Also Known As:
Pars Trash
Iran's Pars Terash Company
Rah Avard Kalaey Iran Company
Pars Tarash
Pars Terash
Pars Taraash
Pars Tarash Co.
Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
Address:
Tehran, Iran
33 Fifteenth (15th) Street, Seyed-Jamal-Eddin-Assad Abadi Avenue, Tehran
Involved in Iran's centrifuge enrichment program; a subsidiary of Kalaye Electric Company; owned or controlled by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
Existence disclosed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October 2003; allegedly the location to which the AEOI moved P-2 centrifuge equipment after June 2003, including domestically manufactured sub-critical carbon composite rotors and bearings, oils, and magnets procured from foreign suppliers; storage location for undeclared P-1 centrifuge equipment; particles of low enriched uranium and high-enriched uranium were found by the IAEA on imported centrifuge components stored at the site, including high-enriched uranium contamination of up to 70% U-235, with almost no depleted uranium; further samples collected by the IAEA from centrifuge components provided by another state, reportedly Pakistan, support Iran's contention that most of the high-enriched uranium contamination found in Iran is of foreign origin.
According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Pars Trash changed its name to Rah Avard Kalaey Iran Company after being inspected by the IAEA; according to the NCRI, manufactures P-2 centrifuge components; according to the NCRI, one of the company's plants is located on Damavand Road.
Reportedly, had been headed by Morteza Behzad; according to the NCRI, members of the Board of Directors have included is Mohammad Hassan Allah Dad, Abdollah Joudat, and Hossein Akhgari; according to the NCRI, Mostafa Rouhi-pour is the Chief Inspector and Ali-Akbar Amini Parizi is the Alternate Inspector.
Sanctions
Designated by the U.N. Security Council on December 23, 2006, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in or supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze assets that are owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that assets are not made available to the entity.
Previously removed from the U.N. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); returned to the U.N. list on September 28, 2025, as part of the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.
Listed by the European Union on April 20, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.
Previously removed from the E.U. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA; returned to the E.U. list on September 29, 2025, as part of the reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran.
Added on June 8, 2007, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems; removed from the SDN list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA.
Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.
Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.
