uranium enrichment experiments using lasers were conducted.

Obtained centrifuge assistance through the foreign proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan; a 1987 offer from the network allegedly included a disassembled centrifuge, drawings and specifications for centrifuge production, drawings, specifications and calculations for a centrifuge plant, and components for 2,000 centrifuges; the offer also referenced auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment, a liquid nitrogen plant, a water treatment and purification plant, a complete set of workshop equipment for mechanical, electrical and electronic support, and uranium reconversion and casting capabilities; received, but claims not to have requested, a document on how to reduce uranium hexafluoride to metal and how to cast and machine enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms, which is related to the production of nuclear weapon components; components for 500 centrifuges delivered in the mid-1990s.

Officials have included Said Esmail Khalilipour (deputy head), Seyyed Hussein Husseini (involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak) Ali Reza Khanchi (head of the Tehran Nuclear Research Center), Amir Rahimi (head of the Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center), Mohammad Qannadi (vice president for research and development), and Jafar Mohammadi (technical advisor in charge of valve production for centrifuges).

Units include:

• Nuclear Fuel Production Division (NFPD): Research and development on the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium exploration, mining, milling, conversion, and nuclear waste management; departments include Jaber Ibn Hayan Research Dept., Exploration and Mining Dept., Benefication and Hydrometallurgical Research Center, Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (Esfahan), Waste Management Dept., and Saghand Mining Dept.
• Nuclear Power Plant Division (NPPD): Responsible for planning, construction, commissioning, decommissioning and nuclear safety of nuclear power plants in Iran; departments include: Engineering and Technical Supervision Department (E&TSD), responsible for design, review, evaluation and approval of engineering and technical documents, participation and quality control; Quality Assurance Department (QAD), responsible for ensuring the quality of power plant design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning and operation; Special Contracts Department (SCD), responsible for contracting for goods and services needed in nuclear power plant construction; Nuclear Services Department (NSD), responsible for training personnel for plant maintenance and operation during construction period, and involved in spare part procurement; and Project Managers (PM), responsible for overall supervision of manufacturing, construction, installation and commissioning activities.
• Research Division: Responsible for planning and guiding research projects; has nine affiliated research centers: Information and Data Processing Center, Nuclear Research Center, Research Center for Lasers and their Application; Nuclear Fusion Research Center, Gamma Irradiation Center, Center for Renewable Energy Development, Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (Karaj), Yazd Radiation Processing Center, and Bonab Research Center.
• Planning, Education and Parliament Affairs Division, which includes the International Affairs Department (IAD): Oversees cooperation with AEOI counterparts abroad and drafts documents on AEOI policies; maintains a delegation at the IAEA in Vienna and one in Moscow, Russia.

Sanctions

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on December 23, 2006, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in or supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze assets that are owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that assets are not made available to the entity.

Previously removed from the U.N. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); returned to the U.N. list on September 28, 2025, as part of the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.

Listed by the European Union on April 20, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Previously removed from the E.U. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA; returned to the E.U. list on September 29, 2025, as part of the reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran.

Added on June 28, 2005, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; also designated pursuant to Executive Order 13599, which targets entities controlled by the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, which restrict the use of the U.S. financial system for transactions involving Iranian entities.

Foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity may be subject to U.S. sanctions; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the entity may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.

Previously removed from the SDN list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA; returned to the SDN list on November 5, 2018, as part of the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

Added on July 12, 2007, to the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List of end users subject to heightened export license requirements (with a presumption of denial) due to involvement in proliferation activities or other activities of national security concern.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.