Part of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) research division; serves as a radioactive waste storage facility.

Location declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2003; placed under IAEA inspection as of November 2003; visited by the IAEA on August 12, 2003, subsequent to open-source reports suggesting that the Ramandeh location, which is part of Karaj, was engaged in laser and centrifuge enrichment activities.

Storage location for a large vacuum vessel (approximately 5m long, 1m in diameter) imported in 2000, that was initially installed at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC); during an IAEA visit to Karaj on October 6, 2003, Iran stated that the vacuum vessel and associated hardware had never been used, and that the equipment was packed for shipment back to the manufacturer.

Also the storage location for dismantled equipment from a laser enrichment pilot plant at Lashkar Ab'ad; on October 28, 2003, the dismantled laser equipment along with uranium metal was presented to IAEA inspectors, at which time environmental samples were taken.

During a visit by the IAEA between December 8 and 16, 2003, inspectors found two undeclared mass spectrometers; Iranian officials acknowledged that the spectrometers had been used to provide isotope enrichment measurements to the atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) program; according to Australian officials one of the spectrometers was supplied by GBC Scientific, an Australian company, under the condition that it be used only for agricultural and medical research; Iran's use conflicted with these export conditions; visited by the IAEA on May 10 and 11, 2004, to verify the dismantled AVLIS and molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) equipment.

Also the storage location for dismantled equipment from the Radiochemical Laboratories at the TNRC, which had been used in bench-scale UF6 production; the dismantled equipment and 6.5 kg of UF6 were presented to the IAEA at Karaj on October 12, 2003; IAEA inspectors visited Karaj on January 14 and 15, 2004, to monitor the recovery of nuclear material hold-up from dismantled equipment used in conversion experiments; approximately 1.25kg of uranium in various forms were recovered and samples were taken for destructive analysis.

Intended recipient of four rotary vacuum pumps, components and accessories for use with vacuum pumps, the procurement of which (through Kavoshyar Iran Company) was denied on April 11, 2003, by a member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Site of a small Chinese-supplied calutron; produces a wide range of radioisotopes and radio pharmaceutical drugs used for diagnostic purposes, as well as nuclear electronic instruments and radiation monitoring devices.

Under construction but partially operating in November 2003.

Affiliated departments include:

• Cyclotron Accelerator Department, which houses 30 million electron volt Belgian cyclotron accelerator used for medical research
• Health Physics Department
• Ion Beam Application Department
• Nuclear Agriculture Department
• Nuclear Electronics Department
• Nuclear Materials Department
• Nuclear Medicine Department
• Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory

Founded in 1986.

Sanctions

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on March 24, 2007, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in or supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze assets that are owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that assets are not made available to the entity.

Previously removed from the U.N. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); returned to the U.N. list on September 28, 2025, as part of the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.

Listed by the European Union on April 21, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Previously removed from the E.U. list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA; returned to the E.U. list on September 29, 2025, as part of the reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran.

Added on August 12, 2008, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems; redesignated on November 5, 2018, pursuant to Executive Order 13599, which targets entities controlled by the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity may be subject to U.S. sanctions.

Previously removed from the SDN list on January 16, 2016, pursuant to the JCPOA; returned to the SDN list on November 5, 2018, as part of the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.