Also Known As:
Pars Aviation Service Company
Pars Aviation Service Co.
P.O. Box 1656-13455, Karaj special road - after Ekbatan overpass - beside the commercial customs, Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran, Iran
+98 21 4466 81 53, +98 21 4466 81 00, +98 21 4466 80 99, +98 21 4463 14 83
+98 21 4467 03 70
Entity Web Site:
An Iranian aircraft supply and repair company that the U.N. Security Council has identified as an entity affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); reportedly owned by Bonyad Taavon Sepah on behalf of the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF).
Services include the calibration of aerial measuring equipment, the design and construction of aerial systems, and the supply and repair of aircraft and helicopter parts; other services have included the design and construction of air testers and the provision of specialized training courses; has maintained departments specializing in commerce, engineering, finance, logistics, operations, and planning.
Has claimed to have two equipment-calibration centers, two repair hangers, three spare-part warehouses, and 20 specialized shops; has maintained an oil analyzer lab, an avionic and power plant and airframe center, and centers for battery charging, calibration, and the decoding of flight data recorders; has repaired the Antonov An-74 cargo aircraft, the Dassault Falcon 20 business jet, the Ilyushin Il-76 cargo aircraft, the Mi-171 military helicopter, and the Sukhoi Su-25 jet aircraft; has maintained the Mi-171 for the IRGC-AF; has run simulator training for the Mi-171 and An-74.
Clients have included the IRGC-AF, the IRGC Navy, the Iranian Air Force, Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI), Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (IAMI), and Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Industries (PANHA); has reportedly maintained the IRGC-AF's fleet of transport and combat aircraft; according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, received financing from the United Arab Emirates-based company Sakan General Trading (Royal Credit General Trading) to purchase military aircraft tires for the Syrian Air Force.
Subsidiaries have included Pouya Air (Yas Air); according to the U.N. Security Council, received assistance from Pouya Air to violate paragraph 5 of U.N. Security Council resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibited Iran from supplying, selling, or transferring arms or related material.
In 2015, held meetings in Tehran with Russian Helicopters, part of Rostec Corporation, to discuss the delivery and maintenance of Russian-manufactured helicopters; in September 2007, reportedly negotiated with the Russian companies Aviaexport and Tupolev to build a service center in Iran for Russian aircraft; in 2000, reportedly signed an accord with Uzbekistan to train air specialists.
Established in 2000 or 2001.
Designated by the U.N. Security Council on March 24, 2007, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze assets that are owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that assets are not made available to the entity.
Listed by the European Union on April 20, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.
Sanctioned (with all successors, sub-units, and subsidiaries) by the U.S. Department of State on April 30, 2018, under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act; sanctions apply for two years and ban the U.S. government from procuring from, contracting with, providing assistance to, or issuing export licenses involving controlled items for the entity.
Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.
Listed by the Japanese government in 2020 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and nuclear weapons; listed by the British government in 2012 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.