Communication Dated 6 March 2013 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

March 6, 2013

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear
  • Missile

Mentioned Suspect Entities & Suppliers: 

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9- The report in its introductory part for the first time entered into a legal qualification and judgment that is absolutely not on discretion and responsibility of the Director General of the IAEA. Defining unilaterally obligations on a sovereign state is beyond mandate of the Director General. As clearly described above, the DG has deviated from its mandate. It is our right to reserve to follow claims against his acts on the damages arises.

10- In the light of the above, the claims and baseless allegations against Islamic Republic of Iran's peaceful nuclear activities as contained in the DG report (GOV/2013/6, dated 21 February 2013) are unprofessional, unfair, illegal and politicized.

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6- Unfortunately, so far the Agency has not been able to protect the confidential information resulting from the conduction of inspections at the safeguarded facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which occasionally has been leaked through the Agency and revealed to the media. The very last one is the information provided to the Agency (23/01/2013) on the installation of new centrifuges (IR2m) in Natanz facility. Such events are profoundly in violation of the above mentioned articles of the IAEA Statute and the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Needless to say that continuation of such trend leads to mistrust between Member States and the IAEA, and also creates negative atmosphere which causes irreparable damages.

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Moreover, it is apparently observed that the Agency's inspectors are being used as verifier of a sabotage operation and the degree of its impacts. In addition to the report of a sabotage case given by H.E. Dr. Abbassi, the President of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, during the 56th Session of General Conference, following the recent false news about explosion in the Fordow facility, was broadcasted by some western media, the Agency immediately embarked on an Unannounced Inspection in the Fordow facility. The day after, the Agency released the result of inspection where it declared that there was no destruction in the facility.

Based on the said experiences, one could easily notice that planning and conducting sabotage against Iran's safeguarded nuclear facilities by terrorists and/or States harboring terrorist are then being evaluated by the Agency. Consequently, through the Agency's reports, which are not being kept confidential, the terrorists and the intelligence services can modify the covert operations.

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1- The United States Government has, for a long time, been in non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In violation of Article I in this treaty, hundreds of nuclear weapons have been transferred to certain non-nuclear-weapon States, including those under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this regard, it is estimated that about 240 nuclear warheads are located in several European countries comprising Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy under the NATO nuclear umbrella system. Evidence of similar violations has been brought forward in the NPT Review Conferences.

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5- This is a matter of serious concern threatening the global security and the non-proliferation regime including the NPT. The Islamic Republic of Iran as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT and a Member State of the IAEA, cannot accept the status quo regarding the development of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is not only a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the NPT by both United States and the European countries hosting nuclear weapons, but also they pose serious threat to global security.

6- I have to reiterate that equipping non-nuclear weapon States in Europe with nuclear weapons activities and delivery systems related to the deployed nuclear weapons by the United States of America is in full contravention of non-proliferation obligations.

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13- The fact is that all declared nuclear material in Iran is accounted for and has not been diverted to military purposes, and remained in peaceful activities under the Agency's full-scope surveillance. Mixing the notions of "declared nuclear material" and "all nuclear material" in the context of the CSA and Additional Protocol, respectively, in a non-professional manner is not legally justified. It is also contrary to the expectation of the Non-Aligned Movement which in its several statements addressed to the Board of Governors that "NAM emphasizes the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states in accordance with their respective Safeguards Agreements, as opposed to any confidence building measures undertaken voluntarily and that do not constitute a legal safeguards obligation." Thus the derived conclusion on aforementioned notion is absolutely wrong and must be corrected accordingly.

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