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Before I begin my remarks, I would like to extend my deepest condolences to the Kingdom of Morocco and all those whose lives have been impacted by the terrible earthquake. The IAEA has extended support to you and will deliver assistance as it has done in past such emergencies.
I would like to welcome Cabo Verde as the 177th Member State of the IAEA. It is indicative of Member States’ increasing interest in the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology that can assist them in meeting their development goals.
Returning to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). As you are aware, the Agency’s JCPOA-related verification and monitoring has been seriously affected by Iran’s decision in February 2021 to stop implementing altogether its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The situation was exacerbated by Iran’s subsequent decision to remove all the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment.
It has been more than two and a half years since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol and, therefore, since it provided updated declarations, and since the Agency was able to conduct complementary access to sites and other locations in Iran.
You also have before you my report on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. I regret that no further progress has been made in implementing the activities set out in the Joint Statement signed in Tehran on 4 March.
Iran also still needs to provide the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at Varamin and Turquzabad and inform the Agency of the current location(s) of related nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment. It also still needs to resolve the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance evaluation relating to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) and to implement modified Code 3.1.
These outstanding safeguards issues stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
I call upon Iran to work with the Agency in earnest and in a sustained way towards the fulfilment of the commitments contained in the Joint Statement.