Also Known As:
Mado Company
Owj Parvaz Mado Nafar Company LLC
شرکت اوج پرواز ما دو نفر
مادو
Weapon Program:
- Drone
Related Country:
- China
- Germany
- Hong Kong
- Russia
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Yemen
Address:
No. 1106, 11 Hemmat Corner, Hemmat Square, Hemmat Boulevard, Shokuhieh Industrial Town, Qom, Qom Province 3718116354, Iran
An Iran-based company specialized in manufacturing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components and in importing and exporting commercial goods; according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has procured UAV engines for entities linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has worked with Yousef Aboutalebi to supply UAV engines to the IRGC Navy, Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA), Qods Aviation Industries (QAI), and other entities supporting weapons development for the Iranian military; has helped Abdollah Mehrabi acquire UAV engines for the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization of the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF).
Through reverse engineering, produces the engines used in Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 UAVs developed by Shahed Aviation Industries for the IRGC Aerospace Force; according to the European Union, Shahed-136 drones have been used by the Russian military against Ukraine under the name Geran-2.
Reportedly manufactures UAV engines reverse-engineered from American, British, German, and other foreign models, including the MD-550 (Limbach 550) engine used in the Shahed-136 UAV and the MDR-200 (AR-741) engine used in the Shahed-131 UAV; MD-550 engines have also reportedly been used in Ababil-3 UAVs produced by HESA.
According to the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen, likely the manufacturer of the MD-275 engine recovered from a Jaffa (Samad-3) UAV used by Yemen's Houthi rebels to attack Tel Aviv, Israel, in July 2024; likely the manufacturer of MDR-208 engines recovered from delta-wing UAVs used to attack Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure in May and September 2019.
Supported by a China- and Hong Kong-based procurement network led by Ma Jie, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury; has used Turkey-based companies Utus Gumrukleme Gida Tekstil Ithalat Ihracat Dis Ticaret ve Sanayi Limited Sirketi, Arya Global Gida Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi, and Altis Tekstil Makina Ticaret Limited Sirketi as financial intermediaries for procurements worth more than USD $1 million, including procurements of sensitive machinery for the IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization's advanced conventional weapons platforms.
Has sold additional piston engine models, including the MD-26, MD-100, and MD-210; the China-based company Beijing Micropilot UAV Control System Ltd. sells UAV engines reportedly manufactured by Mado Company.
As of October 2021, co-owned by Abdollah Mehrabi.
As of April 2024, CEO was Mohammad Sadegh Aboutalebi, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury; as of October 2021, managing director was Yousef Aboutalebi.
National identification number (Iran) is 10590042155; registration number (Iran) is 12121.
Formally established in Iran on May 2, 2013; began operations in 2011 or earlier.
Sanctions
Listed by the European Union on December 12, 2022, as an entity responsible for actions that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine; with limited exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.
Listed by the European Union on February 25, 2023, as an entity in Russia's defense sector; designation prohibits E.U. member states and entities within their jurisdiction from supplying the entity with certain dual-use goods or technology, or facilitating its acquisition thereof, pursuant to E.U. Regulation 833/2014 of July 31, 2014, concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine.
Added on October 29, 2021, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, which restricts the use of the U.S. financial system for transactions involving Iranian entities.
Foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity may be subject to U.S. sanctions; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the entity may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.
Added on January 31, 2023, to the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List of end users subject to heightened export license requirements (with a policy of denial) due to involvement in proliferation activities or other activities of national security concern; exports, reexports, or transfers to the entity of certain foreign-produced items also require a license (with a policy of denial).
Sanctioned by the governments of Australia and the United Kingdom, restricting business and/or financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.
Listed by the Japanese government in 2025 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and conventional weapons.
