Joint Statement by Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Islamic Republic of Iran, People's Republic of China, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Cuba, Republic of Nicaragua, Republic of Zimbabwe, Russian Federation, and Syrian Arab Republic

On item 7.d) "NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran" GOV/2023/43 - 4 September 2023
September 13, 2023

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Related Library Documents: 

We have thoroughly studied the reports of the IAEA Director General "Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231" (GOV /2023/39) and "NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran" (GOV/2023/43). We appreciate the continued efforts of the Secretariat to conduct verification and monitoring activities in Iran.

We recognize continued exchanges between Iran and the lAEA Secretariat since the previous IAEA Board of Governors in June. One meeting took place on 9 August 2023 in Vienna and then a technical meeting was held on 28 August 2023 in Tehran. As it is reported by the Director General in his report GOV/2023/43, during the latest meeting in Tehran, "Iran informed the Agency that it has no additional information on Varamin but stated that it would continue to investigate the matter". Moreover, regarding Turquzabad, Iran stated that "it had collected additional information regarding containers that were present at this location". According to Iran, "none of the containers were transferred intact from Turquzabad; they were all dismantled at the location". Besides, Iran infonned the Agency that "it would provide this infonnation to the Agency for its review, together with other information related to the whereabouts of the dismantled containers". We welcome that Iran continues to cooperate and interact with the Agency on the matter of two outstanding safeguards issues related to the two locations.

We also welcome that, in accordance with the Joint Statement by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed on 4 March 2023, the Agency, in early May, installed surveillance cameras at workshops in Esfahan where centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows are manufactured. In this regard, we note that in his latest report contained in GOV/2023/43 the Director General confirmed that in late April and early May 2023, the Agency has been allowed to install an Enrichment Monitoring Device (EMD) at FFEP, and another EMD at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz. We positively note that on 2 September 2023, the Agency successfully serviced the cameras installed at workshops in Esfahan. This is an important voluntary monitoring measure conducted under Joint Statement of 4 March 2023, that goes beyond the obligations of Iran under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In this regard, we underline that distinction shall always be made between CSA and voluntary measures.

We note with satisfaction conclusion of the Director General made in his report GOV/2023/39 that the Agency accepted Iran's explanation for the origin of high enriched uranium (HEU) particles containing up to 83.7% U-235 and found no indication of the accumulation and collection of nuclear material enriched above 60% U-235 at FFEP. Following the annual physical inventory verification (PIV) conducted at the end of April-beginning of May 2023, and the initial results of the subsequent material balance evaluation, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material.

In connection with the report of the Director General GOV/2023/39, we note that Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile was decreased by 949 kg since the previous quarterly report. On 6 June 2023, the Agency verified that at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) Iran had reverted to using the previous mode of production of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235. The total production rate of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235 has also been significantly reduced. Moreover, during the reporting period, the Agency verified that Iran down-blended 6.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 to uranium enriched up to 20%. Since the Director General's previous quarterly report, Iran has not produced any uranium metal.

It is fundamentally important that the interaction between lran and the IAEA on resolution of the outstanding issues continues. This process should be carried out in a depoliticized manner without interference from the outside, with a view to making progress in addressing them.

We call upon the relevant parties of the Vienna talks on the JCPOA restoration to seize the opportunity presented by Iran's good-faith efforts and to return to the negotiating table in order to achieve full implementation of the agreement by all sides. Once the JCPOA is restored it would allow addressing almost all the concerns expressed with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme.