Farayand Technique

Also Known As: 

Farayand Technique Company
Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company (TCI)
Farayand Technic
Faraayand Technique

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear


Esfahan, Iran
Saadat Abad, Kaj Square, Sarv Gharbi, Sina Medical Building, first floor, unit 8, Tehran, Iran (according to NCRI)
Zobe-Ahan Highway, after highway police station, Siman Road, Ashtarjan industrial city, Sixth Avenue, building of the board of trustees of the industrial city, number 59, Isfahan, Iran (Factory) (according to NCRI)
End of North Karegar Avenue, Shomali, Tehran, Iran
P.O. Box 14155-1339, Tehran, Iran
Esfahan (Isfahan), Iran

Described by the U.S. Treasury Department as an entity that is "owned or controlled by" or acts or purports to act "for or on behalf of" the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and/or the Kalaye Electric Company, a subsidiary of AEOI"; existence disclosed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October 2003 and revealed as a subsidiary of Kalaye Electric Company in January 2004; has had a number of different roles in Iran's centrifuge enrichment program; was intended to be a centrifuge assembly site; said to be the Quality Control Centre for all centrifuge components manufactured for the centrifuge enrichment facility at Natanz; has capabilities suitable for the testing and assembly of centrifuges.

Environmental samples of a vertical balancing machine moved to Farayand from Kalaye Electric revealed more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36% U-235; according to Iran, the balancing machine was also at Natanz between February and November 2003; Iranian authorities attribute the presence of the enriched uranium particles to contamination from imported P1 centrifuge components; however, the uranium contamination at Farayand and Kalaye Electric differs from that found at Natanz, and virtually no particles of 36% U-235 were found on imported centrifuge components; samples collected by the IAEA at a location where components were stored prior to their arrival in Iran did not indicate any contamination; this suggests that the imported components are not the source of enriched uranium contamination; however, samples collected by the IAEA from centrifuge components provided by another state, reportedly Pakistan, support Iran's contention that most of the high enriched uranium contamination found in Iran is of foreign origin; the IAEA continues its investigation of the enriched uranium contamination.

In June 2004, Iran informed the IAEA of plans to resume centrifuge component manufacturing, assembly and testing, which required the removal of IAEA seals at three sites, including Farayand Technique; Iran returned the seals to the IAEA in July 2004; Iran struck a deal with Europe in November 2004 to reinstate its freeze on all enrichment related activity; in January 2006, Iran informed the IAEA of plans to resume uranium enrichment activities and requested the removal of seals applied at three sites, including at Farayand Technique; these seals covered P1 centrifuge components, maraging steel, high strength aluminum and centrifuge quality control and manufacturing equipment; on January 10 and 11, Iran removed these seals in the presence of IAEA inspectors; after which quality control of components and some rotor testing was carried out.

According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), this company changed its name (to Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company (TCI)) and its address (to Saadat Abad) after being inspected by the IAEA; according to the NCRI, this company is headed by Jafar Mohammadi; according to the NCRI, the company's factory in Isfahan is headed by engineer Hassani; according to the NCRI, the other members of the Board of Directors are Morteza Behzad (the Director General) and Seyed Amir Moaeyed Molaie.


Designated by the U.N. Security Council on December 27, 2006, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); removed from the U.N. list on October 18, 2023, following the expiration of targeted sanctions contained in resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on April 20, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Added on June 8, 2007 to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the entity may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2022 as an entity of concern for proliferation related to nuclear weapons.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.

Date Entered: 

July 21, 2004

Date Last Modified: 

December 21, 2023