Madam Chairperson,

Over the past months I have been working closely and intensively with both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America through active consultations in support of their bilateral negotiation to find a mutually acceptable agreement that ensures the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.  

Last week, I travelled to Cairo where I met with President of the Arab Republic of Egypt His Excellency Mr Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, as well as Egypt’s Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr Badr Abdelatty, and Iran’s Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr Abbas Araghchi. I thank Egypt for its constructive engagement in this regard.

The IAEA is playing an important, impartial part in addressing this difficult and delicate matter and will have an indispensable role in verifying any new agreement.

You have before you my quarterly report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In response to the Board’s resolution of November last year, it contains a comprehensive and updated assessment in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

As you know, the Agency found man-made uranium particles at each of three undeclared locations in Iran – at Varamin, Marivan and Turquzabad – at which we conducted complementary access in 2019 and 2020. Since then, we have been seeking explanations and clarifications from Iran for the presence of these uranium particles, including through a number of high-level meetings and consultations in which I have been personally involved.

Unfortunately, Iran has repeatedly either not answered, or not provided technically credible answers to, the Agency’s questions. It has also sought to sanitize the locations, which has impeded Agency verification activities.

The Agency’s comprehensive assessment of what took place – based on our technical evaluation of all available safeguards-relevant information – has led us to conclude that these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material.

Arising from this, the Agency also concludes that Iran did not declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at these three undeclared locations in Iran. As a consequence of this, the Agency is not in a position to determine whether the related nuclear material is still outside of safeguards.  

In addition, Iran’s unilateral decision to stop implementation of modified Code 3.1 has led to a significant reduction in the Agency’s ability to verify whether Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful and is also contrary to its legal obligations set out in Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

The rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium – as detailed in my other report before you: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) – is of serious concern and adds to the complexity of the issues I have described. Given the potential proliferation implications, the Agency cannot ignore the stockpiling of over 400 kg of highly enriched uranium.

I call upon Iran urgently to cooperate fully and effectively with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. I am convinced that the only way forward goes through a diplomatic solution, strongly backed by an IAEA verification arrangement. I will continue to support and encourage the US and Iran to spare no effort and exercise wisdom and political courage to bring this to a successful conclusion. The effect of a stabilized situation in Iran with regards to its nuclear programme will be immediate and bring the Middle East one big step closer to peace and prosperity.

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