Communication Dated 10 July 2013 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

July 10, 2013

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear
  • Missile

Mentioned Suspect Entities & Suppliers: 


7- The Agency should strictly observe its obligations under Article VII.F of the Agency's Statute and Article 5 of the Safeguards Agreement between the I.R. of Iran and the Agency, both emphasizing on the confidentiality requirements. As was emphasized in previous Iran's Explanatory Notes, the information collected during inspections of nuclear facilities should be considered as confidential information. However, once again, the report in contradiction to the Agency's statutory mandate and the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214) contains a lot of confidential technical details that should have not been published. The DG by including detailed information in his reports such as the number of installed and/or operating centrifuges, amount of nuclear material fed and/or produced, etc., has demonstrated his inability to fulfill his commitments on confidentiality measures. It comes as no surprise that almost at the same time the DG report is released, some websites such as ISIS, publish the report contained with sort of fictitious calculations as its evaluation on the detailed information of the report. This fact leaves no doubt that ISIS has real time access to the safeguards confidential information, thanks to the DG's generosity in disclosing confidential information to unauthorized circles before even the less privileged Member States have a chance to examine such reports. We strongly object to this unprofessional and wrong pattern of non-compliance with the legal framework of the IAEA. This continuous violation must be stopped.

8- Regrettably, the main portion of the DG's report is based on certain information related to missile issue, not involving nuclear material activities. The Agency is not entitled to step beyond its mandate to the bilateral Safeguards Agreement, or interfere with Iran's national security concerns on the pretext of Iran's nuclear program. Moreover, the DG has relied on some forged, fabricated and false information provided by Western intelligence services and known sources hostile to Iran, assessed as "overall credible" information, without any authenticity information, while independent observers have revealed part of the false information used by the Agency and criticized ironically its immature assessment on allegations against Iran.