A state-owned company subordinate to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI); declared by Iranian authorities as the primary site for centrifuge enrichment research and development between 1997 and 2002; according to the U.N. Security Council, has been the supplier for the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.

Reportedly identified by the British government in April 2015 to the U.N. Panel of Experts as part of an active Iranian nuclear procurement network; targeted in a Stuxnet computer worm attack on May 11, 2010, reportedly as a means of spreading Stuxnet to Natanz; according to the European Union, responsible for the construction of the uranium enrichment facility at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.

Operated in secret until 2003; was reportedly registered as a watch-making factory in Ab-Ali, 18 miles east of Tehran; began conducting centrifuge research and development testing in 1995; according to Iranian authorities, from 1997 to 2002, used as the primary facility for the assembly and testing of P-1 centrifuges for uranium enrichment; between 1999 and 2002, used to test centrifuges with 1.9 kg of undeclared uranium hexafluoride (UF6), reportedly imported from China; centrifuge equipment was dismantled in the spring of 2003, concealed from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and stored at Pars Trash until being presented to the IAEA at Natanz in October 2003.

IAEA inspectors first permitted limited access in March 2003 and full access in May 2003; modified by Iran to conceal its centrifuge enrichment activities, which affected the IAEA's ability to resolve issues related to Iran's enrichment program; environmental sampling by the IAEA revealed the presence of highly enriched uranium particles which were not consistent with the nuclear material declared by Iran; in 2005, the IAEA found that the presence of these particles was likely caused by contamination from imported centrifuge components.

Has been a research and development facility working on four different centrifuges, including the IR-2; according to Iranian officials, develops centrifuge components, measuring equipment, and vacuum pumps; in 2010, conducted experiments on dose rate calculations of radiation emitted from 30B carbon steel containers holding uranium hexafluoride (UF6); according to the U.S. Department of State, Pishro Systems Research Company replaced Kalaye Electric's Research and Development Department.

According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), company officials allegedly made trips to India and China in 2001 in search of equipment for the project.

Managing director is Majid Khansari; other company personnel include Somaye Ghand and Mehdi Ojaghloo; Raka is a department; subsidiaries include Pars Trash and Farayand Technique.

Entities identified as procurers for Kalaye Electric include:

• Aluminat
• Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation (ESNICO)
• Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company
• Fulmen Group
• Hirbod Co
• Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA)
• Iran Cutting Tools Manufacturing
• Javedan Mehr Toos
• Negin Parto Khavar
• Neka Novin
• Simatic Development Co
• Taghtiran Kashan Company
• Yarsanat

Entities identified as contractors for Kalaye Electric include:

• Iran Uranium Enrichment Company
• Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company (MATSA)
• Neda Industrial Group
• Tosse Silooha

Sanctions

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on December 23, 2006, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in or supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze assets that are owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that assets are not made available to the entity.

Previously removed from the U.N. list on October 18, 2023, following the expiration of targeted sanctions on Iran; returned to the U.N. list on September 28, 2025, as part of the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.

Listed by the European Union on April 20, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Added on February 16, 2007, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, which restrict the use of the U.S. financial system for transactions involving Iranian entities.

Foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity may be subject to U.S. sanctions; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the entity may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.

Added on July 12, 2007, to the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List of end users subject to heightened export license requirements (with a presumption of denial) due to involvement in proliferation activities or other activities of national security concern.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2025 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to nuclear weapons.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.