Karaj Nuclear Research Centre for Medicine and Agriculture

Also Known As: 

Karaji Agricultural and Medical Research Center
Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NRCAM)
Karaj
Karaj Nuclear Research Centre
Karaj Agricultural and Medical Research Centre
Karaji Agricultural & Medical Research Centre
Nuclear Research Centre for Agriculture and Medicine
Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine
NFRPC

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Address: 

AEOI-NRCAM, P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran

Phone: 

+98 261 411106

E-Mail: 

rd@aeoi.org.ir

Part of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) research division; serves as a radioactive waste storage facility.

Location of small Chinese-supplied calutron; roduces a wide range of radioisotopes and radio pharmaceutical drugs used for diagnostic purposes, as well as nuclear electronic instruments and radiation monitoring devices.

Intended recipient of four rotary vacuum pumps, components and accessories for use with vacuum pumps, the procurement of which (through Kavoshyar Iran Company) was denied on April 11, 2003, by a member state of the NuclearSuppliers Group (NSG); founded in 1986; located in Karaj city, 40 km northwest of Tehran; location declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2003; placed under IAEA inspection as of November 2003; under construction but partially operating in November 2003.

Visited by the IAEA on August 12, 2003, subsequent to open-source reports suggesting that the Ramandeh location, which is part of Karaj, was engaged in laser and centrifuge enrichment activities; storage location for a large vacuum vessel (approximately 5m long, 1m in diameter) imported in 2000, that was initially installed at the Tehran NuclearResearch Center (TNRC); during an IAEA visit to Karaj on October 6, 2003, Iran stated that the vacuum vessel and associated hardware had never been used, and that the equipment was packed for shipment back to the manufacturer; also the storage location for dismantled equipment from a laser enrichment pilot plant at Lashkar Ab'ad; on October 28, 2003, the dismantled laser equipment along with uranium metal was presented to IAEA inspectors, at which time environmental samples were taken; during a visit by the IAEA between December 8-16, 2003, inspectors found two undeclared mass spectrometers; Iranian officials acknowledged that the spectrometers had been used to provide isotope enrichment measurements to the atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) program; according to Australian officials one of the spectrometers was supplied by GBC Scientific, an Australian company, under the condition that it be used only for agricultural and medical research; Iran's use conflicted with these export conditions; visited by the IAEA on May 10 and 11, 2004, to verify the dismantled AVLIS and molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) equipment.

Also the storage location for dismantled equipment from the Radiochemical Laboratories at the TNRC, which had been used in bench-scale UF6 production; the dismantled equipment and 6.5 kg of UF6 were presented to the IAEA at Karaj on October 12, 2003; IAEA inspectors visited Karaj on January 14 and 15, 2004, to monitor the recovery of nuclear material hold-up from dismantled equipment used in conversion experiments; approximately 1.25kg of uranium in various forms were recovered and samples were taken for destructive analysis.

Eight affiliated departments include:

  • Cyclotron Accelerator Department, which houses 30 million electron volt Belgian cyclotron accelerator used for medical research
  • Health Physics Department
  • Ion Beam Application Department
  • Nuclear Agriculture Department
  • Nuclear Electronics Department
  • Nuclear Materials Department
  • Nuclear Medicine Department
  • Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory.

Sanctions

As part of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran, added on November 5, 2018 to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13599, which targets entities controlled by the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions.

Previously added to the SDN list on August 12, 2008, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; removed from the SDN list in January 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on March 24, 2007, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; removed from the U.N. list in January 2016 by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on April 21, 2007 as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; removed from the E.U. list in January 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2015 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to nuclear weapons.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list; identified by the British government in February 1998, as having procured goods and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs.

Mentioned Suspect Entities & Suppliers: 

Date Entered: 

January 26, 2004

Date Last Modified: 

December 10, 2018