Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

Also Known As: 

Fordo Fuel Enrichment Plant
Fordow Plant
Fordo Plant
Qom Plant
Qom Enrichment Facility
Qom Enrichment Plant
Fordow Enrichment Plant
Fordo Enrichment Plant
Fordow Enrichment Facility
Fordo Enrichment Facility
Qom Facility
Fordow Facility
Fordo Facility
Qom Nuclear Facility
Fordow Nuclear Facility
Fordo Nuclear Facility
Fordo Uranium Enrichment Facility
Fordow Uranium Enrichment Facility
Qom Uranium Enrichment Facility
Fordo Uranium Enrichment Plant
Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant
Qom Uranium Enrichment Plant
Fordow Nuclear Plant
Fordo Nuclear Plant
Shahid Masoud Alimohammadi (Fordow) Fuel Enrichment Plant
Shahid Masoud Alimohammadi Fuel Enrichment Plant

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear


Off the Qom to Aliabad highway, northeast of Qom, Iran

A gas centrifuge plant for the enrichment of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) developed and managed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

Part of the Amad Plan, a covert Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons, according to the Israeli government; originally designed to contain up to 2,976 gas centrifuges in 16 cascades divided between two units.

Located in an underground tunnel complex on the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military base, about 95 kilometers southwest of Tehran off the Qom-to-Aliabad highway; reportedly guarded by the IRGC; includes two centrifuge halls: "Unit 1" and "Unit 2"; reportedly has three major tunnel entrances leading to the underground enrichment halls; reportedly has blast/debris traps designed to mitigate blasts if tunnel entrances are bombed; reportedly protected by Iranian-made Bavar-373 and Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile systems.

Publicly revealed in September 2009 by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; first inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October 2009; began operating in 2011.

Intended to be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology center pursuant to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which requires Iran to maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges there, with a maximum of 348 active IR-1 centrifuges dedicated to stable isotope production and the remainder kept idle; pursuant to the JCPOA, uranium enrichment is prohibited at Fordow for 15 years; in 2019, the United States announced that it would no longer waive sanctions for foreign firms working at Fordow, which have reportedly included Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom.

Since November 2019, has been enriching uranium in Unit 2 in violation of the JCPOA; since January 2020, has been using 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges to enrich UF6; as of November 2020, housed a total of 1,057 IR-1 centrifuges; in December 2020, was reportedly ordered to produce 120 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent annually and to install IR-6 centrifuges transferred from Natanz; in January 2021, reportedly began enriching uranium to 20 percent; in February 2021, began installation of IR-6 centrifuges.

In 2019, reportedly established the National Center for Vacuum Technology; in 2018, reportedly established the National Materials Science and Engineering Research Center; in 2015, reportedly hosted a briefing on centrifuges for a delegation from the office of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the chancellors of Amirkabir University of Technology (AUT), Islamic Azad University, Shahid Beheshti University (SBU), Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, and Tehran University.

Firms involved in construction have included:

Other organizations involved in construction have reportedly included the Passive Defense Organization.

Entities involved in procurement for the plant have included:

​Individuals involved in research have included Amjad Sazgar and reportedly Morteza Behzad.

Date Entered: 

April 29, 2014

Date Last Modified: 

February 18, 2021