Mr Chairperson,

You have heard my statement on the very grave situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the wider Middle East region during this morning’s special session of the Board of Governors. I will shortly return to the topic and also update you on the situation regarding Iran’s nuclear programme before the commencement of these most recent military strikes.

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Mr Chairperson, 

As I said this morning, the Agency immediately responded to the most recent events unfolding in Iran and the wider Middle East region by focussing, in accordance with our mandate, on possible radiological emergencies derived from the military operations. The IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) is in operation and the regional safety monitoring network has been put on alert and is liaising with us continuously. So far, no elevation of radiation levels above the usual background levels has been detected in countries bordering Iran and we have no indication that nuclear facilities have been hit, either in Iran, or in other States of the region. 

Efforts to contact the Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities through the IEC continue, with no response so far. Let me reiterate that we hope this indispensable channel of communication can be reestablished as soon as possible. 

As you know, I was closely involved in the efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program before these most recent military attacks began. On 16 February I held in-depth technical discussions with Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi in Geneva in preparation for negotiations the following day. I then attended the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran, at which I provided options and advice and on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme.

I believe we share a deep sense of frustration that a diplomatic path was not found at that time. 

Let me again recall past General Conference resolutions that state that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place as they could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State in which such facilities have been attacked.

Consistent with the objectives of the IAEA’s Statute, I call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation.

Over the past days several countries in the region have been attacked, all of them use nuclear applications in one way or the other, including in nuclear power plants and in nuclear research reactors. We cannot rule out the risk of a radiological consequence, even one that could require evacuations of large areas. I have been in close communication with the Member States in the region, and we are on high alert, ready to respond immediately if an attack or an accident were to impact nuclear safety.  

We must return to diplomacy and negotiations. It is the only way to achieve the long-term assurance that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons. It is crucial if we are to maintain the continued effectiveness of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. 

As requested by the Board in its resolution GOV/2025/71 adopted on 20 November last year, I have submitted to the Board a report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As stated in the report, Iran continued to facilitate Agency access to facilities in Iran unaffected by the June 2025 attacks. However, Iran provided neither reports nor access to the Agency, as required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, to the affected facilities and associated nuclear material. Moreover, Iran did not provide access to the Agency to verify the suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water related activities as required by the relevant Security Council and Board resolutions. 

We have now not had access to Iran’s previously declared inventories of LEU and HEU for more than 8 months, making their verification – according to standard safeguards practice – long overdue. 

Consequently, the Agency cannot provide assurances in relation to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities at affected facilities.

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