Also Known As:
Sherkate Technology Centrifuge Iran
Iran Centrifuge Technology Co.
Iran's Centrifuge Technology Company
-Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, Iran
-Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, Iran
-156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, Tehran, Iran
An Iranian company linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) that manufactures centrifuge parts; has played a crucial role in Iran's uranium enrichment program, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Operates the TESA Kashan Complex, a facility responsible for gas centrifuge machine assembly, installation, and startup at the Natanz Enrichment Facility, and operated the TESA Karaj Complex, a centrifuge component manufacturing facility; involved in the production of IR-1 and IR-2M centrifuges and reportedly IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, as well as the testing of IR-8 centrifuges; reportedly built a workshop at Natanz for the assembly of centrifuge components, including bellows, end caps, and rotors; reportedly tasked with replacing centrifuges destroyed in an April 2021 sabotage attack on Natanz.
According to the European Union, took over the activities of Farayand Technique, has owned or controlled Iran Cutting Tools Manufacturing (TABA), and has used the laboratories of Sharif University of Technology; has carried out work for Kalaye Electric Company (KEC); in 2015, reportedly identified by the United Kingdom as a participant in a nuclear procurement network that included KEC.
According to the European Union, contracted Iran Composites Institute (ICI) to provide IR-2M centrifuge rotors; in 2012, held a contract with Iran Aluminum Company (IRALCO) for the supply of aluminum and a contract with Aluminat for the supply of 6061-T6 aluminum; has held production contracts with Iran Uranium Enrichment Company.
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, obtained magnetic tape from Aria Nikan; was the end-user of hundreds of thousands of dollars in Chinese-origin aluminum products, including items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), whose purchase and shipment was facilitated by Bakhtar Raad Sepahan; held a contract with Tamin Kalaye Sabz Aras Company (Sabz Co.) for alloy parts worth tens of thousands of dollars and was the intended end-user of metal materials purchased by Sabz Co. from China; in 2012, was the intended recipient of vacuum pumps to be supplied by Jelvesazan Company, according to the European Union.
Has obtained additional goods or services from the following entities:
- Aras Farayande
- Iran Pooya
According to the U.S. Department of State, has worked with Taghtiran Kashan Company; has allegedly been a customer of the Iran-based company Faratel Co; in 2021, obtained a patent for a micron filing machine for spherical surfaces.
In June 2021, reportedly was the target of a drone attack on the TESA Karaj Complex; following the attack, Iran removed four monitoring cameras operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from the complex and blocked the IAEA from replacing them between September 2021 and December 2021; in 2022, manufacturing of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows reportedly relocated from the TESA Karaj Complex to a site in Isfahan, and production at the TESA Karaj Complex reportedly halted.
Reportedly began operations in 2006 or 2007.
Listed by the European Union on July 26, 2010, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.
Added on November 21, 2011, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the entity may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.
Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and South Korea, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.
Listed by the Japanese government in 2021 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to nuclear weapons.
Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.