Designated by the Canadian government in July 2010 as an entity contributing to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to its development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery systems; designation prohibits Canadian parties from providing goods or financial services to the entity or dealing in property held by the entity; listed as an entity of concern for military procurement activities in an early warning document distributed by the German government to industry in May 2007; identified by the German government as a subunit of MODAFL (Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics) that has been involved in missile-related procurement reportedly a front company for Ya Mahdi Industries (Ya Mahdi Industrial Research Complex).

In August 2006, allegedly ordered 3,410 pounds of U.S.-manufactured precipitation hardening stainless steel from the Turkish company Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S. (Step Standard Technical Part); Milad Jafari (who operates both Step Standard Technical Part and the Turkish company Macpar Makina San. Ve Ticaret A.S.), caused Macpar to order 4,410 pounds of stainless steel known to have aerospace applications from a U.S. company in 2007, the intended recipient of which was allegedly Heavy Metal Industries; allegedly purchased 621 kilograms of U.S.-origin commercial bronze bars from Milad Jafari through his company Step, which were transported from Turkey to Iran in 2007 with transport paperwork indicating the consignee of the shipment was Alborz Rotating Machines Co., in Tehran; in 2004, allegedly purchased fiber optic testing and measuring equipment from Step, including an Optical Time Domain Reflectometer mainframe; allegedly one of several Iranian businesses and government entities that received U.S.-origin goods illegally transshipped to Iran in 2006 by the Dutch company Aviation Services International B.V.